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Tromsø, 20.Mai.2016 
 
 
Roger Kristian Jentoft 
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Executive summary 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to identify site specific challenges In relation to the 23rd 
licensing round in the new area in Barents Sea. In addition, to provide area specific analysis 
of what is required to have an adequate and effective emergency response system and identify 
gaps in relation to valid regulations and industry standards used today for safe operation 
 
The current regulations and standards mostly give functional requirements. Therefore is have 
been considered to arise where site-specific challenges may require additional technological 
or operational measures to fulfill the expectations in the defined performance requirements.  
 
Where possible, quantification of the efficiency of the emergency response, in terms of 
response time and capacity, has been used in the gap assessment that impact the establishment 
of an adequate level of emergency response, identify gaps towards regulatory requirements 
and industry standards with respect to handling defined emergency situations, and finally to 
identify mitigating measures relevant for handling of the site specific challenges in new areas 
in Barents Sea West / East. 
 
Remoteness is identified as a key challenge for both new area in Barents West and Barents 
East, but where some of the area is significantly longer from shore and infrastructure than 
other area. Remoteness creates significant challenges with respect to ensuring a robust level 
of emergency response. This is particularly related to external rescue resources such as Search 
and Rescue helicopters, which will have longer response times. Relatively long periods of 
reduced visibility due to fog may lower the possibility for the helicopter to land on the rig. It 
has been a basic assumption and recommendation, that a helicopter base will be established 
onshore, to reduce the helicopter flight distance as much as practically possible. 
Another important compensating measure is that the field dedicated resources, in particular 
the Stand by Vessel, will need to be given a more extensive role in rescue operations and 
serving as an integral part of the area emergency preparedness. 
 
For the new areas in the 23rd licensing round, operations during the summer season are less 
challenging than winter season operations. Winter season operations will require adequate 
winterization of a drilling rig and field dedicated vessels. In addition winter season operations 
may experience more operational limitations and possibly increased down time due to harsh 
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polar weather (heavy snow fall, polar lows,e.g.) and low temperatures. In the winter season, 
marine icing conditions may occur in both areas. This represents additional operational 
challenges and potentially negative impact on safety critical systems, like lifeboats and 
launching systems. Marine icing is more critical for drilling ships than for the drilling rig. 
 
This thesis will hopefully help to raise the knowledge in relating to the challenges we can 
encountering in North of Barents Sea West and East area and to help to establish one common 
understanding of this issues.  
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Sammendrag 
 
Hovedmålet med denne Masteroppgaven var å identifisere stedsspesifikke utfordringer i 
forhold til den 23. konsesjonsrunde i det nye området i Barentshavet. I tillegg til å gi området 
i BASE og BASW en konkret analyse av hva som kreves for å ha en tilstrekkelig og effektiv 
beredskap og identifisere hull i forhold til gjeldende regelverk og bransjestandarder som 
brukes i dag for sikker drift. 
 
Gjeldende regelverk og standarder er for det meste for å gi funksjonelle krav. Derfor bør en se 
på om det oppstår stedsspesifikke utfordringer som kan kreve ytterligere teknologiske eller 
driftsmessige tiltak for å oppfylle forventningene i de definerte krav til ytelse. 
Funksjonskrav er krav som uttrykker et nivå for sikkerheten som ønskes nådd, men som gir få 
beskrivelser for hva som skal til for å nå disse målene. 
 
Dette fordi kravene er utformet på et overordnet nivå og bruker uttrykk som” tilstrekkelig” og 
”faglig forsvarlig”. Det gis følgelig heller ikke anvisninger til relevante målestokker eller 
standarder som konkretiserer kravene. 
 
Manglende standarder er ikke bare et problem for næringen, men vil også være en utfordring 
for tilsynsmyndighetene. Så denne oppgaven belyser også hvordan tilnærmingen til dette er i 
Barentshavet. Samtidlig er det er det vanskelig for tilsynsmyndighetene å vurdere 
regeletterlevelse, dersom det ikke foreligger en konkret standard å måle selskapene etter. 
. 
Der det er mulig, har kvantifisering av effektiviteten av beredskapen, i form av responstid og 
kapasitet, vært brukt i en vurdering som påvirker etablering av et tilstrekkelig nivå av 
beredskap. Jeg vil se på om det er identifisere hull mot myndighetskrav og industristandarder 
med hensyn til håndtering av definerte krisesituasjoner, og til slutt ønsket jeg å identifisere 
tiltak som har betydning for håndtering av operasjonelle utfordringer i nye områder i 
Barentshavet West / East. 
 
Avstand er identifisert som en sentral utfordring for både nytt område i Barentshavet, men 
hvor noen av områdene er langt fra land og hva betyr det med hensyn på infrastruktur i dette 
område. Vil avstand skape en betydelig utfordring med hensyn til å sikre et robust nivå på 
v 
beredskapen?  Dette er spesielt knyttet til eksterne redningsressurser som søk og 
redningshelikoptre, som vil ha en mye lengre responstid  
 
For de nye områdene i den 23. konsesjonsrunden, er drift i sommersesongen mindre 
utfordrende enn vintersesongen operasjoner. Vintersesongens operasjoner vil kreve 
tilstrekkelig vinterkonservering av en borerigg og feltet må ha dedikerte fartøy. I tillegg vil 
vintersesongens operasjoner oppleve mere operasjonelle begrensninger og muligens økt 
nedetid på grunn av tøffe polar vær (store snøfall, polare lavtrykk, etc.) og lave temperaturer. I 
vintersesongen kan det oppstå marine isingsforhold i begge områdene. Dette representerer 
flere operasjonelle utfordringer og potensielt også negativ innvirkning på sikkerhetskritiske 
systemer, som livbåter og utsettingssystemer.  
 
Denne oppgaven vil forhåpentligvis bidra til å øke kunnskapen i forbindelse med de 
utfordringene vi kan møte i Barentshavet, og for å bidra til å etablere en bedre felles forståelse 
av problemer rundt dette. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Reason for theme 
 
The Norwegian government’s ambition is that Norwegian petroleum industry should be a 
world leader in health, safety and environment (HSE). The Norwegian petroleum industry is 
known for the high technology, resourceful, characterized by high levels of human expertise 
and includes a range of different activities. The petroleum industry is the largest industry by 
value creation, state revenues and export value. The main objective for the petroleum policy is 
to ensure long time profitable production for oil and gas in a long term view. To be able to 
reach this goal, is important at the activity level on the Norwegian shelf must maintained at a 
constant high level. Nevertheless, production of oil and gas is significantly lower now than in 
the peak years (Meld. St.no. 36, 2012-2013). 
 
In 2013, the petroleum activities in the Barents Sea southeast (BASE) was opened, and is big 
interest for the oil and gas company to take part of this opportunity in this area. 2014 was a 
year with great exploration and drilling activity in the Barents Sea (BASE/BASW). 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) estimated in its yearly summary report that 70 
percent of the total resources have not yet been discovered in the Barents Sea  (Carlsen, Ptil.) 
 
That is the reason for Barents Sea (BASE/BASW) is called the new oil province, but there are 
many challenges that must be taken into account before we can start massive production in 
this area. 
 
The organization Norwegian Oil and Gas (NOROG) has done a extensive cooperation with 
different companies for interest in the Barents Sea to corporate together with the project "HSE 
challenges in the northern areas" this project defined a number of challenges related to 
communications, weather forecasting, emergency response, safety, logistics and design.  
The Norwegian Ptil no expects the oil industry to take responsibility and follow up the 
identified challenges. The Barents Sea is an area which is characterized by ice, darkness, cold 
and polar lows. There are a 365/24/7 challenge when is come to changing in weather 
conditions. And this area to the farthest north also creates major challenges in terms of 
infrastructure. It is very far from land so distance is a issue and helicopter transport can be 
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difficult and satellite communications will be challenging (Hoell, E., Nilssen, V. C., Wale, E., 
Nødland, G. & Hoff, B., 2012) 
 
The medical emergency on board installations in the Barents Sea is particularly vulnerable 
because of poor infrastructure and long distances. 
(Hoell et al. 2012) states that in the Barents Sea it may be difficult to meet the established 
norm requirement in the oil industry to evacuate injured personnel to a hospital on land within 
3 hours by the use of helicopters. Particularly challenging is this in the northernmost areas of 
the Barents Sea approximately the area north of 73 degrees. 
The authorities the oil industry and all the involved unions highlights that the only possibility 
to succeed in the Barents Sea is work together through an extensive cooperation 
(Carlsen, Ptil 2015). 
 
The HSE regulations for the petroleum industry as it is designed today, is based on functions. 
Its requirements for result and the companies have a certain degree of freedom to choice 
that is the best way for achieving results. The intention for the regulations is to facilitate for 
development, and ability to find customized solutions who work. Complexity, technological 
development and rapid changes enables more prescriptive regulations may be in danger of 
becoming outdated faster than a regulatory framework that is based on functions. The 
companies will have a clearer responsibility for the solutions they choose, and authorities 
ascribe businesses to a high degree of confidence. On the other side, this may arise different 
challenges using a function based regulations. Specially, it has proved being a challenge for 
the companies to provide complementary and specific descriptions of the goals and results 
that they must fulfill (Haugland, 2012). 
 
When the oil and gas activity moves further North in the Barents Sea, will also the regime be 
transferred to a new area. 
So will it be possible to identify requirements and industry standards with respect to handling 
defined emergency situations be using a function based regulations in the Barents Sea? 
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1.2 Issues and research questions 
 
The main objective for me, is to identify the site specific challenges that impact the 
establishment of an adequate level of emergency response, identify gaps towards regulatory 
requirements and industry standards. In addition, handling to defined emergencies, and finally 
to identify mitigating measures relevant for handling of the site specific challenges. One of 
other questions to be raised in connection 23rd licensing round ,with the announcement of the 
new areas in the Barents Sea. Is the distance to land and what importance of preparedness this 
can have during exploration operations Barents Sea East / West? 
Follows the distance to land I also will investigate if any other physical conditions may have 
operational influence in the areas defined as Barents Sea West and Barents Sea East defined 
as A and B on the map in Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1. New licenses in the southeast Barents Sea 23rd licensing round 
 
 
 
 
 
Barents Sea 
East Area A 
Barents Sea 
East Area B 
Barents Sea 
West PL 720 
SW PL 720 
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To answer the above this issue I formulated four researches question: 
 
1. Today’s HSE regime will be transferred to a new area ref 23rd licensing round. What is the 
new challenges follow towards regulatory requirements and industry standards, will it be too 
complicated and difficult to relate to it?  
 
2. What are the challenges with follow the use of a function based regulations in the oil sector 
 
3. In the Barents Sea area SW / SE what are the specific challenges at the drilling location, 
e.g. met ocean parameters, seasonal variations, availability of emergency preparedness 
resources, and presence of sea ice etc. 
 
4. Is the distance to shore an issue? In addition, what importance of preparedness do this can 
have during operations Barents Sea SW and SE? 
 
With this thesis, I aimed to increase knowledge related to health, safety and working 
environment (HSE) challenges, which could be encountered in the far north of the Norwegian 
continental shelf (NCS), and to establish a common understanding of these issues for 
operating in the new area in Barents Sea SW and SE 
 
1.2 Structure 
This Thesis will consist of the following parts: 
 
Chapter 1: Abstract and Introduction - This is the background for the thesis, issue and 
research questions are presented.  
 
Chapter 2: Theory- The theory found in connection with the thesis through a literature study.  
 
Chapter 3: Method - Here an account of the research methods used to answer issue, in 
addition, an assessment of methods' validity , reliability and  Data analysis presents the results 
that are found, through collection and analysis of data collected and what was said during my 
Interviews. 
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Chapter 4:  Situation / finding in Barents Sea  
 HSE Requirements and review of relevant standards 
 Risk Identification for the Barents Sea 
 Climatic conditions  
 Communication  
 Helicopter logistics  
 Emergency preparedness  
 Logistics and ice management  
Chapter 5: Data analyze-empirical data by theme based on my four research questions 
 
Chapter 6: Discussion - Here the results and findings are discussed against the theory of  
Chapter 2 and against research questions. What does the theory says? Supports the theory my 
findings, is there is a deviation, or have I discovered anything that is not evidenced in theory? 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion – Here I finish with a conclusion of the thesis against the research 
questions, and it will come with recommendations based on this. 
 
Chapter 8: Further research - Here it is recommended what could be looked further in to. 
 
The focus here is on Barents Sea SE / SW specific issues, that separates it from the rest of the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. I have the following parameters and boundaries.  
HSE is defined in this work, as health, safety and the working environment (this means that 
matters related to oil spill response and so forth will not be so deeply considered).  
Efforts were to confine issues to HSE regime and related challenges, but they may be 
extended in certain cases to operational matters. 
 
1.3 Introduction 
 
The Arctic region is one of the remaining unexplored areas where large discoveries of 
petroleum still can be done. This is an area where Norwegian technology can play an 
important role in exploration, development and operation of oil and gas fields. The high level 
of Norwegian competence put Norway in a very favorable position in this area. 
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The findings and estimates in the Arctic are of great importance. Procedures, logistics, etc and 
arctic conditions are some of the many challenges for the oil and gas industry moving to the 
Barents Sea SE / SW. There are great differences between the areas in the Arctic, therefore 
this thesis focuses on areas that are currently open for petroleum activities in the Norwegian 
Barents Sea, e.g. as the Hopen area in. We know at the operations in Arctic waters are very 
challenging due to arctic conditions, i.e. low temperatures, ice, icing, long distances, darkness, 
etc. 
(Barents 2020 phase 4 report)  
 
But is the Barents Sea uniform with respect to hazards and risks related to oil and gas 
operations? The western part is in many ways comparable to the North Sea with respect to 
environmental conditions, while additional arctic challenges increase further east. 
(Barents 2020 phase 3 report) 
  
2.0 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I start by presenting some relevant theories about regulation. I will describe 
theory related to the Norwegian HSE regime and theory related to the function based 
regulation and the use of legal standards. Finally, I present a typology of risk regulation. This 
will be my theoretical framework. Information is also obtained through the information from 
the NOROG members what will be analyzed on the basis of the theoretical basis as presented 
below (Blaikie, 2010). 
2.2 What is regulation 
 
All sectors are under supervision of regulatory provisions and related regimes for the 
government and the monitoring of these regulations. Regulation is multidisciplinary concepts 
that go across different disciplines. However, there are also different approaches to the 
concept (Kringen, 2012: 101). 
 
Traditionally we refer to regulation as a set of binding rules followed up and enforced by the 
authorities. This understanding is reflected in the following definition; "the sustained and 
focused control exercised by a public authority over activities valued by 
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The community "(Selznick, 1985: 363). Baldwin & Cave (1999) goes even further. They 
emphasize the importance of taking into account all types of social control or influence, 
whether they are state imposed or derived from other sources. This is because regulation 
involves a wide range of actors, both private and public; who all helps to establish one set of 
norms, exercise control, manages information, or have other functions within a regulation 
system (Baldwin & Cave, 1999:2). 
 
A definition that incorporates the elements (Baldwin & Cave 1999) refers to the proposed 
(Black, 2001) ,(Engen et al., 2012) and state as follows: "the intentional use of authority two 
affect behavior of a different party according to set standards, Involving Instruments of 
information gathering and behavior modification " ( Engen et al., 2013 : 14). 
 
The Norwegian HSE regime and HSE preparedness in Barents Sea largely reflect the 
definition given by Black (2001). In the way that the Emergency response in Barents Sea 
Southeast / Southwest and the Norwegian HSE regime will be regulated through clear 
government control and authority, with legally binding statutory requirements as a guideline. 
At the same time a number of less formal channels, of influence and, not legally binding 
norms, will regulate the activity. This will be relevant in the sense that safety regime in the 
petroleum sector consists of a clear government regulation and governance, but also involves 
several different players and regulatory mechanisms,  such as various industry standards 
derived at national and international level. Accordingly, the definitions of (Black, 2001) will 
us as a basis for this thesis. 
2.2.1 Regulatory regime 
 
A regulatory regime consists not only of rules and of enforcement mechanisms, but also 
covers everything from overall politic to concrete implementation, actors and agencies at 
various levels, as well as all formal and informal mechanisms that hold the regime together 
and affect its development. A certain stability and durability over time will also characterize a 
regime, although dynamics, change processes and interactions between elements are 
important themes in regime studies (Hood et al., 2001). The term regime is therefore useful 
when we should try to capture the totality of the elements included in a regulatory system. 
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Different disciplines can have different approaches in the study of regulatory regimes. 
Selection of problem issues and focus varies from state science interest in institutional 
structures and the relationship between politics and sciences, to interest rules in social and 
societal effects. The literature often distinguishes between positive and normative regime 
theory (Hood et al., 2001). Positive theory aims to understand the regime characteristics and 
explain relationships and changes, including by looking at the underlying motives and 
reasons. Normative theory seeks to consider a regime actual contribution to realizing the 
objectives that justify its existence. 
 
In this context, the public interest is linked to the regime's ability to protect against adverse 
events and risk management. Understanding of risk, whether it is based on historical data and 
events or an assessment of potential future events, will affect how the public interests 
safeguarded by the regime. The assessment of financial risks plays a key role in investment, 
value creation and returns for companies and for the state and the mainland economy. Risks 
relating to health and personal safety are, important for all who work on offshore, ships and 
shore facilities. Technical safety is important in all phases of drilling from ongoing operations 
to a closure. Missing technical integrity can lead to major accidents with loss of live and 
pollution of oil. 
 
What characterizes the interplay, between public authority, regulators and regulated 
businesses, and how does other groups and regulatory mechanisms help to promote or 
undermine regulatory purposes? Examples of different directions in this research are: 
responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992), smart regulation (Gunningham & 
Grabosky, 1998), risk based regulation (Black, 2005) and self- regulation (Coglianese & 
Mendelson, 2010). Baldwin and Black (2010) has integrated many of insights from this 
research in a normatively oriented approach under the title of "risk-based and responsive 
supervision strategy” (Really responsive risk based regulation). According to this theory, it is 
in brief five factors the authorities must take into account in its regulatory and supervisory 
strategy if they are to be responsive and at the same time risk based: 
 
• Behavior , attitudes and culture in each area ( audiences ) 
• The various supervisory and regulatory instruments' logic ( instruments ) 
• Regime achievement over time (purposes ) 
• Regulatory regime Institutional context 
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• Ability to respond to changes in one or more than the above factor 
 
2.3 The Norwegian HSE regime 
 
The regulations for the petroleum industry have continually changed character in line with the 
development of the field. Until1970s the businesses was characterized by regulatory 
prescriptive and detailed regulations. New technologies, industrial accidents and hazardous 
working conditions were met with new laws and regulation. In the light of a number of 
serious industrial and offshore accidents as the Blow out on Bravo platform in 1977, the 
accident of the accommodation platform Alexander Kielland in 1980 and the explosion of the 
Piper Alpha in 1988 this leading to a was paradigm shift in the oil industry ( Lindøe, 2012)  
So we went from a detailed set of rules that was little adaptable to a law rules role, which was 
more fitting the purpose and also function based. The purpose was to describe which targets 
businesses would achieve with their safety work, and it was within these frames was up to the 
involved partners to choose the methods to fulfill regulatory requirements (Lindøe, 2012)  
 
It is a policy objective for the Norwegian petroleum industry to become "the world class 
leader in HSE". To achieve this goal, there must be a good cooperation between the industry, 
organizations as well as unions and governments (Engen et al., 2013). This cooperation is 
formalized through tripartite cooperation, and referred to as a central pillar of the Norwegian 
HSE regime. 
 
The purpose of the tree partite cooperation was to give workers participation rights and 
securing that contradiction between the interests of a company, the community and the 
workers were leveled out. Tripartite cooperation became seriously institutionalized when the 
working environment law came into effect in 1977 (Ryggvik, 2012). The tripartite 
cooperation is built up through three areas: Safety Forum, Regulatory Forum and Together for 
Safety (SfS) (Engen et al., 2013). In each of these forums, there are representatives of 
employers and workers, as well as from government. Safety Forum and the regulatory Forum 
headed by Ptil, while Together for safety (SfS) is managed and financed by the industry with 
Ptil as an observer. 
 
Safety Forum is the central arena for cooperation between industry and government in 
environmental, health and safety problem in the petroleum activities on the Norwegian shelf 
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and on land activity. The Forum was established in 2001 for the initiate to, discuss and follow 
up on relevant safety, emergency preparedness and working environment issues in the 
petroleum activities in offshore and onshore facilities. On the strategic agenda for the Safety 
Forum is a big major accident and working environment risk and cooperation between the tree 
parties’ collaborations. In addition, if the tree parties from the Safety Forum want to discuss 
other issues in the industry that are important for safety and working environment it’s 
possible. This may be circumstances as capacity, expertise and business conditions. 
Arrangements are made for the mutual sharing of knowledge and information related to 
Safety Forum priority areas. As tree partite forum the Safety Forum, also act as a partner and 
consultation for government regarding new regulations, paragraph on health, safety and 
environment in the petroleum activities. 
(http://www.ptil.no/sikkerhetsforum/category131.html) 
 
Regulatory Forum is a 3 partite forum for health, safety and environmental regulation. From 
the Government participates Ptil, Environment Directorate and the Directorate of Health. 
There are also delegates represented from the largest organizations of employees and 
employers. The mandate states that the Regulatory Forum is a tripartite group established by 
the Ptil in dialogue with the parties, to facilitate issues as: 
 
• Information , discussion, consultation and any feedback about the work of developing 
and maintaining the framework documents for petroleum activities, such as regulatory 
strategy and regulatory work , adaptation to EU / EEA regulations , other international 
frameworks , norms etc . 
• Information and discussion about the practical implementation about HSE rules 
• Exchange of views on the contents and experiences with implementation of the 
individual rules 
(http://www.ptil.no/regelverksforum/category132.html) 
 
Together for Safety (SfS) has as main objective to improve safety in the petroleum industry. It 
includes security and safety of installations, onshore facilities and vessels on the Norwegian 
shelf. Most of this work takes place in working groups that prepare recommendations to the 
industry. This is a forum is a forum that have a project character rather than a Regulatory 
Forum and Safety Forum. 
(http://www.samarbeidforsikkerhet.no/modules/m02/article.aspx?CatId=63&ArtId=7) 
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Another important pillar of the Norwegian HSE regime is internal control.  Internal control 
have been a concept has since the 1970s been constantly development. In line with the rapid 
technological development authorities feared that companies would blame the authorities if 
situations where there occurred serious accidents. The solution was the introduction of 
internal control, which stated that the overriding safety responsibility is businesses unit. In 
1985, the principle of internal control was incorporated into the, and made applicable to all 
activities on the Norwegian shelf. Internal control principle has huge implications for the 
design of new legislation and for the supervision activities. The transition to this indirect form 
of governance implies that the authority's role increasingly more to supervise and control 
whether the businesses have created and documented good and appropriate safety systems 
who correspond with regulatory requirements (Ryggvik, 2012). 
2.4 A system based on thrust? 
 
A concept, which was drawn up to the Norwegian regulatory regime was described, as 
"trust». According to (Elster, 2007) confidence «to lower your guard " or to retrain from 
taking precautions against a partner. Taking precautions is another word or expression for 
distrust. 
 
But is it so that trust and distrust have to be opposites? And is it so that when the distrust 
increases the trust decreases?  According to (Grimen, 2008) this is too narrow view of the 
conceptual pair mistrust and trust. However, it is also too easy to say that confidence is 
functional and mistrust dysfunctional. In her (PhD Thesis Tharaldsen, 2011) show how trust 
and distrust in a safety management system, and within different safety cultures can occur 
through a variety of possible combinations. The principle is that trust implies positive 
expectations about others' intentions and behavior. Trust reduces complexity, but also 
demands vulnerability and a risk. Tharaldsen shows that too much confidence can go into 
naivety. While too much distrust could end up in rigid control strategies. In her thesis, she 
develops a model (Figure 2), which contains four pair of concepts: 
 
• functional trust 
• dysfunctional trust 
• functional mistrust 
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• dysfunctional distrust 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Thrust model 
 
 
In the Norwegian HSE regime the interaction between companies, unions and government 
constitute the central trust relationships, the movement along these dimensions takes place 
continuously. The aim will be to balance optimally between functional trust and distrust. The 
function based regulations are based on that trust (Ptil), has a positive but not naive 
expectations to the companies. In addition, the scope for action, which consists of several 
”legal alternatives” with regard to risk and safety management, a functional confidence that 
companies will choose the best alternative? At the same time is a built in functional distrust in 
the safety regime through an existence number of formal and informal means. The existence 
of supervision is also an expression of an institutional distrust. However, it is necessary for 
the industry as a whole to ensure confidence and external good reputation. 
2.4.1 Confidence Chains and control chains 
 
This thesis is also about examining the appropriateness of a trust based regulatory regime. It 
will briefly say an oversight role; supervision strategy and policy instruments are appropriate 
and cause the system to balance reasonable between functional trust and distrust. Within the 
literature on trust appears in the context of challenges with "trust chains” and” control chains» 
(halter, 2009). Confidence chains usually emerge in producing organizations with multiple 
departments and professions, and where the final result depends on the individual department 
and / or professional expertise to be successful completed. 
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Confidence chains are booth retrospective and present oriented. We trust that the engineer has 
done the job according to the standard, and the consultant has done the job the according to 
the competence. In a chain, we act accordingly without precautions against something that 
someone does or has done. The function based regulations presupposes extent that you trust 
the oil companies when it comes to organizational skills, procedures and analyzes. Man 
checks usually not whether companies are honest or not. Control chains should on the other 
side, reduce errors and omissions arising in the trust chain. In modern working life has terms 
like " quality " and " quality assurance " has become everyday terms, referring to the various 
measures that have been conducted when companies make changes; it be it a new kind of 
technology, or a working procedure or an organizational system. 
 
 
The function based regime creates a maneuver and allows for discretion based decisions. For 
this maneuver should work optimally it is a need what the key players trust each other. Oil 
companies must trust that employees and contractors performing work according to agreed 
quality. Ptil must trust that the oil companies have the right systems and procedures for safe 
work for both themselves and their suppliers. Other governments and unions must trust that 
the authority has established the right supervisory and control chains for companies and 
suppliers. The challenge within this room for maneuver is thus always to strike a good 
balance between trust and control and functional trust. (ibid) 
 
In this task, it will be interesting to see, whether the supervisory role and oversight strategy to 
Ptil experience appropriate in order to ensure appropriate emergency in the Barents Sea West 
and East. It will be interesting to see if my informants think the system balances sensible 
between trust and distrust, and whether the challenges that currently produced in the Barents 
Sea will disturb the balance between confidence giver and trust beneficiary, and thus require a 
clearer regulation that defines clearer regulations who defines room for more maneuver in a 
greater extent. 
 
 
2.4.2 Challenges by the combination of roles 
 
The challenges discussed at the function oriented regulations are reflected in what we may 
designate as inspectors' dilemma as shown in Figure 3. 
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The matrix combines two dimensions: 
• Horizontally displayed roles as controller of HSE (jf.Primary purpose) and service 
provider / facilitator of value creation (jf. Secondary purpose) 
• Vertically displayed standardization by  and non-legally binding requirements 
In the first route (1) is authority control combined with legally binding norms as practiced 
within a "Command & Control" regimen. In route (4) acts audit / inspector as change agents / 
facilitator whose purpose is to contribute to value creation. This occurs on the basis best 
practices and technical standards. It is in line with the principle of self-regulation. Route 2 and 
3 allows for functional requirements and use of legal standards with a broader space for 
interpretation and practice. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Effects on behavior 
 
In route (2) will the inspector role be a facilitator and adviser within the framework of laws 
and regulations. For inspectors this can be a demanding role, which is not in accordance with 
their education or profession. In route (3) will the authority will be a regulatory control but 
within the norms, rules and standards that are not legally binding. This can cause an act of 
control and sanctions without the legal basis of the legislation. Professions norms and 
professional / ethical standards that have been developed within the authority or own 
procession will also be able to «override” the supervision object. Within the scope of action as 
a mission state and function, based regime envisages the combination of roles and norms 
creates confusion about law and regulation. 
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Functional requirements specify the desired result and therefore there is a danger 
interpretation conflict of the implementation of the regulations. To fill the functional 
requirements of content and counteract the risk of interpretation conflicts authorities have 
chosen different approaches. 
For example, we can concretize various aspects of functional description, one can specifically 
desired for a reached target, and one can supplement the functional requirements with method 
claims, which says something about how the results will be achieved. Finally, one can also 
formulate functional as legal standards (Haugland, 2012). 
2.4.3 Legal standards 
 
The oil industry is a complex area in continuous development. To be able to meet these 
challenges we need a regulatory framework that allows for flexibility and customized 
solutions such legal standards allow for (Haugland, 2012). 
 
" With legal standard we aim to words or phrases in a law that specifies a benchmark that is 
outside the law, as a specific practice , prevalent attitudes in society or other conditions that 
change with time. All the while these phenomena change over time, will also content of the 
law do it "(Boe, 2005: 278). 
 
A legal standard gives instructions on a scale that is beyond the law. The law may provide 
interpretation directive and the law vendor must use to the standards that it be given directions 
to. When the legal standards using expressions as fully satisfactory, it may be difficult to 
know which standards it refers to, and how to interpret the scale. It may be necessary to look 
to the back to legislative history, etc. to understand the scale to be use. In some areas, this is a 
safeguarded in that in the interpretation and guidance to the regulations referred to relevant 
professional standards. Such as Ptil guidelines and HSE regulations. Academic justification 
will be such a legal standard that changes meaning in line with the development of new 
knowledge and changes in the value perception. This changed content in provision without 
wording changes. In this way the legal standards to be adaptable when applied by new 
recognized expertise (Haugland, 2012) 
 
 
16 
2.4.4 How judge content in one legally standard 
 
With legal standard, the aim is to achieve good quality and safety based on the best available 
knowledge. But legal standard also allows for use of discretion, and as (May 2003) points out, 
there will be considerable variation in whether businesses comply, with what is good 
professional practice, i.e. that go beyond the minimum requirements, and aims to be 
academically leading, or whether businesses choose suboptimal solutions is at an acceptable 
level, and which is the minimum requirements that business must meet. Such suboptimal 
solutions will also be in danger of not fulfilling regulatory requirements (Haugland, 2012). 
 
A key question in this context is within the legal framework the government and businesses 
and how they can operate, and where the line is for the norms and rules which are legally 
binding. We can illustrate this with the hierarchy of norms that actors should relate to as 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 Norm hirariki 
 
A regime based on internal controls, provides a large leeway with various forms of 
normalization as shown in Figure 4. There is an important distinction between legally binding 
norms that are laws, regulations and decisions, and norms that are not legally binding. None 
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legally binding norms is guides to laws and regulations, measures that are not statutory, and 
industry norms and standards of various kinds 
 
 
Figure 5 Official Controls in meeting with industry practice 
 
That law, rules limited extent specific requirements for procedures and actions, but 
emphasizes results to be achieved, is a significant challenge for them to apply rules. The legal 
aspects and implications of the standard system can be easily overlooked. A particular 
challenge in a function based regulations, the use of legal standards. A legal standard is a 
distinctive kind of judgment criteria (Boe, 2010) : " The legal standard we aim to words or 
phrases in a law that specifies a benchmark that is outside the law, as a specific practice , 
prevalent attitudes in society or other relationship that changes with time. All the while these 
phenomena change over time, will also content of the law do it" 
 
Characteristics of a legal standard are: 
• Text of the law stipulates a scale that is beyond the law 
• Standard provides interpreting directive 
• Standard replacing content with time 
 
The underlying benchmark in the legal standards build our relationship on problem 
understanding , terminology , tradeoffs and solution methods that are being developed in 
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working environments. Working environment the involvement in the process of developing 
standards will therefore have a bearing on the contents of some legal standards used in the 
regulations.  The core of a legal standard consists of a variety of conditions. In this thesis, I 
have chosen to look at a section of the frame conditions for the emergency preparedness 
competence and EER equipment requirements. Both frameworks are regulated by legal 
standards where terms like "full prudent "is frequently used. This indicates that the emergency 
and EER preparedness in is regulated by legal standards with a significant scope. I therefore 
wish to determine how large that actually exists and whether referred to usable either in or 
outside the regulations. This will then form a basis for being able to say whether the current 
requirements to emergency and ERR system is able to ensure a proper level of awareness in 
Barents Sea. 
2.4.5 Risk regulation and Interface 
 
The Norwegian HSE regime will be developed in cooperation between external political 
factors, administrative and judicial practice, culture, knowledge base, accidents and through 
all kinds of social control (Engen et al., 2013). Different players both private and government 
will all contribute to developing a set of norms and exert control. Within various regimes can 
take place in several ways. Figure 5 Illustrated two forms of risk regulation and the interface 
between them, Type I represent a top-down approach. Here is government control prominent 
and the regime will be politically driven through legislation, administrative and regulatory 
control. Laws and regulations lay down and becomes legally binding. Different actors 
influence the regime, both with their own economic interests and stakeholders in civil society. 
Type II approach represents a bottom-up approach in terms of self-regulation. This approach 
is based on the value added by economic actors and stakeholders in different production 
systems and industries. Here want players to minimize risks and ensure the quality of 
products and processes, but also think HSE within commercial action logic. Together with 
Professional knowledge and experience based knowledge attempting a gathering 
understanding for risks in a "best practices". This "best practice" systematized so through 
standards internally in the companies within the industry or as domestic and global standards. 
The Norwegian HSE regime will combine the two risk regulatory approaches to a greater or 
lesser degree. In the interface where the processes are linked together, left a large room for 
maneuver to the industry and their willingness to comply with the regulatory provisions 
(Engen et al., 2013)  
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2.5 Theory summary 
 
As a basis for thesis, I have used the general regulation theory and theory of function based 
regulation. This because it was necessary for me to describe the Norwegian HSE regime, and 
also because this will give me insight information whether the function based regulations can 
create challenges for the dimensioning of the EER response in Barents Sea. 
I have been using literatures have mainly from the study, academia and internal. Otherwise, I 
have used tips from mentor and search in different databases. Law data and Ptil sites have 
also been very useful for giving me knowledge of regulatory provisions for information about 
EER equipment e.g. Recommendations from the government have also been used as 
relevance for this thesis 
 
I also used theory examining the extent of freedom of action, which is in the requirements for 
emergency preparedness and EER system. In addition, whether the requirements will ensure a 
proper and safe emergency in Barents Sea. For this, it was necessary for me to have an 
understanding of how the theory about the Norwegian HSE regime approaches the emergency 
preparedness and EER system offshore. If one, has received a successful combination of the 
two types of risk regulation, or emphasized type II instead of type I? 
3.0 Method 
 
Here an account of the research methods used to answer issue, in addition, an assessment of 
methods' validity, reliability and Data analysis presents the results that are found, through 
collection and analysis of data collected and what was said during my interviews. 
3.1 Theme and research questions 
 
By any scientific investigation is the choice of method a central part of the research process. It 
is important to use methods that can illuminate the problem in such a good way as possible. 
To investigate whether it is possible to ensure, an emergency preparedness and EER system 
offshore in Barents Sea SW /SE. And question the regulatory of adoption of requirements and 
standards. I wanted to use a research design that gave me insight into the Norwegian HSE 
regime and standard hierarchy that currently regulates the emergency preparedness and EER 
system offshore. I wanted a method that gave insight into the challenges that manifests itself 
by using a function -based regulations in the Barents Sea, and whether Informants believe 
rules based on trust and internal control will be appropriate in these areas. I have therefore 
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based this on the purpose of the empirical research is to obtain knowledge (Jacobsen, 2005) 
and use his research design. I will in this chapter go into detail, about the parts that I think are 
particularly relevant to my study, explain what is studied and how this is done. 
 
This thesis topic was early clear for me in the process, but I have several of potential problem 
issues I can have used. To define a clear problem early in the process is according to 
(Jacobsen, 2005) problematic and it is like the rest of the research project a circular process 
that change and develop continuously. In my case, I started with that an issue, with new 
empirical data and new theories were slightly adjusted along the way. Beyond the problem, 
issue one of the most critical parts of a research design the formulation of research questions. 
The research questions indicate focus and direction for the study and are the groundwork for 
the research work, and it is therefore important to have great attention to this work. My 
question and my research questions are essentially "what", "why" and "how" questions, where 
the purpose is to describe the characteristics of a Social phenomenon. In addition, to find out 
of the challenges that follow the use of a function based regulations in Barents Sea and what 
measures might be appropriate in order to ensure proper emergency preparedness and EER 
system in the Barents Sea.  
3.2 Selection of Strategy 
 
There are different types of designs used to solve different issues, and then I need to find the 
survey approach is best suited to our problem. This option would also have implications for 
our survey validity and reliability. 
Research design can according to (Jacobsen, 2005) be classified according to two dimensions. 
Firstly if the study goes out very width ( extensively ) or depth ( intensive ) , and secondly if 
the study is descriptive ( descriptive ) or explanatory ( causal ) . Depth says something about 
how we want to approach the phenomenon we shall investigate, while the width discusses 
how many survey units we want to comment on. 
I want to uncover sufficient details, through such an approach, the discussion becomes 
fruitful.  A respondent is according to (Jacobsen, 2005) people with direct knowledge of a 
phenomenon, and they represent the selection. I want to examine this information directly, by 
also using information from the Norwegian oil and gas members regarding this. 
 
21 
I have both the "what" why "and" how "questions and can consequently use several of 
strategies. My data collection my marks of both using inductive and deductive strategies, but 
because I will not be able to form a universal generalizations or bring forth a truth, or be 
entirely value neutral or free of preconceptions, I wanted to have focus on abduktiv research 
strategy. I wanted an in depth understanding of the interviewees' opinions and interpretations 
about related to is issue. I formulated in my researches question in the Barents Sea using a 
function based regulations. I started with a theoretical basis, and interpreted the data in light 
off selected theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2.0 Several weaknesses can be 
pointed out by the method chosen, for example, the theoretical interpretation in my frame, and 
my bias affect the results of the research. I must have a reflective view of their own study, 
which aims to promote my informants understanding of this. 
3.3 Qualitative data collection 
 
The next step in the research strategy is to determine how I to collect and analyze data. 
Several factors here will be of importance, such as the topic of study, the context study is 
performed, and the type of problem and research questions and what one seeks to answer.  In 
my study, I wanted a depth of understanding about the issue I formulated in my four 
researches question in the Barents Sea and whether regulations i.e. can be transferred without 
specific adaptations. For this, I want a qualitative approach with focus on depth interview me 
key informants. 
 
To collect data I have chosen the qualitative method. This method is good to use if we have 
little knowledge in advance on the subject, and want to find out more about it this issue. The 
most common forms of qualitative data collection are to use interviews and observations 
(Jacobsen, 2005). Qualitative research is concerned with the qualities of a phenomenon. 
Different quantitative methods are one most interested in opinions, meanings and text in 
qualitative methods. Qualitatively work is often empirical, but relies on data collection from a 
relatively small number of individuals. Qualitative research often makes use of the collection 
of textual data by For example, interviewing small groups of people. These texts are then the 
basis for the analyze. By qualitative research, it is important to create a relationship of trust 
with informants; this is done by the personal contact established between researcher and the 
informant. To be closed to the informants makes it easier to obtain a detailed description of 
the individual's experiences, and then a good nuanced picture of the phenomenon. It is 
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conceivable that some will experience this personal contact with the researcher, 
such”aggressive”and that it would have been easier for them to answer a questionnaire. The 
purpose of this study is not to gain insight into sensitive information, but rather information 
about personal experiences, perceptions and opinions. To reveal such information is the most 
appropriate for me to take a qualitative research method where I conduct interviews of our 
informants. This is the reason why I use this method where we can go in depth on individual 
different standpoints. I wanted to get have a good picture of the challenges posed by use of a 
function based regulations in the Barents Sea , and the practical implications it may have for 
the emergency preparedness. Through the use of depth interview I get in depth about 
information about specific issues, and my informants will decide if the information will be 
shared or not. I have also used video material and information from Norwegian oil and gas 
(NOROG) who have collated very specific interview from their members during work group 
and seminars regarding this issue. 
3.4 Data Sources 
 
There are three main types of data; Primary, secondary and tertiary data. Primary data created 
by the researcher. This «new data is used to answer the research question. Secondary data is 
data already collected by other researchers, to be used for different research problems. 
Tertiary data is data that is analyzed either by the researcher or by someone else who uses it 
as secondary data. In my research, questions were answered by using both primary, second 
and tertiary data. 
 
For this thesis, I have use data already collected from the interview, seminars and evaluation 
by Norwegian oil and Gas members as source data. In addition, I have used primary data to 
confirm and or not confirm issues or statement from their members by follows up with new 
interviews. This because, I needed more information regarding, this issue. When using such 
data, I have some control over the circumstances that may affect the reliability. My primary 
data has given me valuable knowledge about the topic in this thesis, which has been required 
since there is little literature on emergency preparedness and ERR system in the Barents Sea.  
 
As mention I have use the data already collected from the interview, seminars and evaluation  
by Norwegian oil and Gas members to a certain extent, because this data and the respondents 
was prepared and the answer they have was in line with direction.  I used the conversation to 
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get some new useful information. When this model as a qualitative approach for the data 
collection was used, it was focused on the individual and open interview meeting with the 
respondent. This gives me also a greater chance to get information or angles they did not 
foresee in advance. According to (Jacobsen, 2005) an interview guide was made "an overview 
of the topics I used during the interview." The purpose of an interview guide was to have a list 
of things I want to get information about on the interview. The guide can be a detailed layout 
with exact question wording or a rough sketch of topics to be covered (Kvale, 2004). 
 
Norwegian Oil and Gas (NOROG) have carry out a structured interview and they had in 
advance prepare an interview guide with a rough sketch of topics they want discuss regarding 
emergency prepares and EER system I the Barents Sea. They have distinguished between the 
questions they think they need answers for and the questions that are not as high priority. 
What also was interesting is for me, was some of the follow up questions to the individual 
informants. The question that came up has some new and useful information for me to follow 
up with more questions for me to ask the informant about with a personal interview. 
 
According to (Kvale, 2004) can each interview questions, be evaluated by a dynamic and a 
thematic dimension. A good interview question should contribute dynamically to create a 
good interview interaction, and thematically to produce knowledge (ibid). 
If there are too many, "why» question. I may remind more about an oral exam rather than an 
interview. The goal is to obtain spontaneous descriptions of the interviewees and the good 
story of the individual, from start to finish (ibid). (Kvale, 2004) emphasizes that the questions 
at an interview should be descriptive.  
 
I also used secondary and tertiary data. I have undertaken a document analysis, where I have 
analyzed the present texts. In my study, this implied an analysis of public documents. Mainly 
existing regulations related to emergency scenarios, recommended industry standards, as well 
as government reports and business reports for the Barents Sea. 
 
When using secondary and tertiary data, I have in mind that the data was collected and 
analyzed by others, and could be intended for different purposes. Such data are based on the 
researcher's prejudices and assumptions, which I have no control over. This can result in a 
discrepancy between the information I should use, and what I want to use. However, there are 
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also benefits from the use of such data; such data is less spontaneous and more thoughtful and 
reflective and timesaving. (Jacobsen, 2005). 
3.4.1 Selection and Selection Criteria 
 
It will be important to try to assess the credibility of secondary data. Certainly, by examining 
what knowledge and skills the authors have. In addition, we should consult several sources 
that can balance each other (Jacobsen, 2005) 
 
As a basis for this thesis, I have use general regulation theory and theory about function based 
regulation. This was necessary to be able to describe the Norwegian HSE regime, and to give 
me insight into whether the function-based regulations can create challenges for the 
dimensioning of the emergency response and EER system in the Barents Sea. Literature that 
have been contributions, and used is mainly literature from the discussed area. In addition, 
search in databases was of great deal of help. Law data and Ptil sites have also been useful to 
give me knowledge of regulatory provisions in the field 
 
First step towards use the information from an interview was to find out what I actually want 
to examine. Therefore, I must find out who is relevant to interviewee, how and where this 
interview will take place. There are not so many companies to ask about information. 
Therefore, my plan was to interviewee’s different companies who have experience, and have 
operated in the Barents Sea. I am looking for that unique and special (Jacobsen, 2005), rather 
than the general. Generalization is not a goal of this task, but if the findings give, new 
opportunities for value transfer or further research, this will be a bonus. However, to make the 
selection of respondents I used (Jacobsen, 2005) step in a sample process, and made me a list 
of all businesses companies. 
 
It is very seldom we operate with representative samples in qualitative methods, as the 
number of people I must talk to becomes too large (Jacobsen, 2005). I have consciously 
chosen informants who can give me special interesting information, and do not focus on it to 
reflect the breadth or be representative of the population in general. Through cooperation with 
Norwegian Oil and Gas Association, I get access to contact information of all the members of 
the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association. Once I have started the effect of "the snowball effect 
", where informants our tipping us about other candidates, will be of great benefit (Jacobsen, 
2005) 
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The selection of informants is relatively predictable; these will contribute as expert 
competence. I have established contact with Norwegian Oil and Gas Association; (NOROG), 
the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association launched the “HSWE challenges in the far north” 
initiative in 2010. Employers, unions and government agencies were invited to participate in 
this work, and a programmed committee was established with representatives from:  
 
 interest and employer associations: Norwegian Oil and Gas, the Norwegian Ship 
owners Association and the Federation of Norwegian Industries  
 Unions: Industry, Energy, the Norwegian Union of Energy Workers (Safe), the 
Norwegian Organization of Managers and Executives and the Cooperating 
Organizations (DSO)  
 Regulators: the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) and the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD).  
The starting point was to use informants from this above forum. I started performing two pilot 
interviews with the union, and seven informants who had extensive experience with 
regulation, requirement, standards, and emergency preparedness and ERR system offshore. I 
ended up with 9 interviews and would agree that it is a representative sample to answer my 
question (Jacobsen, 2005). Below is an overview of informants and their background 
business. 
 
Categori Business 
Authorities Ptil, Norwegian Spacecenter 
Operators Statoil, Eni, Shell, Lundin 
Suppliers Met, Stormweather 
Vikingship, Telenor, AKER,  
Unions SAFE 
 
Tabel 1. Informants overview 
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3.4.2 The Interview 
 
According (Kvale, 2004) is the human interaction in the interview that produces the scientific 
knowledge. It is up to the interviewers, to be able to create a good contact and an atmosphere, 
that causes the interviewee feel confident enough to talk freely about their own experiences 
and feelings. It is through active listening, and by expressing interest, understanding and 
respect for the interviewee says that one makes good contact. Interview first minutes are 
crucial (ibid). 
 
I have use the information from the Norwegian Oil and Gas active participation and they who 
have contributions and everyone who was involved in the “HSWE challenges in the far 
north”. The interview by Norwegian oil and Gas was Face to face interviews. They are often 
costly (Jacobsen, 2005) and time consuming compared to telephone interview. There will be 
advantages and disadvantages with both interview forms. It may be easier to get to a good and 
confidential conversation to meet informants personally, while will get valuable information 
through body language of the informant. Because of long distances, high costs and time 
constraints it will not always be feasible to meet face to face. Therefore, this interview was 
during the different workshop. I need in some cases when necessary to clarify to get 
information that is more specific. Then I cooperate with each informant to consider what the 
best solution was, it was sometime some informants, who prefer telephone interviews rather 
than face-to-face, or vice versa. An alternative to use telephone was to use lynck or video 
conference, where we have the opportunity to see another. During the clarifications question 
it was important to adopt a listening position and confirm with nod and follow-up questions 
where appropriate. In conclusion, I ask whether the informant has anything to add before we 
round off at a gentle and grateful manner. We set aside about 15-20 minutes but some talk up 
to 1hour. I use this additional information from the interview for later analyze.  
3.4.3 Data analyze 
 
The aim of the research is primarily to detect as many options as possible, which gives me the 
opportunity to confirm or discard research questions. To analyze means, according to (Kvale, 
2004) to take something in pieces or elements. At an open interview, the informant gives 
information to the scientist, and the transcription may have the form of a narrative. The story 
is divided into individual pieces, as single paragraphs, sentences or words (ibid).  
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Methods of data reduction helped me to transform raw data into an analyzable form. Data 
reduction and analysis is that the rest of the task a circular process where I having transcribed 
the interviews had filleted, describe and categorize the empirical data. In section 4.0 the 
empirical data is obtained in four categories which are divided according to my research 
issues and I consequently used these further in the discussion. Based on an abduktiv research 
strategy was my interpretation and analysis characterized by the theoretical framework I had 
chosen, and this formed the basis for the interpretation of the data's meaning. I developed 
categories to uncover and connected them with the theoretical perspectives to answer the 
problem and related research question 
 
 (Jacobsen, 2005) says that through compiling all data collected it is desirable to be able to see 
patterns or deviation. This helps me to assist to reach a conclusion. I focus on to highlight key 
details that may be provide me with new insight into the phenomena I research on. Jacobsen 
(ibid) points out that despite that I have large amounts of data; I must choose certain parts and 
put these in perspective. Jacobsen (ibid) is calling this a hermeneutic method, which can be 
seen as a spiral where I have analyzes individual parts, insert these against the totality and 
opposite to then see if I have a new understanding for the parts. This method requires 
systematization from my side, and I have broken this data set down into more detailed 
individual data parts. 
 
(Kvale, 2004) refers to the five analytical methods for interview research, there is meaning 
structure, meaning categorization, narrative analyze, meaning interpretation and ad hoc 
meaning generation. (Jacobsen, 2005) refers to the content analysis and narrative analysis. 
Opinion Categorization of (Kvale, 2004) appears to be like what (Jacobsen, 2005) calls for 
content analysis, where one divides interviewed in categories for easier comparison of 
different texts. The results can be expressed with words, numbers, shapes and charts (ibid). 
Then I categorize individual pieces and try to interpret the data I have collected and 
systematized. The categorization I makes as general as possible and thinking that I initially 
use the criteria for selection as a basis. But Jacobsen ( ibid ) says that general categorization 
becomes not inaccuracy, and I should define what they various categories involves , then 
build them hierarchically with subcategories before I begin to associate the documentation. 
How many categories I’ was going to divide into was hard to say, it was something that I did 
when I was in the process of analysis and have data material ready. I take care to select 
categories that were relevant to more than us and those we examine (Jacobsen, 2005). 
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Otherwise, I could end up with something that is not beneficial to anyone other than my 
selves. 
 
In that phase, I look at the relationship between categories that was beneficial to create 
models to get an overview of how phenomena seem to be link together. I could also see 
relations between the different variables in a table (Jacobsen, 2005). Such tables were well 
suited to use direct quotes from the survey to demonstrate the relationship between different 
categories. Both general findings and deviations should be emphasized, for example when I 
pull out quotes that describe the general and quotes. I also hope to substantiate this model 
with direct quotes from respondents, but also to highlight general findings and discrepancies 
to ensure the validity of the analysis (ibid). 
 
The collected data was looked through several times to make sure that the correct data was 
collected and that no parts were missing. The data was then implemented into the data analyze 
in chapter 5 where the material is divided between the same themes as in the interview guide. 
Therefore, the chapter covering both primary and secondary data will be further analyzed in 
chapter 5.  
3.4.4 Validity and Reliability 
 
This thesis is based on a qualitative method. Data collection in this task is based on literature 
studies and interviews with individuals who have experience working in this area. Input data 
from the interviews provide the basis for analysis use in this process. Therefore, the procedure 
is more qualitative than quantitative. In the data collection process the reliability and validity 
of collected data was examined. The reliability demonstrates the reliability and verifiability of 
the data. Validity is simply the validity of collected data. 
 
To ensure the reliability of the data I must ensure unambiguous indicators. This means that if 
different people use the same indicators independently on the same problem, the result will be 
the same. Assessment of the validity must be discretionary and cannot be tested. The validity 
can be ensured by choosing the right type indicators.  
 
(Jacobsen, 2005) says that internal validity goes on about the results of research that is been 
done perceived is correct. In addition, describes this as inter subjectivity, which means that 
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the closest we get the truth is that more people agree in the description. This was tested to 
through respondent validation (ibid), where I compare findings and conclusions with theory, 
and then confronts the respondents with conclusions, and to confirm if respondents recognize 
this. We must nevertheless be careful in qualitative studies based on few units to come with 
strong generalizations (ibid). 
 
But respondent validating is not enough in itself, when respondents do not necessarily have 
neither the time for a critical assessment of what is happening around them (ibib ), and that 
they often is colored by the situation they find themselves in . Then I need to draw in theory, 
informants and other investigations to corroborate my findings. To ensure good quality 
theoretical sources, so I use either literature or articles that are published.  
 
It was also important to reflect that informants will be affected by the interview situation. 
Different contexts may provide different effects of the result and thus affect the reliability of 
the study (Jacobsen, 2005). If we make the interview at home or on a congress/working 
seminar with the informant, at the workplace or a "neutral» location will all affect the 
informant in different ways, and this is something we need to think through and keep in mind 
when we analyze the data. One must also be aware of the impact study that may arise during 
the interview, where the interviewer's presence helps to create special results (ibid). The 
Norwegian oil and Gas (NOROG) used a video recorder in the interview situation to ensure 
that they get all the data, and that this will not be harmed under poor recording of data under 
interview. Subjective interpretation and reflection during the analysis could lead to 
inaccuracy, in an analysis phase. 
 
(Jacobsen, 2005) talks about two forms of generalization based on a small selection, where 
theoretical generalization to use empires towards theory to find support. In addition, the 
second is the frequency of a phenomenon in a smaller range, where one draws conclusions 
that there must apply to a larger population as well. There is a real danger that sample is not 
representative of the whole population, however, is selected to answer the questions the 
research started with.  
 
(Jacobsen, 2005) shows that it is in the interpretation phase. I must look for what is not 
discovered in the data collection phase, to see if there is any relationship here, which can be 
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interesting to work further on. I use this attempt to make sense of the results and put them 
against a context and a theoretical basis. 
I also verified secondary and tertiary sources credibility that has been used in thesis. One can 
question whether a different research strategy would have produced a different result. My 
goal was is to create an understanding and describe a phenomenon, therefore was the 
informant's subjective understanding a key element in my research. The abduktive strategy 
therefore is experienced as most appropriate in this context. Based on the above, I find the 
data to be reliable 
 
I have explained why my informants are correct candidates in this context; another important 
point is that I have use of the first line expertise as primary sources, i.e. people who have 
direct knowledge of, and experience with the topic of this thesis. If I had had informants 
without the knowledge of emergency prepernes and EER system at i.e. a facility offshore and 
informants without the knowledge of the regulatory regime and standards would validity in 
the research be weakened. 
3.4.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
Its three ethical rules for research on humans. These are informed agree, confidentiality and 
consequences. Informed consent is that the informants should be informed about the study's 
overall objectives, advantages and disadvantages to participate, and that one is free to decide 
whether to withdraw from the study (Kvale, 2004)  
 
Confidentiality is to avoid publishing personal data that could lead to the identity of 
informants revealed (ibid). It varies from survey to survey if the informants are anonymous or 
not. If they are not anonymous, this is something they volunteer to go with this.  (Jacobsen, 
2005) points out that all people are entitled to a free zone, which is not necessarily to be 
examined. 
 
(Kvale, 2004) believes that anyone who conducts surveys have a responsibility to think 
through the consequences for those participating in the survey. In addition, it is important to 
reflect on consequences for any large group informants represent. In a local graphical area this 
industry is such small group in the large context , where our selection of interviewees is even 
less , that for special interest i will be possible to identify individuals in the data material, for 
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example by connecting statements against gender or age. I will thank all the active 
participation from Norwegian oil and Gas members and contributions from everyone who has 
been involved. 
4.0 Findings / Cases from Barents Sea 
 
Two different locations in Barents Sea were selected to represent the varying physical 
conditions from Barents Sea east to west. Both locations are within blocks relevant for the 
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 licensing round (see figure 1) Barents Sea SE / SW. The Physical environment in the 
Barents Sea is often characterized as, being harsher compare to other locations in Norwegian 
Continental shelf.  
In this chapter, I will present the findings /cases from the area, and I have chosen to describe 
the following Items in a structure like this  
Environmental and Operational description 
Requirements’, Risk and Barrier management, literature, process, 
 Ice and Met ocean data as, Clima, Ice, Polar lows, Amount of daylight, 
 Operational Challenges as, Helicopters Operations, EER, Communication,  etc 
4.1 Environmental Description  
 
As has been recommended by other panels of the Barents 2020 project, it is recommended 
also here that the following changes are proposed to the section in ISO 19906 describing the 
Barents Sea. 
 
The Barents Sea is a marginal sea bordering on the Arctic Ocean in the north, the Greenland 
and the Norwegian Seas in the west, the Kara Sea in the east and the coast of the Kola 
Peninsula in the south (see Figure 6). 
 
The Barents Sea has its greatest depths, up to 600 m, in the central part and a vast shelf with 
depths of less than 100 m predominating in the southeast and near the coast of the Svalbard 
Archipelago. Rather than the original description of Barents Sea zones in ISO 19906, it is 
proposed that reference should now be made to the eight regions shown in the figure, as 
described in a report by AARI. This division takes into account the general physical-
geographical features of the Barents Sea (seabed relief, atmospheric processes, system of 
currents, ice edge position, etc.). Regions I and II are referred to as the Western region, 
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Regions III, IV and V as the Northeastern region and Regions VI and VII as the South-eastern 
Region in Tables B.16-2 to B.16-4 of ISO 19906. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Boundaries and regions of the Barents Sea. 
 
(Regions are based on areas with approximately uniform ice conditions (as modified from an 
AARI report): I) Spitsbergen; II) Norwegian; III Franz Josef Land; IV Kara; V 
Novozemelsky; VI Kola; VII Pechora; VIII White Sea. 
 
The major morphometric characteristics of the Barents Sea are as follows: 
 Area: 1,424,000 km2 
 water volume: 316,000 km3 
 average depth: 222 m 
 deepest depth: 600 m 
 
An important distinguishing feature of the Barents Sea ice regime is that its surface area is 
never completely ice covered. During the period of the greatest ice cover, March to April, sea 
ice usually covers only 55 % to 60 % of the surface area, with open water occupying the 
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remainder. The ice cover can be a combination of multi-year ice up to about 3 m thick, first-
year ice generally less than 1.5 m thick and icebergs.  
 
Multi-year ice spreads in a narrow zone along the eastern shores of the Svalbard Archipelago 
and Franz Josef Land, predominantly in spring, but this is not the prevailing ice type. In 
general, for the entire Barents Sea during the period of the maximum ice cover development, 
the fraction of multi-year ice averages 10 %, while the fraction of young ice is around 15 %.  
 
The Barents Sea ice cover contains icebergs from the glaciers of Svalbard, Franz Josef Land 
and Novaya Zemlya. Icebergs drift from these glaciers under the influence of the prevailing 
winds and ocean currents. Entrained in the general ice drift, icebergs can move large distances 
during their life span.  
 
Landfast ice is established annually along most continental and island shores of the Barents 
Sea. The largest width and stability of landfast ice is noted in bays and inlets of the southern 
sea area and among the islands of Franz Josef Land and Svalbard. In the wintertime, strong 
ice pressure often occurs at sea and forms conglomerations such as hummocks, ridges and 
stamukhi. Stamukhi are generated in coastal areas in water depths up to 20 m. The maximum 
sail height for these features ranges from 3 m to 5 m and keel depths from 15 m to 20 m. The 
greatest intensity of ridging is observed in the northwestern and southeastern sea areas due to 
the onshore drift of the ice. 
 
It is important to note that the ice conditions vary significantly between the eight regions. 
Region II is generally ice-free; regions I, III, IV, VII and VIII usually have ice every winter; 
whereas regions V and VI are in between. 
4.2 HSE Operational challenges  
 
In the Barents Sea and the Barents sea SW the Hopen area , as well as in other ice-infested 
regions of the world, a wide range of ice and weather conditions and structure dependent 
factors can be seen at any particular point in time. When establishing offshore activity in the 
Barents Sea East and West area we also introduce potential HSE challenges for the area like 
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER). This has to be included in the operational scenarios. 
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Type of HSE / EER scenarios for the Barents Sea and specially the East and West area 
 Identified by Norwegian oil and gas and their partners is statement like 
 
• Traditional methods of EER may not be appropriate for most of the year. 
(Petroleumstilsynet – Sigurd Robert Jacobsen 
 
• The full range of ice conditions, including icebergs and sea ice, combined with cold weather, 
wind and other weather conditions, may be encountered for operating 
 
• The long distances from the potential emergency site to the support bases and other 
facilities. 
(Petroleumstilsynet – Sigurd Robert Jacobsen 
 
• The lack of experienced personnel and training facilities for the specific evacuation systems 
which have been proposed for the Barents Sea. 
 (Petroleumstilsynet – Sigurd Robert Jacobsen) 
 
• The effect of the polar lows, polar night, with extended periods of darkness, on personnel 
activities in Arctic conditions. 
 (Helge Tangen, Værvarslingen Nord-Norge) 
 
• Difficulties caused by communication due to magnetic conditions and high latitude, lack of 
satellite coverage, and language differences. 
(Norsk Romsenter, Pål Brekke) 
 
• Special features of navigation at high latitudes 
North of 70 degrees north radio and satellite communication and GPS navigation can be a 
challenge due to geomagnetic storms and spots without or with poor coverage 
 (Norsk Romsenter, Rune Sanbakken).  
 
Therefore, I have to take all this issue into account when to examine limitations and critical 
issues for HSE operational challenges in the Barents Sea.  
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The reason for me to choose to examine some of the above condition is that I want to find out 
if the problem raised can be managed, within risk management and emergency preparedness 
procedures and technology. Certain situations are not covered by emergency preparedness, 
procedures due to conscious decisions that are made in the process of risk and emergency 
preparedness analysis, and the selection of acceptance criteria and situations of hazard and 
accident. Other limiting factors can be identified within the areas of human, technology, 
operational or organizational perspectives. Experts are normally aware of the limitations that 
are “designed into the system”. These limitations are not necessarily well communicated to 
society, but may be exposed in the case of an accident. This may lead to a media crisis and 
public outrage if an accident should occur and emergency preparedness appears insufficient 
compared to society’s expectations. Limitations should be dealt with, openly and honestly in a 
risk management regime. 
4.3 HSE Requirements and review of relevant standards 
 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) expects that participants in the Barents sea 
conducts its operations in a safe manner, and acknowledges that this is sensitive areas, and 
they understand the risks associated with activities in these areas. Petroleum Safety Authority 
Norway (Ptil) expects that the participants in the Barents Sea are proactive, and find robust 
solutions and to cooperate among themselves and with the relevant authorities. 
 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) will, in the coming years have the Barents Sea as a 
main priority. As part of this main priority would Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) 
follow up Norwegian Oil Industry Association's (NOROG) activities for knowledge 
acquisition and knowledge of HSE challenges in the Barents Sea. This will be done by 
creating us an overview of the work done, record challenges, and research needs. Furthermore 
will Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) contribute to activities in the Barents Sea are 
comprehensive, robust and defensible.  
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) will set strict demands activity and consider 
updating of regulations if they see this to be necessary. Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
(Ptil) will also facilitate cooperation with the industry in these areas, and to facilitate the 
necessary cooperation between government institutions.  
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The currents regulations are functional and risks based, and are they considered sufficient to 
regulate safe evacuation and rescue in the Barents Sea SW / SE? Also, regarding to EER 
system? The guidelines to the regulations should be complemented with references to 
standards like ISO-19906 and standards like ISO 15544, Norsok Z-013 and Norsok S-001 
 
The international oil and gas industry applies recognized technical standards which are used 
worldwide These standards therefore represent best international practice in order to achieve 
an acceptable level of safety for the oil and gas industry, including offshore activities. As the 
major part of the Barents Sea is an international sea, international rules and requirements will 
govern the maritime transport and operation. 
 
Norwegian petroleum regulations require that personnel on a facility can be evacuated quickly 
and efficiently to a safe area at all times, and in all weather conditions. 
 
In October 2007, started a bilateral work between Russia and Norway, called Barents 2020. 
The initiative came from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim was to 
harmonize standards for operations in the Barents Sea. The first part of the project was 
completed in December 2011 and the final report came in 2012. The report listed a number of 
relevant standards, but also an overview of shortcomings / GAP. 
Eventually other nations also have expressed interest in this work, including through OGP 
participating observers. 
As a continuation of the Barents 2020, it was proposed to establishing a new ISO 
subcommittee under Technical Committee 67 (TC67). This was started in autumn 2011; the 
Sub-Committee 8 (SC8) began in November 2012. SC8 is leaded by Russia, with a 
Norwegian Vice Chairman. 
The aim of the work is Standardization of operations in connection with the exploration, 
production and refining of hydrocarbons onshore and offshore in the Arctic and other 
geographical areas with similar climate challenges.  
 
This work is done coordinated with relevant ISO / TC67 subcommittees and working groups. 
Its 6 working groups (WG1-6) who has started to work on the standards.  
 
WG1: Working Environment, 
WG2: Escape, evacuation and rescue,  
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WG3: Environmental monitoring,  
WG4: Ice management,  
WG5: Arctic materials 
WG6: Physical environment data for arctic operations 
 
WG1, WG5 and WG6 have Norwegian leader (convenor). The work is "voluntary" with 
mainly members from Russia, Norway, Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy and Canada. 
Standard Norway nominates members and has the responsible for the Secretariat. 
 
The Norwegian coordinating expert groups are EGS for WG1-3 and EGN for WG4-7. 
According to plan, these standards should be completed during late 2017.  
 
The primary objective of Work Group 4 (RN04), has been established by the Steering 
Committee for the Barents2020 Project. Who has to make an assessment of the need, for 
change in existing maritime and offshore oil and gas standards. For escape, evacuation and 
rescue (EER) operations in the Barents Sea, and to propose changes to the standards where 
necessary, including standards for related equipment 
 
RN04 concluded that ISO 19906 (Petroleum and natural gas industries – Arctic offshore 
structures), published in December 2010, is the only international standard which deals with 
Arctic EER issues and should therefore be used as a common basis for review, comments and 
subsequent recommendations. It was recognized and agreed that the relevant sections of 
ISO19906 (Chapter 18 and Appendix A18), provide appropriate normative requirements and 
informative guidance for EER operations in general Arctic conditions. 
 
None of the listed standards addresses all of the EER risks that are relevant for the Barents 
Sea. A summary of each of the standards reviewed is provided in Table 1 below, together 
with the limitations of each standard. Only ISO 19906 is written specifically to cover Arctic 
operations. The other standards are however valuable references where relevant. 
 
The Barents RN04 report is intended to be handed over to ISO for consideration when 
updating the standard or to be included as an addendum to ISO 19906. The Barents 2020 
RN04 report does not have official international status but it is hoped that national regulators 
will refer to the document as a complement to existing standards and guidelines.  
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Summary RN04 Remarks 
ISO19906:2010  Petroleum and natural gas industries – Arctic offshore structures (Chapter 18 and 
Appendix A18) 
This standard is the main reference to principles 
for design for cold climate offshore structures. It 
specifies requirements and provides guidance for 
the design, construction, transportation, 
installation, and decommissioning of offshore 
structures, related to the activities of the 
petroleum and natural gas industries, in arctic and 
cold regions environments. 
The standard does not apply to 
specialized equipment or vessels 
associated with Arctic and cold 
regions offshore operations except 
insofar as is necessary for the structure 
to sustain the actions imposed by the 
installation and operation of EER 
equipment. 
ISO15544:2010  Petroleum and natural gas industries - Offshore production 
installations - Requirements and guidelines for emergency response 
This standard describes objectives, functional 
requirements and guidelines for emergency 
response (ER) measures on installations used for 
the development of offshore hydrocarbon 
resources. It is applicable to fixed offshore 
structures or floating production, storage and off-
take systems. 
The standard does not follow latest 
best practice and does not align with 
ISO19906, which it needs to do. 
However, the two standards are 
complementary and it is therefore a 
relevant document that should be 
referred to as part of step 4 of the 
performance standard process.  
ISO 31000:2009  Risk management -- principles and guidelines 
ISO 31000 is the new series of ISO standards that 
define principles of risk management. The 
standard provides the basis for a common 
approach to risk management. The principles in 
this standard are embedded in NORSOK Z-013. 
The risk analysis approach described 
in ISO 31000 should be applied to 
establishing EER system designs in 
the Barents Sea. 
ISO 17776:2000  Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Offshore production 
installations -- Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk 
assessment 
Guidelines for hazard identification and risk 
assessment. This standard provides descriptions 
of specific tools and techniques. The standard is 
particularly useful for hazard identification and 
provides check lists. The principles in this 
standard are embedded in NORSOK Z-013. 
The risk analysis approach described 
in ISO 17776 should be applied to 
establishing EER system designs in 
the Barents Sea. 
 
NORSOK Z-013:2010  Risk and emergency preparedness analysis 
This standard presents requirements to planning, 
execution and use of risk assessments and 
emergency preparedness assessment, with an 
emphasis on providing insight into the process 
and concise definitions.  This standard covers 
analysis of risk and emergency preparedness 
The standard is generic and can be 
used for the Barents Sea; however, it 
does not identify the governing 
environmental conditions. The 
standard should be aligned with ISO 
19906 on guidance for risk assessment 
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associated with exploration, drilling, exploitation, 
production and transport of petroleum resources 
as well as all installations and vessels that take 
part in the activity. 
 
of EER system in Arctic climates. 
This standard provides a systematic 
approach to risk and emergency 
preparedness analysis. ISO 31000 and 
ISO 17776 are normative references in 
Norsok Z-013, which are agreed apply 
to Barents Sea EER system risk 
management process. 
NORSOK S-001:2008  Technical safety 
This is an industry standard for Technical Safety 
which, together with ISO 13702, defines the 
required standard for implementation of 
technologies and emergency preparedness to 
establish and maintain an adequate level of safety 
for personnel, environment and material assets. 
This standard describes requirements for 
individual safety barriers and systems, and 
represents or prescribes generic performance 
requirements standards for these barriers and 
systems. 
The requirements of the standard can 
be applicable to EER systems in the 
Barents Sea; however it should be 
evaluated by following the 
performance standards process 
proposed here. 
 
Table 2. List of Key Standards, Main Contents and RN04 Remarks 
 
Guidance for Barents Sea/ Arctic specific EER processes, requirements and solutions are 
illustrated in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3. Guidance for Barents Sea / Arctic Specific EER Processes 
 
Standard/Guideline 
 
 
 
Topic 
Existing standards and guidelines 
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EER philosophy X X X    X 
EER strategy X X X    X 
Environment X  X    X 
Hazard and risk analysis X  X  X X X 
Continuous assessment X      X 
EER system design X  X X   X 
Emergency response organization X      X 
Competency assurance X X     X 
Communications and alarms X X  X   X 
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Personal protective equipment  X   X   X 
Man overboard recovery X   X   X 
Escape design X   X   X 
Evacuation design X   X   X 
Rescue design X   X   X 
Maintenance of EER equipment  X      
Medical emergency response  X      
Arctic evacuation methods       X 
Emergency response vessels       X 
 
Additional information of guidance to operators and regulators can be found in the following 
documents 
 
 
Standard  Title  
NORSOK C-001  Living Quarters Area  
NMD Reg. No. 853  Evacuation and Rescue Means on Mobile Offshore Units 
OLF/NR No. 002  Guidelines for Safety and Emergency Training  
OLF/NR No. 064 Guidelines for Area Emergency Preparedness  
OLF/NR No. 066  Recommended guidelines for helicopter flights to petroleum 
installations  
IMO, SOLAS  International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea  
IMO, Resolution 
A.1024(26) 
Guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters  
(ratified internationally on December 2, 2009) 
IMO, MODU Code Amendments to the MODU Code (consolidated text of the draft 
revised MODU Code), 2008, (DE 52/5) 
OLF/NR No. 094 Guidelines for Survival Suits  
OLF/NR No. 096 Guidelines Man Overboard 
DNV Rules  Rules for Classification of Ships, Newbuildings, Part 5, Chapter 
7: Tugs, supply vessels and other offshore/harbor vessels  
DNV Rules  Rules for Classification of Ships, Newbuildings, Part 1, Chapter 
1  
IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1206  Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats  
IMO, SAR-79  International convention of Search and Rescue 1979  
PB 08-623-03  Safety Rules for Exploration and Development of offshore Oil 
and Gas fields  
Russian Maritime 
Register of Shipping 
rules  
Rules for classification, construction and equipment of mobile 
offshore drilling units and fixed offshore platforms, 2010 
Rules for classification, construction and equipment of floating  
offshore oil and gas production unit, 2011 
TDC (Canada) - 
Canadian PBS  
Canadian offshore petroleum installations escape, evacuation 
and rescue performance-based standards.  
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SP 1.13130.2009 The systems of fire protection. Evacuation ways and exits.  
SP 2.13130.2009 Systems of fire protection. Fire-resistance security of protecting 
units  
SP 3.13130.2009 Systems of fire protection. System of annunciation and 
management of human evacuation at fire. requirements of fire 
safety  
SP 4.13130.2009 Systems of fire protection. Restriction of fire spread at object of 
defense. Requirements for special layout and structural design 
considerations  
SP 5.13130.2009 Systems of fire protection. Automatic fire extinguishing and 
alarm systems. Design, regulations and rules  
SP 6.13130.2009 Systems of fire protection. Electrical equipment. Requirements 
of fire safety  
SP 7.13130.2009 Heating, ventilation and conditioning. Fire requirements  
SP 12.13130.2009 Determination of categories of rooms, buildings and external 
installations on explosion and fire hazard  
 
Table 4. List of Reference EER Standards 
 
Part of the objective of this thesis was to examine limitations and critical issues for 
emergency preparedness in the Barents Sea. 
4.4 Risk Identification  
 
In the Barents Sea, as well as in other ice-covered regions of the world, a wide range of ice 
and weather conditions and structure-dependent factors can be seen at any particular point in 
time. Because of this, safe EER approaches must be capable of accommodating a full 
spectrum of ice or open water situations, which are often complicated by many other 
environmental and logistical factors. The major EER risks that were identified by the RN04 
Work Group include the following: 
 
 Traditional EER methods may not be appropriate for most of the year. 
 The full range of ice conditions, including icebergs and sea ice, combined with cold 
weather, wind and other weather conditions, which may be encountered. 
 The logistics systems that may be available to support any required evacuation from the 
structure or vessel, including the presence of standby vessels. 
 The long distances from the potential emergency site to the support bases and other 
facilities. 
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 The shortage of duly equipped support vessels that may be called on for assistance, 
concerning their maneuvering and station-keeping abilities in ice. 
 The accumulation of ice on external surfaces and its effect on equipment operation. 
 The limited amount of time that is available to react to a particular emergency situation. 
 The effect of cold temperatures on human physiology and psychology, equipment, 
materials and supplies. 
 The lack of experienced personnel and training facilities for the specific evacuation 
systems, which have been proposed, for the Barents Sea. 
 The effect of the polar night, with extended periods of darkness, on personnel activities in 
Arctic conditions. 
 Difficulties caused by communication due to magnetic conditions and high latitude, lack 
of satellite coverage and language differences. 
 The possible lack of qualified medical help. 
 
The EER risks are closely related to the installation’s type, function, location in the Barents 
Sea and distance from rescue bases and resources. Hence, the EER risks are, and should be, 
an integral part of the overall risk assessment for the installation itself. 
4.4.1 Regulatory requirements 
 
The currents regulations are functional and risk based. They are considered sufficient to 
regulate safe evacuation and rescue in the Barents Sea. The guidelines to the regulations 
should be complemented with references to standards like ISO-19906. Specific requirements 
for thermal insulation of evacuation, rescue and survival equipment for use in the Barents Sea 
should be developed and referenced in the regulations. The Barents 2020 phase 4 project 
should give recommendations on how existing standards may be applied for oil and gas 
operations in the Barents Sea. This project is partly funded, through the Norwegian 
Government’s Barents 2020 program, and partly by Russian and Norwegian Industry. This 
work will take place in the continuation of the Barents 2020 project. 
 
 In order to achieve an acceptable level of safety against new or expanded HSE challenges 
due to arctic challenges, existing technical standards must be supplemented by: 
 
• Definition of societal and company safety objectives; 
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• Suitable and sufficient risk assessment from concept to execution and operations; 
• Survey and acquisition of site specific environmental data and loads; 
• Definition of additional or modified functional Requirements 
4.4.2 Literature in cold clime operations,  
 
There is not so much literature available covering specific issues related to operation in cold 
climates like the Barents Sea. Therefore, I have to use literature based on operations, 
emergency preparedness, cold climates, survival in cold climates, remote areas and 
development of the Norwegian Barents Sea. 
 
I have use risk management theory, and performing interviews with relevant personnel in 
order to gather experience and hands on information.  
 
4.5 Risk Management 
 
In this Chapter I will discuss process regarding risk and barrier management. 
4.5.1 Risk management process 
 
Technical excellence in risk assessment is not sufficient to ensure that risks are properly 
managed. There is a need to implement the full risk management cycle to follow up and 
manage identified risk, Figure 4 Risk Management cycle.  
I wish to get an understanding of the importance of risk management in the North, and what 
risk management is in this area. This objective is targeted through practical examples from the 
industry and authorities, to give a better complete picture on «how and why” we to do risk 
management 
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Figure 7 Risk Management Cycle 
 
We need to identify the need for change. Risk management of major hazards is here 
understood as controlling the risks related to major hazards through developing safe designs 
and how the risk assessment techniques is a tool in this process. We need to consider 
standards for the technical safety barriers that shall prevent and mitigate major hazards, and 
the risk assessment tools used to define requirements to barriers and to measure the risk level 
reflecting the functionality and performance of the safety barriers. The results from this is 
presented in the Barents 2020 phase 4 Final report,  
A major hazard is here understood as an incident that may cause multiple fatalities, and/or 
which has a potential to escalate and threaten the integrity of an installation if it is not 
controlled. Let us the following scenario. The work has been limited to major hazards related 
to the topside and main process systems, and loss of well control. This implies that loss of 
containment of well/process hydrocarbons and ignitions of such releases has been the focus 
for the work.  
The area of offshore safety and risk management has many interfaces to other engineering 
disciplines, and includes aspects within many engineering areas. It has therefore been 
necessary to select some areas for prioritization, since the mandate for the work has been 
review of a limited number of key recognized standards. 
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The following issues have been prioritized:  
Standards for functionality and performance of technical safety barriers in arctic 
conditions see Figure 7 
 Containment of hydrocarbons in order to prevent and mitigate uncontrolled 
releases  
 Ignition source control  
 Fire and explosion risk management  
 Prevention of loss of well integrity and blow outs 
Standards for safety risk assessment of major hazards for topside facilities on offshore 
drilling, production and storage units in the Barents Sea, all with the aim to prevent 
occurrence and escalation of incidents. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Technical safety barriers and standards for risk assessment of major hazards 
 
46 
Special attention has been paid to the challenge enclosing/ sheltering (winterization) of 
hazardous areas due to cold climate, and the effect this may have with respect to ventilation, 
ignition probability and explosion pressures. In these areas, the group have produced and 
coordinated comments and suggestions for change to standards relating to use of electrical 
and non-electrical equipment in explosive atmospheres and ventilation of offshore 
installations.  
Risk is understood as the combination of the probability of an event and its consequences. 
The term “risk” is generally used only when there is at least the possibility of negative 
consequences, 
 
Risk management is the process of:  
• Identifying risk factors  
• Assessing and describing the risk factors  
• Prioritizing risk contributors  
• Evaluating the risk against risk tolerance criteria  
• Implementing measures to control the risks in the areas that give the highest benefit.  
 
The generic process for risk management is given in ISO 31000 “Guidelines on principles and 
implementation for Risk Management”. 
4.6 Recommended Key HSE Standards 
 
The expert in working group RN4 phase 4in Barents 2020 project agreed to assess the 
applicability of technical standards applied in the North Sea, for application in the Barents 
Sea. The main reason for this decision has been that the standards to be applied in the Barents 
Sea must represent a set of best practice standards that have been applied successfully in an 
area that is comparable to the Barents Sea.  
The recommended standards represent the standards applied and developed within the fields 
of risk management and technical safety in the North Sea, based on more than 30 years’ 
experience from offshore activities. The standardization regime in the North Sea also reflects 
the principles of risk management. Based on these 27 standards, a set of 14 standards were 
selected as prioritized and recommended standards, to be included in the basis list of 
standards for offshore activities in the Barents Sea. The recommended standards are shown in 
Figure 9 
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Figure 9. Recommended Key HSE Standards 
4.6.1 Barrier Management  
 
The main objective with barrier management is to establish and maintain safety barriers so 
that they at any time can handle the risks involved by preventing that incident happens and/or 
reduce loss and mitigates the consequences if the incident occurs.  
Management of safety barriers includes the management processes, systems and measures to 
be in place to ensure necessary risk reduction and comply with the requirements set to safe 
design and operation.  
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Risk management, as per ISO 31000 std. assumes the use of risk assessments, suitable for the 
purpose to support decisions to be taken that directly or indirectly man influence the risk, 
positive or negative. 
Risk management/barrier management will have the basis in certain situations or conditions, 
Context, and that a risk picture is established for the given situations and the specified 
conditions.  
 
The risk picture will be the basis for treatment of the risks and the product of the entire 
process, a Strategy ( as per ISO 13702) must be described to ensure the full understanding of 
the need for and role of safety barriers. The outcome should also be the Performance 
standards specifying the performance requirements for the different Technical, Organizational 
and Operational barriers and barrier elements , in terms of Functionality (capacity/ efficiency) 
, Integrity ( reliability, availability, and Vulnerability( robustness, load resistance be efficient 
for the situation considered.  
 
The monitoring and review processes should encompass all aspects of the risk management 
process for the purposes of detecting changes in the external and internal context including 
changes to the risk itself which can require revision of risk treatments and priorities; validate 
that the risk control and treatment measures are effective in both design and operation.  
 
The use of safety barriers to manager fire and explosion hazards is reflected in ISO 13702 – 
Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production facilities. The 
Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority have requirements for safety barrier management in 
their regulations, reference is given to §5 of the Activity Regulation.  
Management of safety barriers includes the management processes, systems and measures to 
be in place to ensure necessary risk reduction and comply with the requirements set to safe 
design and operation.  
For good barrier management, it shall be known:  
 
• Which function the different barriers shall maintain  
• Which performance requirements have been placed on the technical, operational or 
organizational elements that are necessary to ensure that the individual barrier is effective  
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• Monitoring - which barriers are non-functioning or weakened, and the effect on the risk 
level  
• How to implement necessary compensating measures to restore or compensate for 
missing or weakened barriers  
Risk management, as per ISO 31000 std. assumes the use of risk assessments, suitable for the 
purpose to support decisions to be taken that directly or indirectly can influence the risk, 
positive or negative. Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority have described a model for 
management of barriers based on the ISO 31000 principles, e.g. practical application of the 
principles from Statoil on Monitoring and follow up of “safety barriers” as risk management 
in operational phase, (Barents 2020 phase 4) 
 
The phases 1-3 for Barents 2020 have mainly focused on the principles that should be 
included in HSE standards to design inherently safe offshore installations for operations in the 
Barents Sea. The above text is for extended focus to include safe operations, and to 
implement continuous risk management through the different phases of planning, 
development, construction and commissioning, operation and decommissioning. 
4.7 Risk Management Cases  
 
In this chapter I will discuss and show some e.g. on risk management cases from different 
companies. 
4.7.1 Technological risk assessment & risk acceptance criteria  
 
Total approach for the Exploration & Production branch (as well as the Total Group) adopted 
during the development phase to manage technological risks, noting that within the 
organization:  
• Technological risks related to EP’s operated facilities are associated with the use or 
processing of toxic, flammable or explosive characteristics of substances.  
• Identifying, assessing and managing risks associated with these substances are integral 
part of Total’s continuous efforts to improve safety and sustainable development targets.  
• The systematic processes of identifying hazards associated with Total’s operations, 
assessment and management of these risks at all phases of development are known as 
Technological Risk Assessment.  
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• The management of risks involves at reducing the risks for both onsite and offsite facilities 
to a level As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).  
The technical risk assessment implemented by Total EP includes features commonly seen 
within most risk management systems:  
• Hazard identification  
• Preliminary risk assessment  
• Detailed and quantified risk assessment  
• Risk assessment and ALARP demonstration  
• Priority based program of actions and a register of major risk 
 
Total EP adopted a scenario based risk assessment, in part due to the belief that it provided an 
excellent tool for risk communication and the identification of mitigation measures.  
As with all risk assessment approaches, risk levels need to be determined which trigger 
certain decisions.  
4.7.2 Monitoring of “safety barriers”  
 
There are several internal and external (regulatory) requirements to follow up and 
maintenance of safety barriers in the oil & gas industry. It is expected that the operator shall 
establish strategies for handling risks, and provide effective safety barriers in order to prevent 
accidents.  
For good barrier management, it shall be known:  
• Which function the different barriers shall maintain  
• Which performance requirements have been placed on the technical, operational or 
organizational elements that are necessary to ensure that the individual barrier is effective  
• Which barriers are non-functioning or weakened, and the effect on the risk level  
• How to implement necessary compensating measures to restore or compensate for 
missing or weakened barriers  
In the following an overview of important Statoil issues for follow up safety barriers in the 
operational phase is given.  
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Follow up programs  
There is a clear need to establish barriers on several levels. It is important to have safety 
barriers that take care of both human-, organizational- and technical issues. Performance 
standards for the different types of barriers needs to be established, and the condition of the 
barriers should be known at any time.  
Technical safety condition  
Monitoring and follow up of the performance standards for technical safety systems and 
barrier functions should as a minimum address:  
• Functionality, integrity and vulnerability.  
• Maintenance of documentation.  
• Maintaining and developing knowledge and competence on the systems.  
• Compliance with internal and authority requirements through systematic follow-up.  
A verification scheme should comprise:  
• Verification in the terms of a periodic review of the safety condition at the plant and 
mapping of conditions that do not comply with the company is Performance 
Requirements.  
• Follow-up of safety systems and barriers.  
• Visualization and follow-up of safety indicators. 
Operational safety condition  
A review and monitoring program for operational safety condition must cover the human- and 
organizational aspects, like; work practice, competence, procedures, communication, 
workload etc. 
Continuous monitoring of technical integrity  
Statoil has developed a monitoring program that gives an “online” overview of the status of 
the safety barriers on a plant. The Technical Integrity Management Program (TIMP) shall 
ensure a consistent and systematic manner in which to regularly compile and visualize the 
technical condition of equipment, systems, barriers (performance standards), and the overall 
technical integrity of the plant.  
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The status of the technical integrity form the basis for prioritizing and implementing risk 
reducing measures in cases where there are weaknesses identified. TIMP provides an 
overview of the technical integrity at the plant by means of: 
Identifying, documenting, visualizing and assessing the risks related to technical integrity  
• identifying adverse trends/development in order to prevent unacceptable risk due to 
degradation of integrity  
• use of common methods for risk assessment to as far as possible ensure a consistent way 
of identifying risk level  
• Presenting gaps in the plant’s integrity so that these can be taken into account in the daily 
planning (priority) of activities at the plant.  
• sharing relevant experiences (the learning/knowledge that is acquired) from across the 
plants  
The technical integrity is assessed in terms of effect on both safety and production. 
Responsible persons are appointed for all relevant indicators for the plant, and data are 
collected automatically from different sources in order to make the assessment process easier 
(sources are for example; backlog on safety critical equipment, performance test data, 
dispensations, etc. for the relevant equipment). The Performance Standard (PS) responsible is 
responsible, that the function and condition of the performance standards, are met and 
documented in accordance with regulations and internal requirements.  
The purpose of the TIMP work process use by Statoil is to ensure that the technical integrity 
of the plant is ensured at all times. As such, status of all indicators shall be registered and 
assessed with respect to risk and risk reducing measures, with the aim of taking action before 
an accident occur. 
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Figure 10. TIMP Model 
 
Standards are met, and documented in accordance with regulations and internal requirements.  
The purpose of the TIMP work process is to ensure that the technical integrity of the plant is 
ensured at all times. As such, status of all indicators shall be registered and assessed with 
respect to risk and risk reducing measures, with the aim of taking action before an accident 
occur. 
Conclusions  
• Performance Standards for safety barriers needs to be established on several levels, and 
include human-, organizational-and technical safety barriers.  
• The status of the safety barriers needs to be known at all times, and risk reducing measures 
implemented where weaknesses are revealed.  
• TIMP is a tool developed in order to give an “online” status of safety barriers, and is a tool 
for barrier assessment and risk reducing measures in operation.  
• The method is useful and identifies:  
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––Status of safety barriers.  
––Areas for improvement/ compensating measures.  
––Trends (as indicators).  
––Improved competence and understanding of risks and barriers  
––Comparison between installations.  
 
• Performance is monitored at the highest level, giving focus on compliance.  
• Safety barriers will be under control and improved, and consequently reduce the risk 
for major accidents. 
4.7.3 Risk based approach  
 
The Goliat field in the Barents Sea is being developed, and is the first offshore oil field in the 
Barents Sea. The development consists of a geostationary FPSO, 8 sub-sea templates (22 
wells) and an electrical power supply from shore. The produced water will be re-injected and 
the oil will be exported by the use of shuttle tankers. Eni Norge is operator and Statoil ASA is 
the only license partner. The area has high political focus, especially on oil spill preparedness, 
and strict environmental requirements.  
 
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) is responsible for developing and enforcing 
regulations, which govern safety and working environment in the petroleum activities on the 
Norwegian continental shelf and associated land facilities states in their regulations: 
 
“The responsible party shall carry out risk analyses that provide a balanced and most 
comprehensive possible picture of the risk associated with the activities. The analyses shall be 
appropriate as regards providing support for decisions related to the upcoming operation or 
phase. Risk analyses shall be carried out to identify and assess contributions to major 
accident and environmental risk, as well as ascertain the effects various operations and 
modifications will have on major accident and environmental risk.” 
The oil spill preparedness requirements, will be solution will be set by The Norwegian 
Climate and Pollution Agency based on the operators risk assessments and proposed oil spill 
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preparedness solution, as part of a discharge permit, which is required before drilling or 
production can be conducted.  
Eni Norge have  implementing the Goliat oil spill preparedness for the production drilling, 
based on conducted environmental risk and oil spill contingency analysis (including oil drift 
modeling). Important inputs to these studies were blow out potential and well release 
frequencies; oil weathering data, natural recourse data and meteorological data. The analyses 
were based on Norwegian industry standards developed by OLF.  
Eni Norge’s aim for the Goliat oil spill preparedness is that it shall be robust, effective and 
well adapted to local conditions. 
4.7.4 Learning from accidents a part of managing risk 
 
Learning from accidents is an important part of managing risk. During the history, we have 
had accidents, which have changed the way we design offshore installations, and how we 
work with safety. Maybe the most important accident in this regard is Piper Alpha in 1988. 
This was a game changer in light of how we on British and Norwegian continental shelf 
include risk evaluations in design and operation of offshore installations. Now we have the 
Macondo accident. The question we raise; what can we learn?  
 
In the Report to the President it is stated; “One of the key responsibilities of government is to 
regulate – to direct the behavior of individuals and institutions according to rules1”. There 
exist different regulatory regimes; prescriptive and performance based. However, no 
regulations or authority scheme is occasional. Historical, cultural and legal traditions have 
influenced on how regulatory regime is and will be designed.  
 
Regulatory oversight alone is however, not sufficient to ensure adequate safety. The oil and 
gas industry will need to take its own steps to increase safety throughout the industry, 
including self-policing mechanisms that supplement governmental enforcement. ( Ref “Deep 
Water; The Gulf Oil disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling”, Report to the President, 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, January 
2011, section 8) 
 
From 2004 to 2009, fatalities in the offshore industry where more than four times higher per 
person-hour worked in US water than in European water. Even though many of the same 
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companies worked in both areas, this reinforce the view that the problem is not an inherent 
trait of the business itself, but rather depends on the different cultures and regulatory systems 
under which members of the industry operates. (Ref “Deep Water; The Gulf Oil disaster and 
the Future of Offshore Drilling”, Report to the President, National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, January 2011, section 8) 
 
The Chief Council’s report concluded that “Better management would have identified the 
risks at Macondo and prevented the technical failures that lead to the blowout.( Page 225, 
“Macondo; The Gulf Oil Disaster”, Chief Councel’s Report 2011, National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling) 
 
 The most risky industry can be made safer, given the right incentives and disciplined system, 
sustained by committed leadership and effective training. 
4.8 Risk tolerance criteria 
 
Criteria for risk acceptability or risk tolerance are a central part of the risk management 
process. The risk tolerance criteria defines the risk levels or ranges, often in quantitative 
terms, which are unacceptable and acceptable with respect to exposure of personnel, 
environment etc.  
 
There are different approaches for formulating such criteria (quantitative, qualitative, what 
kind of parameters to measure etc.); and who has the responsibility to define the criteria. In 
the petroleum industry, it is both seen that the operators themselves set criteria, but also some 
places by the authorities. By including in the regulations a requirement, that the operators 
shall establish a risk acceptance criteria, but not giving the specific criteria, one can attain a 
dynamic process, where each operator wants to appear as best in class – or at least be as good 
as the others, and by that a continuous process to increase the safety ambitions of the industry. 
This also makes it possible for the authority to confront the operators with their safety 
ambitions, relative to other operators. On the opposite side criteria defined by each operator 
may lead to a conserving process, where the industry as a whole is reluctant to take the 
responsibility for improvement, afraid of costs that may incur from raising safety ambitions in 
the industry. In any sense it will be the task of the authority to supervise the application of the 
risk tolerance criteria, to ensure that the regulations are complied with and risks are managed. 
 
57 
The risk tolerance criteria is a central part of the risk based approach to safety, but needs to be 
linked with a process to reduce the risk to a level which is As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable. This implies that risk reduction shall continue, even when the risk acceptance 
criteria is complied with, until the benefit from further risk reduction is outweighed by any 
costs/disadvantages. In this process is also included the use of cost-benefit assessments, as an 
analytical process of estimating the costs and benefits of specific risk reducing measures. The 
ALARP process with assessments of benefit from risk reducing measures implies that the 
responsible party will need to compare the implied costs of a statistically saved life and other 
relevant benefits such as expected increased production, secured brand/reputations (ICAF = 
cost of measure/ number of saved lives), with the actual willingness to pay for these benefits 
(i.e. risk reduction). The willingness to pay for the risk reduction is not a constant and 
objective factor, but is influenced by the risk perception in the industry, the risk management 
policy of the operator, societal risk perception, expectations from non-governmental 
organizations etc.  
Through company internal and public processes, all these stakeholders play a necessary part 
of the process to achieve a knowledge based risk management process that applies the 
ALARP-process in a holistic way. 
A proactive and systematic method to reveal non-compliance with best work practices in 
different levels in the organization should be implemented. Observations and findings will 
form a basis for developing risk reducing measures by the operating unit. The focus is on 
work practices that could affect the risk for major accidents. 
 The North Sea also represents an area that in many ways can be compared to the Barents Sea, 
but still with differences with respect to specific arctic conditions. The implications of these 
differences are the subject of this thesis  
 
There are important challenges with respect to the interface between the proposed standards, 
and national legislation and national standards. Solving the challenges that this interface 
represents has not been go in depth in this thesis, but rather to see a common set of prioritized 
standards. I will see as a starting point, the involved partners should develop a coherent safety 
regime in the Barents Sea based on internationally accepted standards. 
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4.9 Operational Challenges in the Barents Sea  
 
In this section, some operational challenges for the Barents Sea East / West area are 
discussed, all originating from the remoteness and arctic weather and climate conditions, 
and/or a combination of these. 
4.9.1 The biggest challenge  
 
Compared to Johan Castberg where sea ice is a remote possibility, Barents Sea North west has 
experienced sea ice at least once every decade between 1870 and 2008. Although it is still an 
infrequent event, a conservative approach would nevertheless require sea ice to be considered, 
both in design as well as in operational concept. 
 
The probability of encountering icebergs at i.e. Hopen is significantly higher than at Johan 
Castberg, where it has been estimated that one can expect about 2.6·10-5 encounters per year 
in a 100 m radius (Eik et al., 2013). For comparison, the encounter frequency at the White 
Rose field in eastern Canada is estimated to be about two orders of magnitude greater (Husky 
Oil, 2000). Again, a conservative approach would however require icebergs to be considered 
both in the design with regards to strength and the ability to disconnect as well as 
Ice management preparedness. 
 
Polar lows is a phenomenon that until recently have been poorly understood. These small but 
intense low pressure systems forms and moves quickly and can create rapid changes in wind 
and sea state, as well as producing very large amounts of snow over a short period of time. 
The combined effect of wind and snow can temporarily disable and block access to vital 
systems unless this has been accounted for in the design and winterization strategy of the 
installation. Polar lows are not specific to Barents Sea SW, rather they can be encountered all 
over the Barents Sea and they should be considered for all installations in this area. 
 
At i.e. the Hopen area, the sun stays below the horizon for 92 consecutive days. Unlike fields 
further south on the NCS one do not always have the option to execute complicated 
operations during daylight. In addition, the long period of darkness as well as the long period 
of continuous sunlight (92 days) might introduce some challenges concerning human 
performance due to sleep pattern disruptions. 
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Fog is also considerably more common in the northern part of the Barents Sea than anywhere 
else on the NCS. During summer, flight operations might have to be suspended one out of 
every 6 days due to fog. This creates new challenges concerning HSE, medical preparedness 
and SAR operations 
 
I.e. Hopen area is at the brink of the maximum unrefueled range from the closest mainland 
airport (Hammerfest) for most current helicopter types. The closest land mass is Bjørnøya 
roughly half the distance to Hammerfest, and even Longyearbyen is almost at the same 
distance as Tromsø. 
 
The biggest challenge at Barents Sea SW area is the general remoteness and accessibility. 
This might require some new thinking about operations and emergency preparedness 
4.9.2 Barents Sea Area 
 
 
Figure 11. The "Barents Sea - Middle to Early Jurassic” geological play (NPD 
2013). 
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The Hopen area is part of the "Barents Sea - Middle to Early Jurassic” geological play (NPD 
2013), which also includes the Snøhvit and Wisting fields. Figure 2-2 shows the location of 
the fields and the geological formation. It is expected to find properties similar to those at 
Snøhvit and Wisting both for the reservoir and for the seabed. The seabed is flat with a water 
depth of approximately 400 m. From seismic exploration of the area, it is expected to have a 
potential for large O&G reservoirs at around 1700 m below seabed. At PL615, two 
exploration wells known as “Apollo” and “Atlantis” will be drilled in 2016. 
 
The Hopen area includes several productions licenses, among them PL615, PL615 B and 
PL723 (all inside the area marked Hopen in Figure 10) 
 
 
Table 5. Licenses in Hopen area (NPD) 
4.9.3 Location 
 
 
Figure 12. Distances to relevant locations 
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The location at 74° North and 25° East implies several challenges due to its remoteness. 
Table 5 shows approximately distances and flight times (Sea King – 330 Squadron) from 
PL 615 to Johan Castberg, Goliat and some of the most important destinations onshore. 
 
 
Table 6. Distances and flight time from PL 615 
 
As seen from Figure 12 and Table 6, remoteness is a challenge that must be taken into 
account in most operational aspects due to: 
 
 Long distance to shore 
 Communication challenges 
 Few available service locations in Finnmark 
 Search and rescue (SAR) and HSE related challenges 
 
4.9.4 Clima  
 
The Hopen location North in the Barents Sea is characterized by harsh arctic climate. The 
climate and environment differs significantly from well-known field locations in the North 
Sea. The following sections discuss specific environmental conditions to be expected at the 
Hopen location. 
4.9.5 Ice Management  
 
There exists substantial experience with iceberg management from the Grand Banks. Sea ice 
management comes mainly from drilling operations north of Canada and the Caspian Sea. Ice 
management acts as a tool to increase operability, but has not yet been taken into account for 
design. It may be anticipated that the icebreakers conducting the ice management operation 
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will have problems operating during the heavy ice conditions that drive the design. ISO 
19906/DIS mentions IM by setting performance standards but gives no guidance on how to 
include IM in design 
 
One of the most important operation criteria for Hopen will be how to handle the expected sea 
ice. It is technically possible to build an installation that can withstand all expected sea ice 
scenarios with the exception of large icebergs. However, given that sea ice is an infrequent 
event and likely to become even more infrequent if current climate predictions holds true, a 
more flexible approach can be to reduce the ice strengthening criteria and build an installation 
that relies on an ice management system to reduce the biggest ice loads. This gives the 
operator the ability to bolster or reduce the ice management system according to the actual 
future development of the sea ice situation. 
 
Regardless of ice management philosophy, any installation at Hopen should as a minimum 
have the means to detect and evaluate ice threats. Detections could be done by using high 
resolution satellite imagery and on board radar. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) or 
helicopter reconnaissance providing high-resolution visual or radar imagery, density, 
thickness measurements and other important parameters could supplement this. Trajectory 
modelling can be done combining wind and wave elements of the weather forecast with 
physical and environmental information gathered on site to evaluate possible threats. 
 
To mitigate possible ice threats the platform could in the late winter season be assisted by a 
purpose built standby vessel with sufficient icebreaking capacity to break up large floes and 
with sufficient bollard pull to tow away threatening growlers or bergy bits. In addition the 
vessel could be equipped with Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler to provide detailed real-time 
input to trajectory modelling and side scan sonar for detailed profiling and draught 
measurements of ice threats. Figure 12 shows an example of an icebreaking AHTS (DnV 
ICE-10 class) with a bollard pull of 200 tons. 
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Figure 13. Icebreaking AHTS Viking Supply Ships 
4.9.6 Sea Ice  
 
Presence, or the absence, of sea ice in the Barents Sea has been widely discussed in the recent 
years. Sea ice, icebergs, icing and wind chill are new elements that may increase both 
frequency of accidents and the consequences. The consensus is that the summer sea ice, 
distribution is currently shrinking, but future projections are still uncertain. Operation in this 
area with respect to presence of sea ice is should be taken in to consideration. The Hopen area 
in Barents SW area has been covered with first year level ice at least once within every 10-
year period between 1870 and 2008 (University of Illinois). As a first approach, assuming 
level ice at least every 10 year at the Hopen location seems reasonable. Figure 13 shows 
maximum ice extent for sea ice with concentration above 30 % for the 2003 ice season, where 
it is seen that the ice border is close to the Hopen location (Met.no / Istjenesten). Figure 14 
shows maximum ice extent for April month, years 2001 – 2011 (Met.no). 
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Figure 14. Maximum sea ice extent, 2003, 30 % concentration (Met.no / Istjenesten). 
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Figure 15. Maximum ice extent for April month, years 2001 – 2011 (met.no). 
4.9.10 Icebergs  
 
 
Figure 16. Iceberg occurrence in the Barents Sea. The contour lines are the annual probability 
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for occurrence of icebergs in a 100×100 km grid cell. Triangles and shaded areas are 
abnormal observations of icebergs (Eik et al., 2013). 
 
The annual probability for iceberg intrusion in a 100 ×100 km grid cell in the Barents Sea is 
shown in Figure 16 (Eik et al., 2013). For the Hopen location, the annual probability is 
approximately 10 times the probability at Johan Castberg, with a probability on 10 % for 
annual occurrence. Most of the icebergs in this area are growlers and bergy bits, but larger 
icebergs can occur. Growlers and bergy bits can “hide” within waves, and might be hard to 
detect. An iceberg classification is found in in Figure 16. Impact with smaller icebergs is not 
unlikely. For larger icebergs, the situation is different 
 
 
Figure 17. Iceberg size classification (The COMET Program). 
4.9.11 Sea spray icing 
There are two main sources for sea spray in the Barents Sea, ,(Hopen area) which is the basis 
for the foundation of sea spray 
Icing: 
• Wind induced spray 
• Wave induced spray. 
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Wind induced spray, denoted whitecap spray, originates when wind is blowing off droplets 
from whitecaps on the sea surface. Wave induced spray or interaction spray is formed when 
waves interacts with a structure (e.g. a vessel or a platform). For a fixed or moored offshore 
structure wave, induced spray is the important factor for sea spray generation. Sea spray 
droplets are produced by three mechanisms 
 
 Film droplets: When air bubbles rises to the ocean surface the surrounding bubble cap 
thins resulting the rupture of the air bubble. Rupturing air bubbles throw film droplets 
into the air. These film droplets have a size of sub-micro meter and micro meter 
(W.perrie, 2002). 
 Jet droplets: When the bubble cavity collapses, jet droplets are produced. They shoot 
into the air. Top jet droplets are usually smaller than lower jet droplets. The top jet 
droplets are about one- tenth the radius of the original droplets (W.perrie, 2002). 
 Spume: When wind speed exceeds 9 m/s spume droplets are produced by the wind 
tearing off the wave crests. These droplets are usually the largest sea spray droplets 
(with a radius greater than 10 μm) (W.perrie, 2002). 
4.9.12 Sea spray conditions  
 
There are three main factors, which determine the amount of sea, spray icing: in the Hopen 
area 
• Wind speed 
• Air temperature 
• Sea temperature 
As a rule of thumb, sea spray icing starts when the wind speed is above 10 m/s and water 
temperature is below 7 C. Air temperature must be below freezing point of sea water (about 
−1.9 °C). Sea spray ice can accumulate fast, and is often impossible to remove during ice 
events. 
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Figure 18. Occurrence (%) of temperature below -1.9 and wind above 10m/s January 1961-
2010 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Atmospheric icing Frequency 
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Figure 20. Shows an example of heavy sea spray icing on a buoy. 
4.9.13 Atmospheric icing  
 
Atmospheric icing may impact offshore platform operations in this area. It can reduce safety, 
operational tempo and productivity, but is likely not a threat against structure integrity. ISO-
12494 divides atmospheric icing into three different categories, where as only the first two is 
of significance for offshore structures. 
 
• Precipitation icing (freezing precipitation and wet snow) 
• In-cloud icing (also called rime/glaze, including fog) 
• Hoar frost 
 
Atmospheric icing is handled through winterization of the structure (e.g. sheltering, smooth 
surfaces, heating systems etc), which ensures safety and tempo during operations.  
 
The ISO 19901-6 code can be augmented in areas of wind and current monitoring when 
operating in ice covered areas. A general reference on ice monitoring was found in ISO 19906 
Sections 6.3 and 6.5: “Ice conditions shall be considered as part of the environmental data 
monitoring program The IMO Polar code in Section 1.2 refers to the need of having ice 
navigators on board the vessel or vessels. It is of great importance that personnel with proper 
training and background have been appraised on the planned conditions, that they can monitor 
these conditions continuously and also record them and make the results available across the 
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fleet where possible as well as the shore, where possible and where needed. The availability 
of such operational data is indispensable, not only to conduct continuous quality checks of the 
data gathered, but also to make forecasts and to use for any analysis, during actual operations 
and as post event analysis. In accordance with section 6 of the Arctic Ice regime Shipping 
System or AIRSS, every ship using the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System must have on 
board an Ice Navigator. The ice navigator may be any person on board, including the Master, 
who meets the requirements. 
 
 
Figure 21. General locations where atmospheric icing (frost, snow, rime and glaze) and 
Superstructure ice (sea spray icing) would be expected to occur on a drilling platform 
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Figure 21. Ices on supply Vessel (Picture Troms offshore) 
4.9.14 Polar lows  
 
A polar low is a small-scale (100 – 1000 km), short-lived (2-3 days) vigorous atmospheric 
low pressure system that is found over the ocean areas pole ward of the main polar front in 
both the northern and the southern hemispheres. Polar lows are small Arctic cyclones, and 
they are generated by an atmospheric instability driven by a large vertical temperature 
gradient in combination with high wind speeds. A necessary condition for a polar low to be 
generated, is that the difference between the sea temperature and the atmospheric temperature 
at 6 km height (500 hPa) exceeds 43 ℃ (Yanase and Niino, 2007). As a result of the 
instability, a counter-clockwise rotating vortex is generated. The spinning vortex will feed on 
the heat energy available from the sea, and hence intensify as it propagates, while an upward 
transport of moisture and heat through the centre of the vortex produces a cloud pattern. The 
polar low will form a vortex with several spiral shaped cloud bands or a single comma shaped 
cloud band, a cloud free eye, and a relatively warm core. In Figure 22, we see a satellite 
image of a spiral shaped polar low East of Svalbard, clearly exhibiting cloud filled spiral arms 
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Figure 23. Satellite image of spiral shaped polar low east of Svalbard (KSAT) 
 
Polar lows carry with them large amounts of snow which precipitates heavily as they 
propagate. The wind speed in a polar low is typically in the range 15 – 45 m/s, although much 
higher wind speeds have been reported. The propagation speed for the pressure system as a 
whole is typically 25 – 50 km/h. The wind speed distribution within a polar low will vary 
much around the vortex. Since the vortex is propagated by a North-westerly high-speed wind, 
the net wind vector will be the sum of the propagation speed and the local vortex speed. 
Hence, on the east and north side of the vortex, one encounters relatively small wind speeds. 
On the west and south sides of the vortex, however, the wind speeds can be very large, and 
this is also where the largest amount of precipitation is observed. 
 
In Figure 23 we see three snapshots of a polar low 
Approaching Lofoten and Vesterålen on 4th April 2013. The green colour indicates snow 
 
73 
 
 
Figure 24. Time evolution of a polar low approaching Lofoten and Vesterålen on 4th April 
2013. The green colour indicates snow, and the wind flags indicate the direction and the 
strength of the wind locally (Met.no). 
 
Figure 23 shows a photo taken on the island of Senja on the 4th April 2013 after a polar low 
has passed by. We see that a large snow accumulation is present. The amount of snow 
dropped by a polar low can range from tens of centimetres, to more than a metre in a very 
short amount of time, typically just a few hours’ time. 
Under some conditions, polar lows can create large amplitude sea waves due to nonlinear 
resonance effects (Dysthe and Harbitz, 1987). The increased level of wave activity leads to an 
increase in sea spray generation, which in turn can lead to an increase in sea spray icing. A 
major difference between a polar low and a normal low pressure system is that all parameters 
related to polar lows may change extremely rapidly. E.g., the significant wave height can 
increase by several meters in a very short time interval as a polar low approaches. Also, large 
amounts of snow may appear suddenly, and huge amounts of snow may be dropped in a short 
time interval. The fact that polar lows forms and moves rapidly can reduce warning time and 
time for preparations on board installations, potentially causing disruptions in on-going 
operations and be a HSE hazard 
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Figure 25. Photo from met.no 
 
 
Polar lows appear only in the cold winter season from October to April. In the Barents Sea 
one typically observe 10 – 20 polar lows per year. Troms and Finnmark having the largest 
concentration of polar lows. 
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Figure 26. Point of origin of polar lows from 2000 to 2014, a total of 196 cases 
 
Polar lows appear only in the cold winter season from October to April. In the Barents Sea 
one typically observe 10 – 20 polar lows per year see figure below. The months at the 
beginning and end of the polar low season (November and March) have very fluctuating 
number of occurrences. The point of origin of polar lows from 2000 – 2012 can be seen in the 
figure above. 
 
 
Figure 27. Monthly distribution of polar lows in the Norwegian and Barents Sea, registered at 
the Norwegian meteorological institute from 2000 - 2012. 
 
Polar Low is in general hard to predict due to the fact that they occur in areas with few 
observations and because they have a relatively small scale considering the observation 
coverage. The meteorological forecast models are improving, and according to most polar 
lows will be detected within 6-12 hours prior to occurring. Polar lows are also difficult to 
detect, and they may abruptly appear close to an installation without much lead time. Hence, 
one should instrument offshore installations, with microwave weather surveillance radars as 
part of the operational and HSE support. A pulse-Doppler radar is capable of detecting the 
location and motion of precipitation, and to map the structure of approaching weather 
systems. The measured output from the radar should be fed into a local numerical weather 
prediction model to forecast the trajectory and effects of the detected system. A weather radar 
has a maximum range of about 240 km, so polar lows can potentially be detected, and tracked 
a few hours before they hit the installation. This may be important for safeguarding the 
installation and for taking the necessary precautions. 
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4.9.15 Polar nights  
 
Table 7 shows periods with polar nights and midnight sun in the Hopen area. The long period 
with polar nights must be taken into account both when it comes to operational and HSE/SAR 
aspects. Unlike areas further south on NCS the operators cannot always choose to carry out 
flight operations and other complicated operations during daylight. Constant darkness and 
constant daylight is also known to cause slip pattern disruptions in some individuals which 
may cause tiredness and reduced vigilance. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Periods with polar nights and midnight sun at 74° North and 25° East. 
4.9.16 Visibility  
 
Reduced visibility can be a challenge for operations. The Barents Sea SW is characterized by 
periods of poor visibility. Meteorological stations at Bjørnøya and Hopen measure visibility 
(based on human observations). These observations are considered representative for e.g. 
Hopen at present stage, and in Table 8. They are compared with observations from Ekofisk 
and Tromsø Lufthavn. There is a significant difference in fog time between Bjørnøya and 
Ekofisk. Periods with low visibility can be a challenge for regularity of air operations, as 
regular air operations normally have restrictions in visibility lower than 0.5 NM (~1km) 
 
 
 
Table 8. Visibility in the Hopen area [% of time] based on observations in the period 1992 – 
2012 (Eklima / met.no). 
77 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Bad visibility Photo from Snorre A, Fog in the North: The most frequently during 
the summer, caused by warm air over cold seas 
4.9.17 BSSW area Compared to Johan Castberg 
 
Johan Castberg (PL532, block 7220/8) See fig below (6-14) is an oilfield is located in the 
Barents Sea, approximately 200 km southwest of Hopen. Statoil is operator with Eni and 
Petoro as partners. The project is in an extended concept study phase, and is waiting for a 
decision to develop the field and eventually which concept to choose. Environmental 
conditions at Johan Castberg are in general assumed similar or slightly better than at Hopen 
except for one major difference.  Sea ice is not expected to be an operational challenge for the 
Johan Castberg field. At the moment, the project is considering two different platform 
concepts, a ship-shaped FPSO and a semi-submersible FPU with pipeline to shore. Both 
concepts have some unsolved challenges with regard to operate in the Barents Sea, which 
must be solved. 
Technical solutions that work at Johan Castberg will also work at Hopen with additional 
measures to account for occasional sea ice. 
 
Distance to shore is approximately almost twice for Hopen (7423/3) compared to Johan 
Castberg, which makes a difference for logistics, evacuation and assistance from shore. These 
challenges are new compared to the existing and planned locations in the Barents Sea. 
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Figure 29. Map Barents Sea Block 
4.9.20 BSSE area Compared to Shtokman 
 
The Shtokman field is the world’s largest offshore natural gas field, situated in the Russian 
sector of the Barents Sea. The location is approximately 600 km from shore and the climate is 
expected to be harsher than the situation met at Hopen. Therefore, there is a lot of relevant 
experience to gain from this project. (Shtokman Development AG., 2013) are discussing some 
challenges and proposed solutions for Shtokman. 
 
At one stage of the Shtokman project, a floating island was proposed to solve the challenge 
with long distance to shore. For the Hopen project, such a solution is also relevant. 
 
 
4.10 Helicopter operations  
 
Four SAR helicopters were available from April 2014 (Table 7-1) to cover the Barents Sea 
area. There is no shared area emergency preparedness as on the southern part of the NCS. 
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From Figure 7-2 we see that there are large areas in the Barents Sea which currently are not 
covered by the 120 min. total flight time requirement for area emergency preparedness DFU 
2. Combined with the weather and climate conditions in the area this implies challenges for 
medical transport, evacuation and rescue, and also for the regularity for transport of personnel 
with helicopters. AWSAR helicopters have used a location onshore that reduces the distance 
to the locations as much as practically possible. The AWSAR will be used for emergency 
situations, and is assumed to have a flight speed in emergency situation of 140 knots. The 
helicopter needs to be equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks, to be able to operate in the area. It is 
manned by rescue man, winch man, medical doctor and 2 pilots, and has a capacity to rescue 
21 persons. The helicopter may take up to 4 stretchers at the same time. 
Mobilization time for SAR helicopter is 45 minutes, except during helicopter transportation it 
is 15 minutes. It is assumed that the doctor has the same mobilization time as the rest of the 
helicopter crew. The helicopter is assumed to meet requirements for operating all year round 
in the Barents Sea, and will have de-icing equipment. There is work ongoing to implement 
night vision googles (NVG). 
 
 
The possibility of atmospheric icing through large parts of the year will require that 
helicopters assigned to the Hopen area, are equipped with de-icing equipment to achieve, 
akseptable operational availability. 
 
DFU2 – Definert fare og ulykkessituasjon 2: Personell i sjøen som følge av helikopterulykke. 
A helicopter with total of 21 people (incl. flight crew) crashing in the sea must be rescued 
within 120 minutes including 3 min. for winching each person from the sea. Norwegian Oil 
and gas (064 –Anbefalte retningslinjer for områdeberedskap) 
 
80 
 
Table 9. Available AWSAR helicopters for the Barents Sea (forsvaret.no, Bristow Group 
2013 and Lufttransport 2013). 
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Figure 30. - 120 min radius for SAR helicopters stationed in Hammerfest (black – EC 225), 
Banak (red – Sea King) and Southern part of the NCS. Radius shows 120 min. total flight 
time including pick up of 21 passengers as described in 064 (Norsk Olje og Gass anbefalte 
retningslinjer for områdeberedskap.) 
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For the purpose of this study the cases with AWSAR helicopters have used a location onshore 
that reduces the distance to the locations as much as practically possible. The AWSAR will be 
used for emergency situations, and is assumed to have a flight speed in emergency situation of 
140 knots. The helicopter needs to be equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks, to be able to operate 
in the area. It is manned by rescue man, winch man, medical doctor and 2 pilots, and has a 
capacity to rescue 21 persons. The helicopter may take up to 4 stretchers at the same time. 
Mobilization time for SAR helicopter is 45 minutes, except during helicopter transportation it 
is 15 minutes. It is assumed that the doctor has the same mobilization time as the rest of the 
helicopter crew. The helicopter is assumed to meet requirements for operating all year round 
in the Barents Sea, and will have de-icing equipment. There is work ongoing to implement 
night vision googles (NVG). 
4.10.1 Medical evacuations  
 
Current requirements for medical evacuation are a maximum of 3 hours from a decision about 
medical evacuation is taken until the patient is brought to hospital  (064 – Norwegian oil and 
Gas  2012) For the i.e. the Hopen area this is only possible if the helicopter is stationed at the 
Hopen field. Also, weather and visibility might increase response time even further. It is 
therefore necessary to seek additional solutions to compensate for this: 
 
• Extended use of telemedicine solutions for remote diagnostics and treatment. 
• Increased medical capacity and more advanced medical equipment on offshore 
installations and support vessels. 
• Stricter health requirements for personnel working on these installations to reduce 
the potential for medical related transport by reducing the number of persons with 
health risk factors. 
• Use of faster helicopters than those in use today, such as for instance the Bell 
Boeing V22 Osprey (only available in military version today) which is 
approximately twice as fast as most helicopters currently in use. 
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Figure 31. Action radius without refueling for currently available SAR helicopters 
 
DFU7 – Definert fare og ulykkessituasjon 7: Personskade/sykdom med behov for ekstern 
assistanse. Injured/sick personnel must be evacuated from installation to hospital in less than 
3 hours from time of decision to evacuate. (Norsk Olje og Gass 064 – Anbefalte retningslinjer 
for områdeberedskap.) 
 
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is currently in a procurement process for a new 
generation of SAR helicopters to replace todays Sea King helicopters. Norway intends to 
acquire up to 16 new SAR helicopters with an option for additional 6. The project target is 
that the contract will be awarded by the end of 2016 and the last Sea King phased out by end 
of 2020. The Ministry is currently negotiating with the companies Agusta Westland for the 
delayed delivery 
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As the number of petroleum installations in the Barents Sea (in general) wills increases, it is 
apparent that the establishment of a shared area emergency preparedness should be strongly 
encouraged as a part of this development. Helicopter should be permanently available, either 
on the installation itself or on nearby support vessels. Due to the weather and climate 
conditions in this area there should also be hangars available for helicopters, and support 
Vessels should as a minimum have a helideck. Support vessels with refueling facilities 
(preferably in-flight refueling) should also be considered. 
4.10.2 Transport of Personnel 
 
Today transport of people to/from installations on the NCS is carried out on a routine basis 
using helicopters. However, due to both remoteness and climate conditions at the Barents Sea 
area today’s regulations and requirements should probably be revised with regards to: 
 
• Extended training 
• Flight conditions 
• Improved weather forecasts 
• Visibility: Polar nights / fog / snow storms / polar lows 
• Evacuation from helicopter 
• Safety suits 
 
The long distance to the Barents area must also be taken into account when it comes to 
transport of personnel. Using the currently available Eurocopter ECC225 AWSAR helicopter 
in Hammerfest (Table 9.) as a reference for transport of personnel, we see that this helicopter 
(as is) has an action radius of 324 km. While the distance from Hammerfest to the centre of 
PL 615 is 360 km, which implies that this helicopter has a point of no return approximately 35 
km south of the centre of PL 615 (HOPEN-AREA). It is likely that due to the arctic weather 
and climate conditions, regularity of flights for transporting personnel to and from 
installations in the Hopen area will be more challenging than what is the current situation on 
the NCS. In fact, it is quite possible that a better stability can be achieved if flying from 
Longyearbyen to Hopen, than from Hammerfest to Hopen. However, this needs to be 
investigated further 
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4.11 Communication  
 
Norwegian waters in the North are very large compared to our land area , and because of a 
milder clima than other parts of the Arctic, these areas is of interest for various maritime 
industries such as oil and gas , fisheries , tourism and shipping / transport (via Northwest and 
Northeast passages ). Based on data collected by the Norwegian AIS satellite we also know 
that it is in the Norwegian part of the Arctic that the majority of maritime users already exist. 
Maritime users have, together with the Norwegian authorities who is responsible for the 
safety in these areas, also a communication needs. With few exceptions, the only options to 
serve the users in this area, is by using satellites, because it is hardly any land-based options 
in this area. 
 
There is a requirement for having communication systems that makes it possible to 
communicate at any time internally on and between installations, vessels, aircrafts and shore 
(Innretningsforskriften, §18). 
 
When the operations move north of 70 degrees north, we will also put today’s current 
satellite-based infrastructure to a test. Number of satellites covering the areas of interest 
decreases, and with an increasingly lower angle up to the satellites will eventually, 
communication conditions be poorer, especially in bad weather. North of 72-75 degrees north, 
there are very few options. It will with high degree of probability be possible to get coverage 
of geostationary satellites up to about 75 degrees north with the use of today's 
communications solutions. However, the quality will be descending and offer more and more 
limited the further north you are. North of 75 degrees north, one can hardly rely on 
geostationary solutions at all. The new and modern satellite solutions who is released in these 
days, and that can provide large bandwidths (i.e. Telenor's Thor 7 system for our areas) but 
would hardly cover further north than about 72 degrees north due to the frequency band who 
is in used.  
Iridium is a low orbit system with worldwide coverage, but this system is primarily in use, for 
voice with very limited bandwidth, for data and also has challenges in relation to stability. 
Although this system now renewed it will not be able to offer broadband connectivity to the 
concurrent users in our areas. 
 
86 
 
Figure 32. Map Barents Sea Ka band limit 
 
Geosynchronous (GEO) satellites are currently the only viable technology that can provide 
medium/high bandwidth volumes. This technology’s main limitation is that it requires line of 
sight to the satellite, which translates to limitations on how far north such satellites can be 
used. 
Other useful background information is that satellite technology is evolving and generally 
speaking there is a trend towards higher frequencies being used for satellite communication 
(from C-band to Ku-band, and from Ku-band to Ka-band). At the same time satellite, 
performance continues to increase, through the use of smaller and more focused spot beams. 
 
Based on this the Norwegian Space Centre and Telenor Satellite Broadcasting have for the 
two latest years identified the user needs and look at possible technical solutions to meet the 
growing communication needs for this area over the next 15-20 years.  
VSAT systems for use further south will in the next few years increasingly changed to new 
frequency ranges due to increased capacity needs. These systems will not necessarily provide 
equally stable capacity northward as the aging systems that is currently in used, and parts of 
the frequency bands, which is in used, are threatened by other uses (cellular / terrestrial data 
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traffic). It is therefore considered that most provident to use higher frequencies also for a 
future system of communication in the Areas North of 75 degrees. When it will be able to 
offer the users ranging from a few Mbit / s up to tens of Mbit / s, depending on the antenna 
and equipment that will be used. It is also possible to design such satellites that they can offer 
very large amounts of data (hundreds of Mbit / s) to more permanent installations. Such a 
system seems best realized by so-called high elitist satellites (HEO) which because of orbit 
will "hang over the Arctic" in the major part of each orbit. A system with two or more 
satellites will then provide continuous coverage for users via satellites that are very high up in 
the sky. 
 
88 
 
Figure 33. Satellite cover Norsk Romsenter 
 
A new satellite communication system will earliest be established at the end of this decade. It 
will be designed for approximately 15 year life, and will therefore have to be designed for 
capacity up to 2035. The cost is not yet fully clarified but from about 1.5 billion. NOK and up 
depending on the communications services they aims to cover and how many satellites is 
aiming for. 
It will be necessary by government grants and engagement on a broad front , especially from 
the oil and gas sector which have great challenges with communication capacity for oil-
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related emergency , distribution of ice information , need for secure communications solutions 
for integrated operations , potentially large amounts of data both from / installations / rigs and 
ships, much crew welfare etc. In addition, long time horizons covering all activities from 
seismic, exploration drilling and possibly production. 
 
The work continues in the first half of 2016-2017 in a collaboration between TSBc and Space 
Norway, in parallel with the Norwegian Space Centre also required to submit a separate 
report for their ministry (NFD) related to the needs and possibilities of robust 
communications solutions in our waters in the north. (Rune Sandbakken Norsk Romsenter) 
4.12 Weather forecasting  
 
The Barents Sea and the Hopen area is a "hot" wedge between Ice Sea in the north and east, 
and cold lands (winter) in Scandinavia and Russia. This leads to some weather and 
meteorological challenges that you have less of in further south (Norwegian Sea and North 
Sea). Especially in winter time occurs occasionally short-term and unpredictable weather 
systems that can provide high winds, dense snow flurries and icing due to ice-spray. Polar 
lows and arctic fronts can occur suddenly in connection with cold air outbreaks. They are of 
relatively small extent (typically scale 100 nm), but provides high winds and poor visibility. 
They are difficult to forecast exactly because of their limited extent and sometimes explosive 
development. They can last from a few hours to up to a day. It is expected that climate change 
may lead to the spread of polar lows changed. Some places e.g. east of Svalbard, you may get 
several of more polar lows, while there may be fewer furthest west in the Barents Sea and the 
Norwegian Sea. Icing from ice spray is another challenge in winter. This type of icing is most 
prominent in eastern and northern areas, since low air temperature is an important prerequisite 
for this.. As of today, warning of icing is based on text notifications from meteorologist, but it 
is relatively easy to implement an icing parameter in table or chart format. Fog is a typical 
summer phenomenon (25% -30 % of the time at Hopen-area) that is difficult to predict in 
detail. General research and improvement of weather models is important here. Sea ice is a 
challenge, especially in the north and east of the Barents Sea. Today there are good ice charts 
that are updated once or twice per. day and night. Is alerts are under development, but the 
quality is not yet validated. 
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There is a great lack of weather observations in the Hopen area, which leads to lower wind 
forecast quality than areas with better coverage. 
 
 
Figure 34. Weather observations 
 
Only a handful of sightings are obtainable from the island around the Barents Sea, as well as 
from a few ships and weather / wave buoys. A very important observation source is data from 
polar orbiting satellites. They pass, however, over the relevant areas at irregular intervals, 
allowing satellite monitoring does not happen continuously as further south where we have 
coverage from geostationary satellites. Data from weather radar is important in detection of 
tracking of polar lows. Today there is weather radar on the coast of Finnmark.  
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Figure 35. HF-radar coverage 
 
An extension with a radar at Bear Island would have been of great importance. This would 
provide continuous radar surveillance of the coast of Finnmark, via Bear Island and to the 
south tip of Spitsbergen. This should be an area to priorities. This is important since blocks in 
the area is developed and need to receive regular weather observations that also go into the 
global weather network used to drive global weather models. It’s also important to have a 
system that can store and convey temporary weather observations made in connection with 
the activity in this area. (Olav Krogsæter, storm geo) 
4.13 Escape, Evacuation and rescue (EER)  
 
Establishing offshore activity in the new Barents Sea area also introduces potential challenges 
for Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER). 
 
As discussed earlier, remoteness together with the arctic weather and climate conditions 
implies challenges for the usage of helicopters. Helicopter should therefore not be the 
preferred or primary method for evacuation. Usage of lifeboats, rafts and evacuation to other 
installations over gangways must be considered as the main means of evacuation, together 
with the presence of standby support vessels third generation or better (064 - Norsk olje og 
gass, 2012). 
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EER situations in ice covered waters are a challenge which is equally applicable for all 
concepts being considered. And in situations with presence of sea ice, no documented or 
approved method exists for evacuation over ice. 
 
Presence of sea ice is a well-known problem for evacuation with lifeboats and rafts. Free 
falling lifeboats cannot be used in sea ice due to high risk for injuries of personnel and 
damage to the lifeboat. According to current regulations, only empty (up to 3 persons) free 
falling lifeboats can be lowered from an installation. Safe ways to lower free falling lifeboats 
with personnel should be investigated, and the regulations changed. Winterized systems with 
gravity launched stairs or chutes, equipped with assembly platforms and automatic launched 
rafts, capable to evacuate up to 140 persons in 10 minutes are in existence and should also be 
considered. Presence of sea ice can also make it difficult for life boats and rafts to find open 
water and to navigate away from the installation. An ice management system is therefore 
required to ensure open water around the installation. 
4.13.1 Evacuation Methods  
 
The ARKTOS Evacuation Craft is an amphibious craft designed for evacuation and rescue 
functions. The craft consists of a pair of reinforced hulls, designed to withstand crushing 
forces from ice floe formations, permanently linked together by a hydraulically powered 
articulating arm. This arm is necessary to enable the front and rear units to operate at 
independent angles so they can transit a variety of irregular features on land, at sea or on ice. 
On solid surfaces, the craft moves on tracks while propulsion jets supply the thrust in open 
water.  
ARKTOS has proven ability to climb from water onto ice floes and maneuver through most 
ice-rubble fields and to handle limited-angle steep slopes on hard or soft surfaces. ARKTOS 
has been used for crew evacuation for several offshore developments consisting of gravel 
islands in the Beaufort Sea located well within the land-fast ice area and the northeast Caspian 
Sea, and are typically parked near the edge of the islands. Should an evacuation be necessary 
the craft can be driven away from the island over the ice.  
The manufacturers state that a conceptual design has been developed for a 75-person 
ARKTOS suitable for operation beyond the shear zone. This includes the effect on 
performance in ice of increased craft track width, extended track carriages, increased water jet 
thrust, self-righting capability, improved vertical ice step climbing capability, hydrostatic 
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drives for improved track performance, fire resistant hull and track material, and davit 
launching from a production platform onto ice, mixtures of broken and water, or open water. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36. - ARKTOS evacuation craft undergoing pilot training in the US Beaufort Sea  
(source: ARKTOS Development Ltd.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37. ARKTOS evacuation craft undergoing pilot training in the US Beaufort Sea  
(source: ARKTOS Development Ltd.) 
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The Ice Breaking Emergency Evacuation Vessel (IBEEV has DNV notation X1A1 ICE1B 
DAT (-30°C). The IBEEV has an extremely shallow draft for Sea operations and is capable of 
breaking ice by moving in either direction via twin helm positions. It protects evacuees from 
the lethal effects of toxic gas (H2S) and can operate in gas, fire or explosion conditions. 
Evacuees enter the vessels through evacuation tunnels linking each vessel to the facility. 
Evacuees enter air locks on the IBEEV which will be purged using stored air from cylinders 
before proceeding into three hermetically sealed evacuee compartments. The IBEEV has the 
capacity to evacuate 340 persons in extra wide seats, and has a medical suite and toilets 
onboard.  
The IBEEV has proven Caspian sea-keeping abilities and is capable of operating in extremely 
low temperatures as well as in first year ice up to 0.6 m thick. Due to the shallow waters in 
which it operates, the IBEEV cannot function like an ordinary icebreaker which cuts through 
the ice. Instead the bow of the IBEEV crushes the ice in front of the vessel; the vessel’s 
powerful engines allow the vessel to make its way through the ice while those inside can 
breathe via self-contained air supplies or oxygen candles if needed. 
 
  
Figure 38. - An IBEEV near Kashagan D-Island in the Caspian Sea  
(source: travel.webshots.com/album) 
 
 
The Boat-In-A-Box davit is part of the “Nadiro Arctic System”, together with a disc-brake 
winch system and the “Drop-In-Ball” hook system.  
The Boat-in-a-Box davit is a system developed for operation in extreme environments. The 
Arctic survival craft and all ancillary equipment, except the davit arms, are stowed inside a 
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container, which protects it from toxic fumes, smoke and other hazards, as well as ambient 
environmental conditions. While the container itself is reinforced to handle ice accretion, it 
excludes the potential for ice accretion on the craft, and deterioration by sunlight and 
corrosion. Furthermore, insulating material can be incorporated for protection against extreme 
temperatures. The container comprises a de-humidification system and heating appliances. 
Hydraulic oil and cylinders are certified for low temperatures and material selection is based 
on extreme design temperatures.  
Upon embarkation, one must open the doors on the container and survival craft then board. 
Upon deployment, the davit arms move the container from the stowed position to the launch 
position, so the davit mechanism deploys the survival craft as well as its protective stowage 
arrangements, i.e. the container, outside the facility’s perimeter, providing a controlled 
launching and recovery environment. Stabilizing mechanisms inside the container are meant 
to prevent survival craft motion making it unable to move and damage the survival craft 
canopy or container interior. 
 
 
Figure 39. - A Boat-In-A-Box installation, in launched and stowed positions  
(source: Barr et al) 
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Figure 40. The Mobil EER in ice (ICETECH 2014) 
 
In a worst case situation, evacuation away from the installation by foot over the sea ice could 
be the only option. The challenge of evacuation by foot is followed up by challenges of 
survival on ice, localization and pickup from helicopters and/or standby vessels (Proactima 
2012). Evacuation in ice covered areas is such a challenging topic that Statoil has launched an 
initiative called “Finding the best solutions for evacuation in the Arctic”, where they are 
asking for ideas on how to handle this (Statoil 2012, evacuation over ice). 
 
Sea ice also implies serious challenges in man over board situations, both when it comes to 
finding the person, getting her out of the water and surviving until rescue (Proactima 2012). 
 
The possible presence of polar lows with strong wind, high waves, increased icing and large 
amounts of snow, also requires further studies on evacuation methods. In an evacuation 
situation within a polar low, usage of helicopter may not be an option, pickup of rafts and 
lifeboats from support vessels may be very demanding, and stability may be an issue for rafts 
and lifeboats (Proactima 2012). Due to cold, snow and general weather conditions, it is 
expected that there will be new design requirements for muster stations, evacuation routes and 
assembly points.  
 
RN04in Barents 2020 concluded that ISO19906 (Petroleum and natural gas industries – 
Arctic offshore structures), published in December 2010, is the only international standard 
which deals with Arctic EER issues and should therefore be used as a common basis for 
review, comments and subsequent recommendations. It was recognized and agreed that the 
relevant sections of ISO19906 (Chapter 18 and Appendix A18), provide appropriate 
normative requirements and informative guidance for EER operations in general Arctic 
conditions.  
RN04 in Barents 2020 chose to review the Barents Sea specific EER system requirements 
based on ISO19906 and standards such as ISO15544, Norsok Z-013 and Norsok S-001.  
None of the listed standards address all of the EER risks that are relevant for the Barents Sea. 
So it was recommended that the process for developing performance standards in Section 2.1 
should be used as a guide. A summary of each of the standards reviewed is provided in Table 
5 below, together with the limitations of each standard. Only ISO19906 is written specifically 
97 
to cover Arctic operations. The other standards are however valuable references where 
relevant.  
 
 
 
The RN04 Barents 2020 report is intended to be handed over to the ISO for consideration for 
updating the standard or to be included as an addendum to ISO19906. The Barents 2020 
report does not have official international status but it is hoped that national regulators will 
refer to the document as a complement to existing standards and guidelines. 
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Table 10 . List of Key Standards, Main Contents and RN04 Remarks: 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
4.13.2 Emergency Response Vessels 
 
An Arctic Emergency Response Vessel will most certainly be assigned tasks and functions 
other than those to fulfil its obligation as a rescue vessel. I will presents some of Arctic 
Emergency Response Vessels that have been developed, are under development, or under 
consideration. 
 
The construction of a state-of-the-art safety and standby vessel, will be a major milestone 
towards reaching the objective of a robust and effective oil spill preparedness system. On the 
Goliat field off the coast of Finnmark, Norway. The winterized vessel will be mobilized at the 
field location at all times, and will be designed and equipped to operate under the full range of 
Barents Sea conditions.  
The ship differs from other standby ships because it can accommodate daughter crafts or 
rescue boats directly on board through a special stern arrangement, even under difficult 
weather conditions, with waves of up to 10 m. The vessel has the Ulstein X-bow that, among 
other advantages, allows higher transit speed in rough weather, reduces fuel consumption, 
decreases spray, and reduces vibration levels. The ERV has a diesel electric propulsion 
system.  
The ship will be able to take on board 370 accident victims, and it will be able to operate as a 
tow and salvage vessel. The standby / rescue vessel is 80 m long and 17 m wide. It can 
operate at speeds of over 16 knots in calm weather, and is furnished for a crew of 40 people. 
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Figure 41.  Emergency Response Vessel for the Goliat Development  
(source: ulsteingroup.com) 
 
 
In the context of Russian governmental decisions and the Russian federal program 
“Development of the Transport System of Russia for 2012-2017”, a total of 4 multipurpose 
rescue and salvage vessels are under construction, capable of carrying out search and rescue 
and emergency response operations, ship-repair, towage and diving work in Arctic seas. The 
vessels will all be classed as KM Icebreaker AUT2 FF2 Salvage Ship. 
. 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Multipurpose rescue and salvage vessel for Arctic areas  
(source: Central Marine Research and Design Institute) 
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5.0 Data analyze 
 
In this chapter, I will present the empirical data that emerged during the information I have 
from NOROG and with interview with my all-respective informants. I have chosen to present 
the empirical data by theme based on my four research questions. 
 
1. Today’s HSE regime will be transferred to a new area ref 23rd licensing round. What is the 
new challenges follow towards regulatory requirements and industry standards, will it be too 
complicated and difficult to relate to it?  
 
2. What are the challenges with follow the use of a function based regulations in the oil sector 
 
3. In the Barents Sea area SW and SE and what are the specific challenges at the drilling 
location, e.g. met ocean parameters, seasonal variations, availability of emergency 
preparedness resources, and presence of sea ice etc. 
 
4. Is the distance to shore an issue? And what importance of preparedness this can have 
during operations Barents Sea SW and SE: 
 
The main objective for me was to identify the site specific challenges that impact the 
establishment of an adequate level of emergency response, identify gaps towards regulatory 
requirements and industry standards. And handling to defined emergency situations, and 
finally to identify mitigating measures relevant for handling of the site specific challenges. 
One of other questions to be answered in connection 23rd licensing round ,with the 
announcement of the new areas in the Barents Sea.  
 
 In Table 11, I present the classification statement above, the following sub questions has 
been analyzed and answered: 
  
Chapter Categories based on researchquestion Sub Categories 
5.1 challenges with follow the use of a 
function based regulations and new 
challenges follow towards regulatory 
requirements and industry standards 
 
 
What advantages do functional 
regulations offer? 
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Supervision, 
Company internal guidelines 
Responsibility 
5.2 Spesific challenges, Infrastructure 
Communication  
5.3 Area emergency 064 and 3 hour spec time, 
Traditional methods of EER may not 
be appropriate for most of the year. 
 
Table 11. Statement 
 
The main objective for me was to identify the site specific challenges that impact the 
establishment of an adequate level of emergency response, identify gaps towards regulatory 
requirements and industry standards. And handling to defined emergency situations, and 
finally to identify mitigating measures relevant for handling of the site specific challenges. 
One of other questions to be answered in connection 23rd licensing round ,with the 
announcement of the new areas in the Barents Sea. Is the distance to land and what 
importance of preparedness this can have during exploration operations Barents Sea East / 
West. Follows the distance to land I also have to investigate if any other physical conditions 
may have operational influence. 
5.1 Challenges  
 
In line with my research question one and two, I want to identify the challenges my 
Informants believe arising from the use of a function based regulations and new challenges 
follow towards regulatory requirements and industry standards.  In the following I will 
presented the challenges that are considered applicable for Barents Sea. 
5.1.1 What advantages do functional regulations offer? 
 
The provisions in Norway’s HSE regulations for the petroleum sector are formulated in a 
performance (functional) terms, and specify the safety level to be obtained. 
The interviews are concerned and ask, what is good enough in the Barents Sea, when they do 
not have any know standard.  They don’t like that the authorities  do not prescribe how this 
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level is to be achieved, which according to the informants gives the companies to much 
freedom in deciding how they should fulfill the official requirements in practice. 
Some of the informants do not think the government has the right knowledge and competence 
about how to operate in the Barents Sea. They are afraid for of the company will avoid 
technical advances by outstripping the regulatory framework and creating no need for 
constant revisions to keep the necessary standard in place 
At the same time they are worried the authorities leaves everything to the operators including 
the responsibility when they are using the functional requirements. They emphasize that 
planning and executing operations in order to meet the safety targets are a matter for the 
companies, and are concerned when this are connected up to a Bonus system who will have 
different incentive. 
Some informants think a performance-based solution places the responsibility on the industry 
itself, which not only has the greatest interest in doing the job but also possesses the necessary 
resources. They mention we have guidelines that are provided to avoid misunderstandings 
about what it takes to fulfill the regulations, and often refer to recognized Norwegian and 
international industrial standards. 
Some informants say that they trust the industry to make equipment or procedures for the 
Barents Sea standard, and a regulatory requirement is considered to be fulfilled when a 
recommended solution has been adopted. However, it is fully possible to choose an 
alternative approach providing the company can show that the demands have been met as well 
as or better than the standard. However, they says it should be a minimum standard to be used 
in the Barents Sea.  
Most of the informants agree that the industry usually goes far meet the challenges we face in 
the Barents Sea. However, some points out some companies do not take this seriously, and 
other companies who have lack of knowledge to understanding the Norwegian HSE regime, 
where one of the falls is that interpretation can result in poor safety. In addition, it expressed a 
special concern for smaller companies and international companies regarding this because 
they do not have knowledge of the function based regulation In Norway regulations. 
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All informants, referring to that function based regulations have a large spread, which leaves 
room for interpretation and discretion. This gives companies much power .Some informants 
notes that there could be some guesswork, and that it is inconsistent content of e.g. some 
services on the shelf. The informant points out that it is easier to relate to specific guidelines. 
The informant points out that there are great opportunities within the regulations, and that the 
responsible must ensure to build a system that works in accordance with the regulations. 
According to the interview informants, it is a major challenge with a wide interpretation of 
possibilities and it is up to the companies to solve this interpretation space. 
5.1.2 Supervision 
 
Another significant point that was highlighted during the interviewing was the relation to the 
Authority regulations. All respondents felt that the supervisory authorities providing great 
respect in the industry, but some of the respondents believe the government will face new 
challenges as they are not familiar with in Barents Sea, they stressed that the Ptil also must 
involve expert if there is a lack of knowledge in this area. Informants says supervision shape 
in Barents Sea must be similar to that in the south, meaning that it is risk based on trust, and 
participant in the Ptil believes that it is not any indication that one should change the 
supervision strategy. Informant say’s the Ptil does not approve the activity, but agree that, 
with the information provided, and they have confidence that the operators have done what 
they should do to drive responsibly and move forward. "So legally Ptil has declined 
something, but agreed that the companies' internal management system is in line with what 
the regulations require," said the informant.  
 
The informant in Ptil stated that their supervision form is based on trust, but stressed that 
Norway has a strong three party cooperation.  Which means that workers are in position to 
submit reports of concern to Ptil. And say it like this "companies cannot just do what they 
want because you will because we do not come on supervision" If Ptil gets reports of concern 
that remain unresolved, Ptil obviously will be involved as he point out. This do not the union 
informant is just as easy, and explains that one of the challenges of today's supervision form, 
is just that that is highly dependent on the safety delegate. To detect significant risks and avert 
incidents. He says, "Safety representatives are important and they serve as a kind of forward 
supervision". Nevertheless, he believes their role these days is weakened considerably 
because companies like Statoil cuts down on full time safety officers and chooses to roll out 
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this task on different people. Because of this the safety representative’s opportunity to speak 
out are weakened. This could have very negative consequences for safety issues offshore, and 
especially in the Barents Sea. 
5.1.3 Company internal guidelines 
 
Another challenge highlighted by several of the informants is, that internal company policies 
are applied and considered as established norm requirements. Informants believes Statoil's 
procedures have become normative for many companies, because they have good experience 
and good practices and because they know that their control systems have been approved. 
Union’s representative believes it is not only advantages to using someone else's guidelines.  
He said if we use someone else's guidelines, it could be difficult to know which assumptions 
is the reason for the different requirements. He gives an example as guidelines Statoil have 
designed a requirements to address they have certified personnel in a specific area. 
They certified their skills annually by external expertise in a specialist services. The person 
stressed that if some operators does not have the same skill level and maintenance regimes. 
There is a danger that there is a disparity between policy and the actual competence. Several 
of the informants point out that, they today have a good cooperation on HSE between the 
companies. However, emphasizes that the greatest danger is if an external two and 3 party 
companies copy, and used the documents for operations in the Barents Sea without knowing 
the background for this requirements. 
Another problem is that the companies who have drafted these guidelines make updates on a 
regular basis. If some companies used a copied version, they will not get a regularly update 
and their internal guidelines stands of risk of failure. 
 
Some of the informants pointed out that they believes it will have been much more 
appropriate to exposure requirements expressed as regulatory requirements or through its own 
standards, before they are taken from some companies. This is not necessarily, as Statoil is 
not in possession of good guidelines, but because these documents have certain assumptions 
that form the basis, and because there are living documents that are continuously improved 
and updated. Due to this, the regulatory requirements or own standards will to a much greater 
extent ensure a certain level of implemented services. 
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5.1.4 Responsibility 
 
All informants agree that the legislation should be updated and put into context, they also 
strongly pointed out the need for develop new standards and guidelines that are intended for 
used in the Barents Sea. When asked who should take responsibility for developing any 
guidelines and standards for the Barents Sea, the responding informants mean this should be 
left to the industry. They adding that the companies themselves must take an active role to 
define what is meant by adequate safety and preparedness in the Barents Sea. The informants 
believe that the development of a standard or guideline should be developed in a partnership 
between industry and the authorities be the use of the tripartite cooperation.  
5.2 Specific Challenges 
 
It was about the same information who come from interviews. Where there was little variation 
around the framework conditions that are considered critical for the operational preparedness 
in Barents Sea. 
5.2.1 Exterior environment 
 
Most of the informants highlight the climate as a new framework conditions in the Barents 
Sea. Climate challenges could be a challenge due to a medical, because the risks associated 
with climate injured will maybe increase. Wind combined with freezing temperatures can be a 
deadly combination.  Hypothermia will be a particular challenge, in a man overboard 
situation. This will be problematic if not survival suits are up to the climatic standard.  The 
sea and swell appears to be less demanding than in the south, such as the sea is less dramatic 
in Barents Sea than e.g.Norne, because one does not have the same sea wave profile. See 
Figure 43.  Barents Sea is climatically a big challenge, to the thinking that everything should 
flow easy are wrong, says informants. The union points out they often speak about have 
stationed helicopters on board, as a compensatory precaution. This is problematic underlines 
the informant because the helicopters will have trouble to fly much of the year because of the 
poor climate, fog and polar lows. One of the informants said that having stationed helicopters 
at the facilities is not always to the best, because they also must have a full crew in rotation, 
as well as a hangar due to the weather conditions. This is an incredibly costly operation. 
Informants in the union says there are companies’ responsibility to carry out a risk analysis to 
valid the climatic conditions, but they are questioning the EER if the helicopters are not 
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available. Informants in the union are very clear that the responsible is the operators to solve 
this issue.  
 
 
Figure 43.Wave Situation 
 
5.2.2 Infrastructure  
 
Another framework condition that concerns all the informants was the distance from offshore 
installations to land. All agree that the distances and infrastructure is the biggest challenge by 
working in the In Barents Sea SW / SE. Union representative says one will be more or less, 
left to ourselves, because we cannot expect that injured or sick personnel will be taken care 
by. As effectively as in the North Sea in general terms. One of the unions representative 
added that it sometimes sounds like people have an unrealistic wishes and expectation of an 
healthcare service offshore. The representative thinks there is a certain limitation of what a 
healthcare provider can handle offshore. We must accepted that working offshore is a risk and 
cannot save everyone regardless of medical condition and says "yes this is problematic, but 
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watch the fishing fleet, it had never been accepted that petroleum industry accepted the same 
HSE figures, is it really logical, no but that's the way it is " 
 
Another problem mentioned is the health infrastructure a shore in Finnmark. All informants 
believe that hospitals on the coast of Finnmark will have very difficult to dealing with some 
of the advanced medical cases. The informant in Ptil says that one must stop and not just think 
about what happens offshore, but also take into account how the patient will be transported, 
when they have come ashore. Certainly if the hospital in e.g. Hammerfest is not the right one, 
the patient must continue to Tromsø. The emergency medical chain is long and continues 
until the patient is in a hospital, that can provide adequate treatment emphasizes the same 
informant. 
 
One of the representative informed that there are still some skepticism about activities in the 
Barents Sea. Companies must therefore try to create a good emergency cooperation. Also 
between different parts including Health Nord. The person says "In a sense you could say that 
the whole of Finnmark is regarded as remote place, so in this way, companies must attempt to 
go into a dialogue and gain experience from the community up there, so that one can achieve 
good and safe health in case of an  Emergency accident offshore ". As a company, they must 
therefore win and gain trust for us working offshore, he said.  The Informants therefore wish 
to upgrade the infrastructure not only offshore but also onshore. For example, where the 
emergency devices offshore are linked to several health cares, and have direct lines of 
communication to relevant doctors or nurses. Who can stand ready to help “them” on the 
installation in case of an emergency. 
 
5.2.3 Communications 
 
Several of the informants highlights issues related to communications and satellite coverage. 
The union was particularly concerned about lack of communication lines so far north. They 
are very worried about what happens if they start with drilling operation in Barents Sea 
without having the communication in place. Moreover, they asking the questioning, who will 
take responsibility for firing up the satellites needed to bring a 24/7 coverage in Barents Sea. 
The unions believe there are many incentives in the industry that are hooked up in this. In 
addition, they want someone to take the front seat and kick off a communication project, but 
they knows that this costs money, and there for no one take responsibility. He adds "the 
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willingness to spend money on anything quite small." Union and other informants do not 
think it should be so difficult to solve this communication problem because the cost is 
relatively minimal if you compare it with what it costs to drill for oil. A must is to have 
cooperation with all players on the Norwegian shelf he added. 
5.3 Area Contingency 
 
All the informants believe 064 (Recommended guidelines for area emergency preparedness) 
is used as a guideline by the entire industry. One informant emphasizes that 064 
(Recommended guidelines for area emergency preparedness) has some of the overall goals 
that companies seem to measure up against, regardless of whether they have area contingency 
or not. Nevertheless he underlines concerned that he would like to see that some an additional 
document to 064 (Recommended guidelines for area emergency preparedness), who said 
anything about how to deal with the various new areas on the Norwegian shelf, and says, "It 
will make everyone's life much easier." 
 
In Barents Sea one informant said, there are not any scientific basis for changing the existing 
three-hour demand. According to other informants, it is great to see that they do not wish to 
reduce on the claim, but according to other, this requirement is immaterial, because the 
objective will not be achieved regardless.  Informants believe therefore, one should disregard 
the claim, and rather think about how to get the risk down in other ways. Informants said an 
obviously must strive to act quickly as possible if something happen, and not lean on the 
requirement and close our eyes to the reality. 
 
When it comes to the discussion whether the three-hour requirement will be applicable or not, 
says the informant, it is not a regulatory requirement, but it is expected that the companies say 
something about how to raise up against the requirement, and what might be done if you 
cannot reach it. While emphasizing the person said this is an ongoing discussion, because the 
industries will agree that 064 will not be applicable when there is no established area 
preparedness in the Barents Sea. For that, he says that they so far have the words intact, but 
that those supervisory authorities not necessarily agree. This is because one has a paragraph 
that says there that something is an "established practice" in the industry as it is regarded as an 
established safety requirement, and if companies choose to disregard this established practice 
must eventually answer why. 
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One informant expresses that you obviously want companies in Barents Sea who do not meet 
the three-hour requirement, but that it expects that compensatory measures are implemented. 
The informant also felt concerned that three hour requirement is horrible theoretical, and is 
just a number to indicate a general emergency level 
5.4 Summary 
 
Below In table 12.  I have summarized results and opinions. The summary is not exhaustive 
and some individual elements are not included. The following list will form the basis for what 
is taken forward to the discussion in the next chapter. 
 
Issue / Recommendations Challenges  
Regulations / Standards/Guidelines 
 
Through the work on HSWE challenges in the far north, a 
number of proposals have been made to establish new or 
revised Norwegian Oil and Gas guidelines  
 
The authorities’ leaves 
responsibility for to defining 
competence to companies and 
their risk analyzes. The 
analyzes is for overall, and 
reflects not competence needs 
in Barents Sea 
Risk Management 
 
For natural reasons, little specific experience exists in 
Norway from oil and gas operations in cold regions. A 
good deal of experience data (time series) related to oil and 
gas activities in the USA and Canada are available from 
the 1980s, but this material is fairly difficult to access.  
Where ignition sources are concerned, care must be taken 
in dealing with particular problems in the far north such as 
static electricity, termite  reactions and the like.  
The operator companies must 
assess whether a joint initiative 
would be appropriate for 
obtaining and systematizing 
this information from the USA 
and Canada.  
Unified approach to icebergs as input for analyses of 
defined situations of hazards and accidents (DSHA).  
 
Unified approach to icebergs as 
input for analyses of defined 
situations of hazards and 
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accidents (DSHA).  
 
Communications 
 
Operations pursued so far have resolved this issue in 
various ways and with somewhat varying quality.  
Broadband requirements in the Arctic and the far north 
(particularly the Norwegian and European sectors) are now 
being identified by the Norwegian Space Centre in 
cooperation with Telenor Satellite Broadcasting. This work 
forms part of a study on whether the basis exists for a 
Norwegian satellite communication system to provide 
broadband in the Arctic and the far north.  
Such a solution has a long time frame, given that it takes 
five years from the decision point to launch a satellite and 
that such devices then have an operating life of about 15 
years.  
An important contribution will be for the oil and gas 
industry to provide information about its (long-term) 
requirements. Operator companies should study their need 
for data communication and the advantages/drawbacks of 
various solutions available (fibreoptic cable and local 
coverage via mobile broadband versus satellite-based 
systems).  
Operator companies, vessel 
owners, Norwegian Space 
Centre., Norwegian oil and gas 
 
Space weather phenomena can affect communication and 
positioning, and their effect increases the higher the 
latitude. Forecasts are available today from several sources  
Operator companies and vessel 
owners.  
 
HELICOPTER LOGISTICS AND EMERGENCY 
PREPAREDNESS 
 
Need for more search and rescue (SAR) helicopters 
(national SAR helicopter in Tromsø?).  
 
The SAR helicopter in Hammerfest (Statoil/ENI) is the 
main resource, and is regarded as sufficient for this area – 
Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security (JBD).  
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with support from the national SAR resources at Banak 
and in Svalbard as well as from the Norwegian Coastguard  
Ensure that all helicopters are equipped with satellite 
communication, de-icing systems and so forth. The SAR 
helicopters must be equipped for all-weather search and 
rescue (Awsar) with the latest safety/ location systems, 
such as automatic identification system (AIS) tracking.  
 
Operator companies, 
committee for helicopter safety 
on the NCS (SF).  
Further rules are not 
considered necessary in this 
area today, but the SF has the 
subject on its agenda for 
ongoing work  
 
Helicopter range in Barents Sea South-East. Intermediate 
landing? Intermediate landing is not required for the 
southern Barents Sea since two helicopter types (S-
92/H225) are available which have the range to make 
return flights without needing to refuel. An extra landing 
would only increase the risk, and efforts should be made to 
avoid it.  However, this issue will be assessed in the event 
of a possible opening of Barents Sea North.  
Operator companies.  
Not relevant for the southern 
Barents Sea.  
 
Assess restrictions on weight (passenger numbers) in 
relation to distance. This is dealt with automatically in 
order to comply with applicable regulations. These mean 
that long-distance flights will reduce the ability to fill all 
the seats in the helicopter. Forthcoming upgrades to the S-
92/H225 machines will extend their range and increase 
capacity.  
Operator Companies.  
Secure the AWSAR helicopter in a hangar on an 
installation in a fixed location.  
A hangar would be required if it were considered 
necessary to position an SAR helicopter offshore in 
connection with a production facility in a fixed location. 
No plans exist for this today, since the Hammerfest base 
covers the area in a satisfactory manner.  
Since this is not a relevant 
issue today, measures do not 
need to be adopted now.  
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Study opportunities for transmitting medical data/images 
during flights – telemedicine.  
Operator companies (represented by Statoil) have 
addressed the need for inflight telemedicine with 
transmission directly to hospitals, including with the 
helicopter manufacturers.  
Operator companies, helicopter 
companies, helicopter 
manufacturers.  
Work is under way on this. 
Progress depends on 
technological advances.  
 
Assess the use of night vision goggles (NVG) for SAR 
crew during rescue operations.  
Work has been under way on this issue for a number of 
years. Agreement exists that the introduction of NVGs for 
SAR crew and as back up for crew on transport flights will 
enhance their vision in an SAR context and reduce the risk 
of landing at and taking off from locations such as Bear 
Island and Hammerfest.  
Because of long processing time (more than two years) at 
the manufacturer and European civil aviation authorities, 
implementing the use of NVGs in the remaining contract 
period would be impractical  
 
Operator companies in 
cooperation with the helicopter 
companies.  
Work will be pursued to get 
this requirement implemented 
for the next contract round in 
Hammerfest and for possible 
new contracts covering this 
area.  
 
Emergency Preparedness 
 
A good collaboration with the Northern Norway Regional 
Health Authority is essential for both telemedicine and 
general medical preparedness in the far north.  
The Northern Norway Regional Health Authority has a 
large and well-functioning emergency response 
organization. In collaborating with the offshore industry, 
the challenges will lie in coordinating routines and 
communication channels, [ensuring] compatible medical 
monitoring and communication systems, and a common 
understanding of the problems based on the circumstances. 
[It] welcomes a joint initiative by the offshore industry to 
Operator 
companies/Norwegian Oil and 
Gas, Northern Norway 
Regional Health Authority  
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establish a collaboration over these challenges.  
Experience from cooperation with the Western Norway 
RHA is a good reference here.  
White Paper no 7 (2011-2012) on the high north indicates 
that the government believes the petroleum industry must 
accept a widened rescue responsibility – in other words, an 
expectation exists that private players will have a rescue 
responsibility beyond the 500-metre zone around an 
installation.  
Norwegian Oil and Gas recommended guideline no 064 on 
establishing area emergency preparedness assumes that the 
division of rescue responsibility will be the same in all 
parts of the NCS – in other words, that the private players 
have rescue responsibility in a 500-metre zone around 
offshore installations, while the public rescue resources are 
responsible for responses from land out to the 500-metre 
zone.  
The new national AW101 rescue helicopters, with 
substantially increased range and capacity, will be phased 
in during 2018-19. Through their SAR helicopters, 
however, the operators will always ensure a satisfactory 
emergency response for the whole flight phase to and from 
their installations.  
Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security (JBD).  
 
Assess area emergency preparedness in the Barents Sea  
Uncertainty prevails so far about whether and where fixed 
facilities might be installed in the area on a scale which 
could form the basis for a formal area emergency 
preparedness scheme. Action must await this clarification 
as a result of developments 
Operator companies  
Area emergency response is 
assessed when several 
permanent operations/fixed 
facilities are to be established 
in an area, so that collaboration 
over preparedness can be 
considered.  
 
Are special performance requirements for emergency Operator companies.  
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preparedness required in the far north?  
The operator companies must ensure that their emergency 
preparedness analyses take account of conditions in the far 
north. Since it covers area emergency preparedness, 
Norwegian Oil and Gas recommended guideline no 064 on 
establishing area emergency preparedness will not be 
relevant in the far north for a very long time (the 
requirement is several fixed facilities in geographical 
proximity).  
All stakeholders share one HSWE goal for petroleum 
activities in the far north – these operations will have a 
satisfactory level of risk. In other words, the level must be 
satisfactory and prudent regardless of where petroleum 
activities take place on the NCS.  
The level of risk must be 
satisfactory and prudent 
regardless of where petroleum 
activities take place on the 
NCS.  
 
Need to identify alternative evacuation sites, including 
methods and transport for personnel in emergencies.  
Can the Bear Island and Hopen area be used, today as 
evacuation sites, since they have facilities, helicopter 
landing sites and fuel?  
 
The operator companies must 
plan for alternative evacuation 
sites based on location-specific 
conditions.  
Bear Island and hopefully 
Hopen can be used today as 
evacuation sites, since they 
have facilities, helicopter 
landing sites and fuel. 
Facilitating safe helicopter 
operations as well as necessary 
equipment must be taken into 
account when developing 
emergency preparedness plans.  
A beacon on survival suits could represent an important 
aid in SAR operations.  
Several operating companies have incorporated a beacon 
in their survival suits. The industry should consider 
working for common solutions.  
At the request of the operator 
companies/vessel owners, 
Norwegian Oil and Gas and the 
Norwegian Ship owners 
Association can consider 
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including this requirement in a 
future update of Norwegian Oil 
and Gas recommended 
guideline 094 on requirement 
specifications for survival suits 
on the NCS.  
 
Given certain location specific weather phenomena, 
conditions could arise during emergencies, which make it 
difficult to use ordinary rescue facilities, such as 
helicopters and lifeboats.  
Alternative evacuation facilities, such as the Frog, bridges 
and vessels with heave-compensating systems, could be 
relevant in the far north.  
At the request of the operator 
companies/vessel owners, 
Norwegian Oil and Gas and the 
Norwegian Ship owners 
Association can develop 
descriptions of available 
solutions for operations in the 
far north.  
 
Establish location-specific emergency response solutions, 
including good medical preparedness, which take account 
of the relevant conditions.  
This also includes ensuring satisfactory communication 
during emergencies.  
The operator companies must 
plan their operations on the 
basis of location-specific 
conditions.  
 
Are special requirements related to medical services/duty 
doctors and medical resources needed offshore in the far 
north?  Possible requirements in this area are set by the 
government, which must assess the issue.  
Directorate of Health, 
Petroleum Safety Authority 
Norway.  
Possible measures must be 
taken by the government.  
 
Climatic Conditions 
 
More reliable weather forecasting systems in the far north, 
particularly for Polar lows, troughs (in other words, very 
intensive snowstorms), fog and icing forecasts for ships, 
rigs or fixed installations.  
Operator companies and vessel owners must follow up the 
The operator companies will 
seek to install automated 
weather observing systems 
(Awos) on the rigs they use for 
exploration drilling, as well as 
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requirements in the official consent concerning weather 
observations and collaboration with Met.no. This will help 
to improve the quality of forecasting in these areas by 
providing more measurement points and ensuring that such 
data are incorporated directly in ongoing predictions.  
Improvements can be achieved here relatively easily 
through better collaboration between the players. This 
means that the industry provides more measuring points on 
rigs, fixed installations and data buoys. As well as 
assessing opportunities for including supply ships on long-
term charters Met.no contributes through further 
development of forecasting models and provides 
guidelines on delivering met ocean data (frequency, format 
and quality) so that this information can be incorporated 
directly in the weather forecasting models.  
 
reporting weather conditions 
with the aid of trained 
observers. As the only fixed 
installation in the area at 
present, Goliat will also 
provide this.  
Furthermore, efforts will be 
made to ensure that Met.no 
Tromsø is given access to these 
data in addition to other 
desired information (such as 
sea state and so forth) from the 
rigs.  
 
A joint industry project (JIP) 
currently being established 
under Statoil’s leadership will 
involve interested companies 
(more than 10) in a three-year 
programmed. This will deploy 
around seven data buoys to 
improve met ocean 
measurement information.  
 
The Norwegian Meteorological Institute has submitted a 
project proposal to the Arctic 2030 programed being run 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for implementing a 
completely new computer model of the Barents Sea. This 
will incorporate sea states, sea ice and atmospheric 
conditions. The model will have a higher resolution that 
any earlier work in the area. Seeking collaboration with the 
oil and gas industry could be relevant in order to ensure 
that the model established becomes even better at 
Operator companies, vessel 
owners, Norwegian 
Meteorological Institute  
Providing that a need and a 
wish exist among its members, 
Norwegian Oil and Gas will 
establish a collaboration with 
the Norwegian Meteorological 
Institute.  
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providing a picture of weather, sea states and ice warnings 
in the far north.  
 
 
Need for growler warnings. These large lumps of ice in the 
open sea may represent a potential risk, particularly for 
drill strings and the like.  
This is a demanding job, and no dedicated warning service 
has so far been put in place.  
The operator companies/vessel owners must ensure 
monitoring and adaptation to the actual climatic conditions 
in the relevant area.  
Operator companies, vessel 
owners, Norwegian 
Meteorological Institute.  
 
Need for better icing forecasts – both atmospheric and 
from sea spray.  
Operator companies can currently request regular icing 
forecasts from the Norwegian Meteorological Institute.  
The institute has been urged to initiate relevant 
studies/modelling work on icing conditions in cooperation 
with operator companies/ vessel owners. Must also be 
viewed in relation to the Polar Code  
Norwegian Meteorological 
Institute, Marintek and other 
relevant research institutions, 
operator companies, vessel 
owners  
 
Improve local weather forecasting/observations by 
installing X-band radar on rigs and fixed installations.  
Reference has been made to experience with this in 
Canada.  
Goliat will have X-band radars with a range of about 45 
kilometers (while the land-based weather radars have a 
range of about 250 kilometers).  
Included in ENI’s plans for 
Goliat as part of an extensive 
programmed for weather 
observations  
 
Operational Conditions 
 
Need for operational collaboration where relevant, 
including in connection with infrastructure for logistics 
and emergency response functions.  
The Barents Sea Exploration Collaboration (Basec) 
established between operator companies will look at these 
waters, but with special emphasis on the 23rd round.  
Operator companies.  
Further cooperation will be 
initiated when required.  
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It there a need for alternative personnel transport (instead 
of helicopters) Assess methods, systems and infrastructure 
for alternative personnel logistics/transport.  
Reliable and efficient personnel transport can be a 
challenge because fog may be very extensive at times; long 
distances are involved and so forth. Using various types of 
ships could then be relevant.  
 
At the request of the operator 
companies/vessel owners, 
Norwegian Oil and Gas and the 
Norwegian Ship owners 
Association can develop 
descriptions of available 
solutions for operations in the 
far north.  
 
Ice management systems must be established for 
operations in ice-covered waters.  
Extensive experience has been acquired on this issue 
outside the NCS and by international companies which 
undertake such assignments. The issue is regarded as 
resolved for the areas currently opened. Ice management 
plans were prepared, for example, in connection with 
Hopen. These primarily involved satellite monitoring and, 
if the ice comes close, plugging the well and moving the 
rig from the location. The need for possible improved 
warnings of ice, icebergs  
 
Operator companies  
Considered for operations in 
locations where ice can occur, 
primarily in the north/east. 
 
Table 12. Results and opinions 
 
6.0 Discussion  
 
In this, the part of thesis I want to discuss different issue whom a forms foundation for thesis. 
The first being discussed is how problematic it can be if companies and governments relate to 
current norm requirements stipulated in the industry's own guideline (064) and who says to 
get e.g. patient to a hospital ashore during three hours. 
 
I will then also discuss the competence and equipment and how the use of legal standards can 
prevent regulatory compliance. I will here highlight contradictions in regulatory provisions, 
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and the themes discussed in the light of the theory of the function based regulations, the use of 
legal standards as well as issues related to soundness concept in health and well care services. 
Following the adoption of legal standards. This is seen in the light of different issues as 
challenge mentioned is how responsibility refer style an industry, which means a risk of lack 
of knowledge basis and economic willingness to comply with regulatory provisions 
 
I will also discuss how the hiring of professionals can provide challenges for regulatory 
compliance. Hired offshore people has generally not as a framework that professionals 
employed by the operating companies. This can result in less maintenance of competence in 
terms of training and courses, and there is a real danger that the personnel when not possess 
the skills given the impression that they have. Hired people are also more on the sidelines 
when it comes to participation rights, and in a weaker position to give informed criticism. 
Thus, this may represent a challenge for the emergency preparedness in Barents Sea 
 
I will then show how the use of legal standards may prevent a successful supervision strategy. 
This will be discussed in the light of the above issues. Authorities have like industry a limited 
knowledge base for areas in Barents Sea. It questioned how the authorities should assess 
whether the emergency is in line with practice and if the authorities and the industry has 
established a common "best practice"  
 
It the last chapter in this,  I will addresses the challenges in the Barents Sea SW /SE for 
develop  and see what concrete steps should be implemented to have a safe operation with the 
challenges identified and discussed earlier. 
6.1 Distance  
 
A discussion of this thesis has been about the significance of the large distances, we can have 
for e.g. a medical preparedness in Barents Sea. There is no doubt that the risk factors are 
different in Barents Sea, versus the rest of the Norwegian shelf. Therefore, I must be a high 
level of health safety on board an installation in the Barents Sea. 
 
The medical preparedness on the Norwegian continental shelf is measured up against the 
norm requirement given in the industry's own guideline from NOROG (2012) "064 
Guidelines for establishing area emergency". In this guideline 064 (Recommended guidelines 
for area emergency preparedness) emphasized that it is not found professional basis need for 
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establishing specific efficiency requirements for Barents Sea, and it noted that this in 
requirement DFU7 "Personal injury / illness requiring external assistance" are particularly 
important to fulfill. Efficiency requirement in DFU 7 indicate that a patient should be taken to 
hospital during three hours, also I Barents Sea (NORORG, 2012: 11). 
 
The academic rationale for setting an efficiency requirement of three hours has its basis in 
community health in a remote village on the country .Here one reasonable demands for 
transport to hospital in such a situation is within 90-120 minutes, if the air ambulance is not 
available. Accordingly, it has therefore not found any scientific basis that would suggest a 
change that involves lengthening the time requirement. If changes should be made this should 
be reduced ant not increased the requirement. (Preventor, 2012: 66). 
 
 
Table 13.  Flight distances (nm/km) to locations A, B, C and D 
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Figure 44. Area SE Barents Sea 
If a patient requires emergency medevac may the worst possible scenario be that one must 
carry the injured ashore by boat. A standby vessel with an average speed of 15,5knop will use 
minimum19 hour from the far Installations in the Barents Sea to Hammerfest. Another 
important point in this connection is that the emergency medical chain does not stop then 
the man arrives. Transportation of the most serious cases will mean that "Driving by" past 
local hospitals for example in Hammerfest, and go directly to a hospital with specialist for 
diagnosis is set (Preventor, 2012). If this is Tromsø in this case we must expect further 45 
minutes flying time from Hammerfest to Tromsø (Hoell e tal., 2012) 
 
Dealing with the guideline 064 (Recommended guidelines for area emergency preparedness) 
,as an industry requirement for the area emergency is highly debatable in the Barents Sea.  In 
an initial phase in Barents Sea, one would not have established an area emergency. In a way it 
is possible that 064 (Recommended guidelines for area emergency preparedness) is not 
applicable in Barents Sea. Nevertheless, this can be viewed from another angle. If Ptil in their 
regulations referring to policies in regulations, and companies choose to deviate from these 
recommended solutions they are obliged by virtue of § 24 of the Framework Regulations 
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(2011) to show that the chosen solutions are at least as good as those recommended in the 
regulations. 
 
Ptil does not refer to NOORG guideline 064 (Recommended guidelines for area emergency 
preparedness) in the regulations, but still expiries that almost all companies says something 
about where they stand, measured up against 064 (Recommended guidelines for area 
emergency preparedness). Let use e.g. take ENI and their installation at Goliat. Goliat was to 
be the first oil field to come on production in the Barents Sea and that without area 
preparedness. Despite this ENI, wish an emergency standard at least equivalent of area 
preparedness (Preventor, 2012). 
 
In this way, it is possible that 064(Recommended guidelines for area emergency 
preparedness) is an expression of what is considered proper business when it comes to 
emergency of. E.g., transit of transport with injured personnel to mainland. By virtue of 
Section 10 of the Framework Regulations (2011) may Ptil assume that 064 is an "established 
practice" in the industry and challenge those companies that do not relate to 064 in light of 
this paragraph, where it says "A high standards of health, safety and security must be 
established and further developed " (the Framework Regulations, 2011). In this way it is 
therefore also be argued that 064 will be applicable as a guideline for emergency l 
preparedness, in the Barents Sea. 
 
Given that 064 (Recommended guidelines for area emergency preparedness) could be 
considered a current guideline, it is apparent that in Barents Sea we will face situations, where 
it would be far from to meet the industry's own industrial requirements. Based on a three-hour 
requirement one cannot ensure adequate health services in Barents Sea, and one must 
therefore establish adequate health services in another way. 
 6.2 Functionality Challenges 
 
As previously, mentioned one has chosen a function based regulations for several reasons. 
Among other things, there is a presumption that trough the performance criteria adding more 
to ensure continuous development and customized solutions in the industry (Haugland, 2012). 
According to the union, will it in line with the theory also be far easier for the authorities to 
design functional requirements. The functional requirements must still be filled with specific 
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content through industry standards and "best practices" (ibid.). According to May (2003), it 
has been problematic to formulate objectives and results specific to a function based 
 regulations regime. Functional requirements, who can be decomposed and concretized in 
quantitative variables, are reasonably manageable. While functional requirements expressed 
in qualitative size illustrated in petroleum regulations in kapittel.2.3 is significantly more 
demanding for all parties (Haugland, 2012). 
 
The rules as it is designed with function oriented rules and using legal standards, and a large 
amount of voluntary industry standards, provides a large room for interpretations. It is in this 
context appropriate to distinguish between interpretation of significance” determining the 
legal maneuver” and interpretation as» choice among several legal alternatives." The first 
meaning applies legal framework for the business, while the second shows the industry's 
independent responsibility for security. These two meanings of the term «interpretation» is 
also significant in the discussion on remedies. Where the first shows to order / stop that means 
that must instruments we must have pursuant to applicable laws and regulations, and which 
may be reviewed by administrative complaints shows the other standard development, 
dialogue and guidance. 
Accountability of operators occurs while they are given a large room for maneuver, which in 
some leading to uncertainty as to what at any time is appropriate and correct. Some who`s 
was interview regardless of affiliation, report the need for greater clarity and predictability in 
all areas because interpretation processes. In some contexts are perceived as resource and cost 
intensive. On the other hand, it appears that a majority of the people I interview, agree, that 
this is the price that must be paid, for this type of regulatory structure. However, it seems 
easier for large companies to accept this cost dimension than the new licensees. The new 
licensees on the Barents Sea are increasingly looking to more guidance and detailed 
requirements related to regulations. This also applies to interview groups of drilling 
contractors and ISO subjects, i.e. from enterprises, which take different type of maintenance 
and engineering task´s 
 
Interview members emphasizes without exception that the function oriented regulations are 
functioning very well. The use of dialogue, between the authorities and duty subject without 
the use of formal instruments, "is one of the important" policy grip "for the Ptil. Several of 
interviewed shows, that dialogue is a necessary interaction form and a means to follow up on 
a function oriented goal oriented legislation, that provides both duty subject and authority a 
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wider scope for selection of detailed solutions. Several interview groups among operators 
highlighting "dialogue" as the preferred goal to work with. Interview safety delegate and 
safety service is mainly positive to the function oriented regulatory framework, but calls for a 
greater degree of detailed regulation of specific areas. This is particularly areas related to 
work environment, where laws and regulations have largely been subject to interpretation of a 
”determination of maneuver» and how it has been required judicial review in order to clarify 
the legal basis and legal status. 
 
6.3 Requirement and legal standard 
 
The legislation used to regulate the requirements for professionals and devices is expressed as 
shown in section 2 as legal standards. The requirements are at a parent level, which uses 
expressions such as "fully satisfactory". 
 
What qualifies as "fully satisfactory"? Will that also be changed in line with the development 
of new knowledge and changes in society's perceptions of values (Proposition. 91L, 2010 --- 
2011: 263). When to establish what is in the acceptability requirements for services at a 
facility in Barents Sea, we must interpret through to the core of the legal standard. In some 
cases it is not self-explanatory .This refers to, and must see together with preparatory works, 
interpretations and guidelines for to understand the scale to be used (Haugland, 2012). 
 
Haugland (2012) shows in Figure 11 in section 4.4.2, that the core of a legal standard will 
consist of various conditions, which constitute the components for proper professional 
practice. Regarding readiness Barents Sea can the core may be for example 
consist of: 
 Competence 
 raining and maintenance of competence 
 organization of service equipment 
 procedures 
 staffing 
 
In Facilities Regulations (2011) section 21says only that "(Offshore emergency preparedness 
cooperation)” shall be equipment on the facility so that it can be given e.g. First aid and 
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medical treatment. Furthermore, it is elaborated that the equipment should be defined 
Based on defined risk and accidents. Requirements are therefore no specific requirements for 
devices in the regulatory framework that ensures a minimum outfitting of a facility. The 
guideline of NAND, 015 (1994) specifies equipment, but the guideline is over 20 years old 
and therefore outdated 
 
Ptil states that the current requirements are intended as a minimum requirement, and points 
out that although it lacks standards for areas such as Barents Sea then rules will be adequate, 
for this part of the Norwegian shelf. The reason for such an assertion would be that there is a 
regulatory framework, which is at a very high level. It is set in § 10 of 
Framework Regulations (2011) require that the business should be fully justified and in § 11 
of the Framework Regulations (2011) requires that companies undertake a risk reduction. 
Simultaneous as in the Management Regulations (2011), § 17presiseres at the responsible 
shall carry out risk analyzes that provide a complete and comprehensive picture of risk 
factors. In related guidance emphasized that to meet the requirements of risk and readiness 
prepares should companies use NORSOK Z 013. According to the informant in Ptil is the 
high-level paragraphs sufficient to cover all the activity on the Norwegian shelf. 
 
Based on regulatory provisions have the informant on Ptil in principle right, and it may be 
difficult to argue that the regulations are not adequate. But a successful control strategy that 
emphasizes self-regulation through the use of a function based legislation requires that 
declared yardsticks either in or outside the regulations that specify the legal standards and sets 
a standard for "best practice" (Haugland, 2012). Only then can we ensure the regulations will 
facilitate development and customized solutions for individual organizations (ibid.). At first 
glance, it may in line with what the informant in Ptil says, watch out for that regulations are 
adequate to ensure proper emergency in Barents Sea SW/SE, but with an absence of standards 
and norms for "best practice" is reasonable to argue that legislation is actually not adequate, 
despite overall requirements. 
 
It is also recognizes that standardization work is important, "Going to continue with function 
based regulation, development and further development of standards and norms which 
legislation may refer to. If this work crumbles, will also the foundation for function based 
approach away "(Kjeldstad, 2015: 48). 
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So even if the government can demonstrate overriding requirement of proper business 
Is it reasonable to assume that the foundation behind regulatory provisions are in the process 
of crumble. Based on Figure 5, presented in Section 2.4.4 of different typologies of risk 
regulation (Engen et al., 2013), it seems that self-regulation (type II) is the approach to risk 
management of the emergency. This means that the vast room for maneuver left to industry, 
and without established norms of "best practice», the government can risk regulatory 
approach conceivably get several unintended consequences. 
 
Another underlying cause, which was pointed out as a root cause in many accidents at Sea, 
was that the crew had inadequate education and training (ibid). How much time and resources 
spent on skills, education and training of personnel is currently very dependent company 
(Guldbrandsen, 2015). An operator is usually subject to a carefully planned and resource set 
maintenance program, and have the finances to implement improvement measures if deemed 
necessary. On the other hand, hiring company often have short term missions, limited follow 
up resources and weak risk management systems (Dahle & Zachariassen, 2015). This may 
result in companies that rent out professionals have poorer exercise regimens than operating 
companies. In downturns, this company cut it first in training and courses and the level of 
competence will decrease. The informant from Ptil expressing a concern about what the 
economic downturn oil industry, because this now can influence on the HSE. Therefore, there 
is also a danger that the operator side because of cut on training and expertise in tight 
economic times, because regulatory requirements allow for this to happened. 
 
Based on regulatory requirements, it may seem that it may be difficult to pinpoint that a 
service is unjustifiable, even though training regime is relatively weak. As long as companies 
can demonstrate that people per period and have a certain degree of training (§ 23, the 
Activities Regulations, 2011), it may appear that one is within the scope of action of the legal 
standard which will be regarded as justifiable for training, 
 
One should therefore aim to specify a standard for "best practices" of what is adequate 
training for professionals and that kind of training what is needed. One will then increasingly 
ensure that the hiring company meets the requirements for such management of competence, 
and that they have a training regime that is in line with sound professional practice 
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6.4 Trust and control 
 
With a feature based regulations that provide more "legal alternatives" is required, that Ptil 
has a functional confidence that companies choose the best alternative and that they have the 
necessary internal control system to ensure regulatory compliance. On the other hand, 
companies must also rely on the Authority has established the right supervision and control 
chains (ibid.). 
 
The challenge within the scope of action in the legal standards, will for the supervisory 
authorities be balancing, between trust and control, and functional trust and distrust. The 
supervisory authorities aims for a "really responsive and risk based regulatory approach". 
That means supervisory authority must take into account changes in purpose structures and 
priorities, changes in resource availability, markets and technologies. This requires 
continuous vigilance, flexibility and adaptability (Kringen, 2012). Fintland & Braut (2012) 
also emphasizes that a good supervision must have a broad understanding of risk for the areas 
they oversees 
 
If the supervisory authorities fail to take account of the new regulatory framework in the 
Barents Sea. In addition, an industry in continuous development, one stands in danger of 
overlooking some important areas that may represent a risk for the emergency preparedness in 
Barents Sea (ibid.). Informants in Ptil say, that today's supervision strategy will remain. This 
may indicate that supervisory the government is currently developing a dysfunctional trust to 
industry, where a trust blindly that companies will choose the best solutions for the 
emergency preparedness in Barents Sea (Tharaldsen, 2011). However, with today's 
requirements, it is difficult for the industry to know which solutions who actually will be 
selected, to ensure regulatory compliance. In addition, the industry is in a very tight financial 
situation and the risk of selecting suboptimal solution increased (ibid.). This indicates that the 
authorities who attending should have a functional distrust of the industry where a take 
realistic precautionary considerations. 
 
In the Barents Sea, this may mean that you need to change approach. Today's supervision 
form is superior and primarily founded on a system audit. This allows the industry to be 
relatively unproblematic to demonstrate good management without reality is just as nice 
(Ryggvik, 2012). If the authorities do not have, a standard of "best practices" to assess 
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management systems against it may be problematic to detect security flaws in the emergency 
preparedness (Haugland, 2012). Governments should therefore not push from them the 
liability. They should aim to improve the knowledge base so that supervision is better 
equipped. To understand the risks that represent a security challenge for the emergency 
preparedness in the Barents Sea. The authorities should also supervise other risk challenges in 
the south than in the north, and control chains should be happy sharpened 
In terms of such an increased visibility in the Barents Sea. The informant in Ptil expresses that 
a changes in supervision strategy will be to show distrust. I think this somewhat narrow 
thinking. To adapt to new challenges in the Barents Sea, and modify the supervision strategy 
can rather be referred to as a functional confidence in industry. Where one takes healthy 
precautions in areas where uncertainties are prominent (Tharaldsen, 2011). 
 
The Authorities should therefore be more involved in the standardization work to establish a 
Norm for "best practices" that both government and industry can assess emergency 
preparedness up to. This will increase quality in a supervisory practice, because supervisors 
will be better equipped to know what standard or rule of law, in assessing the emergency 
preparedness up in the (Fintland & Braut, 2012). In this way, also the industry will gain 
increased confidence that the Authority is not based on random and discretionary ratings of 
individual supervisors. 
 
A function-based approach to regulating emergency preparedness can provide clear benefits. 
A function based regulations allow for customized solutions in the industry, and Aven (2007) 
emphasizes that the use of functional requirements can contribute to greater freedom for 
decision makers when selecting solutions and procedures that best suit their own business. 
Haugland (2012) also emphasizes that one is dependent on legal standards in legislation in 
order to achieve an appropriate regulation on areas in continuous development. However, this 
seems to have some challenges when it comes to ensuring proper emergency preparedness in 
the Barents Sea. I seem to represent some challenges for the emergency preparedness in 
Barents Sea. As long as the requirements are as little specific is the danger of 
misinterpretation of regulations large (Engen et al., 2013). 
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6.5 Observation Regulations 
 
Without exception, the groups of people I interview are very positive to the Norwegian HSE 
regime, its behavior and intent. The principle of a by purpose and risk based regulations on 
functional requirements are considered as successful.  Where one manages to get a 
complicated industry to work for the government and the industry goal of safe and efficient 
operation. It is also considered as positive that the authorities (governor) perform its tasks 
without incurring substantial resources for inspections and controls. This is an effect of the 
internal principle which emphasizes and clarifies that the responsibility for safety lies with the 
operators. 
 
An essential principle of the HSE regulations and supervision is the accountability of the 
Operators. An accountability of the Operators has meant that companies and the industry 
overall is initiating projects going beyond the requirements of the regulations. This also 
happens in cooperation with local authorities, but then on an equal basis .This work has been 
and will be, a significant contribution to the overall HSE level in the petroleum activities. If 
this volunteer work should work in a good way, the prerequisites for this work have to be 
predictable. From the industry's point of view a driver for this type of work often also 
avoidance of introduction of rigid regulatory provisions. Regulation will not always be the 
most appropriate instrument, and it cannot be an end in itself that everything should be in 
regulations. In a review of HSE regulations it must be considered whether the objective can 
be achieved by instruments other than regulation (soft law). 
 
Besides referring to everything that can be achieved, without the use of regulations (voluntary 
work) and the accountability of the industry, also shows the quote to another feature of the 
regulations, namely that it is adaptable across organizational and technical changes. Several 
interview members emphasized the importance of the regulations do not hinder the 
willingness and ability to develop and adopt new technology. Some of the informants also 
showed how prescriptive regulations elsewhere e.g. In the US, is an obstacle to innovations 
and implementation of new technical solutions and organizational forms. 
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6.5 Observation functionality and interpretations 
 
The rules as is designed with function oriented rules, and using legal standards and a large 
amount of voluntary industry standards, provides a large room for interpretations. It is in this 
context appropriate to distinguish between interpretation of significance «determining the 
legal maneuver” and interpretation as» choice among several legal alternatives." The first 
meaning applies legal framework for the business, while the second shows the industry's 
independent responsibility for security. These two meanings of the term «interpretation «is 
also significant in the discussion on remedies. Where the first shows to order / stop that means 
that must instruments we must have pursuant to applicable laws and regulations, and which 
may be reviewed by administrative complaints shows the other standard development, 
dialogue and guidance. 
Accountability of operators occurs while they are given a large room for maneuver, which in 
some leading to uncertainty as to what at any time is appropriate and correct. Some who`s 
was interview regardless of affiliation report the need for greater clarity and predictability in 
all areas because interpretation processes, in some contexts are perceived as resource  and cost 
intensive. On the other hand it appears that a majority of the people I interview agree that this 
is the price that must be paid for this type of regulatory structure. However, it seems easier for 
large companies to accept this cost dimension than the new licensees. The new licensees on 
the Barents Sea are increasingly looking to more guidance and detailed requirements related 
to regulations. This also applies to interview groups of drilling contractors and ISO subjects, 
i.e. from enterprises, which take different type of maintenance and engineering task´s 
 
Interview members emphasizes without exception that the function oriented regulations are 
functioning very well. The use of dialogue between the authorities and duty subject without 
the use of formal instruments, "is one of the important" policy grip "for the Ptil. Several of 
interviewed shows that dialogue is a necessary interaction form and a means to follow up on a 
function oriented goal oriented legislation that provides both duty subject and authority a 
wider scope for selection of detailed solutions. Several interview groups among operators 
highlighting "dialogue" as the preferred goal to work with. Interview safety delegate and 
safety service is mainly positive to the function oriented regulatory framework, but calls for a 
greater degree of detailed regulation of specific areas. This is particularly areas related to 
work environment, where laws and regulations have largely been subject to interpretation of a 
132 
«determination of maneuver» and how it has been required judicial review in order to clarify 
the legal basis and legal status. 
6.6 Industry challenges  
 
On the issue if it is need for simplification of legislation, most of raters are positive. They will 
not, however with clear proposals about how these changes should come and what such 
changes should involve. Participants in some of the interview complain that regulations are 
complicated and it is difficult to relate to. In this context the challenges associated with 
multiple and overlapping industry standards highlighted. Here request some of the 
interviewed harmonization and internationalization. In practice, there's no way around 
standards, but the question is whether the content of individual standards to a greater extent 
will be added to legislation and regulations so that they become legally binding.  That the 
maintenance of standards also not in line with the technological and organizational 
development, the compounded by the high level of activity that prevails at the moment. 
Several interest groups therefore stresses that the industry urgently intensify efforts to develop 
the standards. 
 
However some informant has reported a weaker understanding and lack of knowledge of the 
regime on the Norwegian shelf in some executives within foreign Companies. This also 
applies for managers linked to the offshore installation in parent company. Lack of knowledge 
is not performed as a big challenge and with a strong degree of delegation to the Norwegian 
departments and Norwegian leaders. Also among the new licensees in the Barents Sea there is 
little interest to change the rules. They requested greater clarity and predictability, but it is 
more aimed at how the regulations should be practiced than a desire to change the main 
structure. The function oriented regulations meet certain challenges related to changes in 
player picture. Interview the groups believe that the current situation suggests some 
adjustments, but no one is proposing comprehensive revision of the rule. Both Regulatory 
Forum and Safety Forum is regarded as important areas where the social partners and 
representatives of authority hold discusses overall safety issues in the industry. So although 
the descriptions of the tripartite predominantly occurs in a positive terms. 
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6.6.1 Related to regulations and standard 
 
A function-based approach to regulating preparedness can provide clear benefits. A function 
based regulations allow for customized solutions in the industry, and Aven (2007) emphasizes 
that the use of functional requirements can contribute to greater freedom for decision makers 
when selecting solutions and procedures that best suit their own business. Haugland (2012) 
also emphasizes that one is depending on the legal standards in the legislation in order to 
achieve an appropriate regulation in areas subject to continuous development. Nevertheless, 
this seems to pose challenges when one is required to ensure proper emergency preparedness 
in the Barents Sea. The handling room seems to be so large that it may represent security 
challenges for the emergency preparedness in the Barents Sea. As long as the requirements 
are as little specific is the danger of misinterpretation of regulations are large (Engen et al., 
2013). 
 
Aven (2007) discusses whether it is possible to find an "optimal" rule for how to break down 
the general requirements for more detailed. Although many have tried to find a solution to 
this, there is a danger that it may help to limit flexibility and increase costs. This can be 
another obstacle to development and innovation in the sector. The foregoing discussion 
suggests that it is indeed the overarching requirements that hinder to ensure proper 
emergency preparedness. (Engen et al., 2013) presents in Figure 5 in this Section 2.4.4 a 
model of two approaches types of risk management and the interface between them. Based on 
the requirements imposed for personnel and emergency, it is clear that there is currently 
substantial preponderance of self-regulation, i.e. type II approach to risk management. 
Government regulatory provisions are little clear and give room for maneuver, which is then 
is left to the industry, and this makes it difficult to act in accordance with regulatory 
provisions. 
 
Sinclear (1997) believes a predominance of one or the other type of risk regulation is 
unfortunate, and thinks one must aim to combine the two different regulatory strategies; 
command and control, and self-regulation. A successful control objective is achieved 
according Sinclear (1997 ) when one manages to combine a top down approach, and a bottom 
up approach, as illustrated in Figure 5 in this Section 2.4.4 ( Engen et al. , 2013) . To achieve 
an optimal control strategy must therefore have clear requirements set by the authorities, 
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combined with self-regulation and functional requirements with reference to a norm for «best 
practice», where the industry gets freedom with responsibility 
 
This can provide a win - win situation for both industry and government. The industry will 
increase its credibility in the community and for the individual worker. The industry will also 
easier to be able to ensure that their practices are in compliance with regulatory requirements. 
The authorities on the other side will be better able to assess whether the industry complies 
with regulatory requirement, because it will be clear which legal rule or standard operations 
are assets against. This will also provide greater transparency and verifiability in supervisory 
practice, which could mean increased credibility to their supervisory practice (Haugland , 
2012) . 
 
 6.7 The industry norm 
 
What level one chooses to add the norm for, "good practice" also determines which actors are 
drawn into the regulatory process. If you want to add the norm on a legally binding level as 
level 1 or 2, the process can be both resource - and time consuming and central authorities 
must be engaged. We must create a political consensus and the final bill must go through 
several stages before it will be established as a binding requirement (Engen et al., 2013). 
Adding norm at level 3, meaning that it developed as an industry standard being applied and 
referred to the guidelines to the regulations. Here the key players must be engaged, also 
expertise from the industry and others who is involved.  Ptil must also be included in this 
work. Adding standard at company level, level 4, as an industry norm can present challenges. 
It will then emerge as a company internal document, and will have difficulty in reaching out 
to the entire industry. Such internal company document is often laid on top of existing 
documents and procedures and thus stands a risk of it being unwieldy and impractical 
(Myhrvold, 2015). To the extent that there is a "best practices" today, you will find it on this 
level. 
 
This requirement in the oil and gas sector is complex and perfected in line with new 
knowledge. Thus speaks this that one should pronounce the norm at level three. A standing 
here freer to update and change the standard in line with developments, but it demands a 
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common agreement among the tripartite and between the communities in order to make any 
changes (ibid.)  
The norm will not be considered legally binding, but it will have a major impact, and will for 
the industry seen as a legally binding requirement by virtue of § 24 of the Framework 
Regulations (2011), which affirmed that the players who use norms recommended in the 
guidelines to a provision of the regulations, will comply with regulatory requirements. If 
companies choose not to use the recommended standards, they must defend their chosen 
solutions at least as good. In this way, a standard at this level as equally binding as, law and 
regulations. The authorities must also be involved if we are to add standard at this level. This 
can create arenas for cooperation; provide a basis for the development of a functional 
confidence in the authorities and the industry. Thus, ensure an optimal approach to the 
preparedness In the Barents Sea (Haugland, 2012). The government's role will also be clearer 
because one gets a clearer state control of the preparedness and while getting the industry an 
individual responsibility to safeguard the "best practices" that have been established. Thus, it 
is conceivable that a better balance between prescriptive regulation and self-regulation as 
illustrated in figure 5 in this section 2.4.4 Engen, et al. (2013) and will be a step closer to an 
optimal control approach for risk management for the preparedness in the Barents Sea 
(Sinclear, 1997). 
6.7 Recommended measures from the new area 
 
The new area in BSSE and BSSW in the Barents Sea is often characterized as being harsher 
compare to other locations in Norwegian Continental shelf.  In this section, I will discuss the 
findings /cases from the selected area, and present and discuss them, as I describe earlier on in 
this thesis this is a new area we want to investigate. 
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Figure 45. Map of licenses in the Barents Sea and areas. 
 
Regulations and standards on the Norwegian shelf provide mostly functional requirements. As 
discussed earlier in this thesis when interview people regarding a gap analyze in relation to 
these functional requirements, something arise when we need further technological or 
operational measures to fulfill the expectation of a functional requirement. The gap have been 
identified common to zone A and B (ref figure 45) but the range A because it is further from 
shore it will be slightly larger for this area when it comes to escape time for example. But the 
requirement for winterization will be the same for both areas. Because of the distance to land 
resources must be on the field, such as stand by vessels, and they need to play a more 
prominent role than is usual in other areas on the Norwegian shelf. 
 
We can discuss if most of the requirements of the current legislation for preparedness are 
assessed and can be met through established equipment plans and procedures. But bases on 
this info it have been identified different DSHAs (DSHA list, descriptions/scope of each 
individual DSHA) where it is recommended to go further to ensure that requirements and best 
practices should be satisfied. Based on these findings, there is provided a recommendation to 
introduce three new performance requirements that will address the challenges: 
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 Personnel shall be picked up from the lifeboat within 24 hours after this is put out. 
 It must be possible save people from the sea within 8 minutes after personnel at sea 
are detected. 
 If the helicopter has had to make an emergency landing outside the rig's safety zone 
(500 m) , persons in the sea must rescued as soon as possible and no later than four 
hours after the accident- 
 
As discussed under the interview with the informants we discussed the risk of sea ice is low 
for this area , and the risk of icebergs is also very low .Nevertheless, this risk have to be taken 
into account and it recommended the establishment of a system for monitoring and handling 
of sea ice and icebergs. 
 
A prerequisite for preparedness recommendations are that the helicopter base will be 
established on land. This because: 
• Today's helicopter can with some modifications, flights to and from Area A (se figure 45) 
• An establishment of a landing point midway between the land and the rig is not very 
appropriate since this will not increase the operational capability in an accident situation. 
Such a landing point will instead introduce a new additional risk through landing and takeoff 
on a mobile device. 
• Helicopter bases should be located on land appropriately for the various operation areas. 
 
In relation to the proposed changes, it is also identified specific measures to ensure 
emergency preparedness (EER) during an operation, at the desirable level. This includes 
proposals for equipment, personnel training and restrictions on where and when operations 
can be carried aboard the rig under certain relationship. 
Bases on the work carried out we can concludes that winter operations are possible in this 
area from a emergency preparedness , but requires the operators to conducted the necessary 
adjustment  to winterize the equipment and establishes the necessary operational procedures. 
Operations during the summer season will however have less operational challenges less need 
for winterization and higher regularity. 
 
For the Hopen area and the Barents Sea southwest area, the conditions are different from the 
Barents Sea southeast area. This is: 
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 There is a lower probability of sea ice and icebergs 
 Greater availability of equipment (EER) and other infrastructure for contingency 
purposes 
 Based on weather data from Bjørnøya it’s  greater challenges associate with fog 
 
Therefore, the reference group gives the Barents Sea southwest area a few recommendations 
for operational measures beyond those provided for Barents Sea southeast area. This applies 
in particular for recommendation to increase the meteorological monitoring of fog. 
Such a move would strengthen weather forecasting for the area as such. Otherwise all the 
proposed change requirements for the Barents Sea southeast also apply to areas in southwest 
in similar distance from shore in a similar condition 
 
A gap assessment that was carried out to identified site specific challenges were assessed 
compliance with performance requirements from regulations and standards. Areas where there 
is considered to be a gap between the required performance and the available level of 
performance were identified. In addition, the challenges for which there were not established 
any performance requirements covering the site specific challenges, or where performance 
requirements are inadequate or not specific, were identified. The assessment included gaps 
towards the following standards and requirements: 
 
• Ptil Activities and Facilities regulations  
• NOROG Guideline 064 Recommended guidelines for area emergency preparedness  
• NOROG Guideline 016 Medical emergency  
• NOROG Guideline 096 Man overboard emergency  
• ISO 19906 Arctic Offshore (to the extent that this is applicable to mobile offshore units)  
• Internal requirements for some of the Basec companies; GDF Suez, OMV and Statoil  
 
Note that the gap assessment that was performed perform by BaSEC on an informative basis, 
as some of the standards above was not mandatory for the drilling operations in Barents West 
/ East area. The regulations and standards mostly give functional requirements. Hence, gaps 
were considered to arise where site specific challenges require additional technological or 
operational measures to fulfill the expectations in the defined performance requirements. 
Wherever possible, quantification of the efficiency of the emergency response, in terms of 
response time and capacity, has been used in the gap assessment.  
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All year operation in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea is possible when appropriate 
risk analysis and risk reduction measures are put in place. 
6.8 Findings DSHA in the new area 
 
For the 23 license round in the Barents Sea South east area and locations around the Barents 
south west area, 23 DSHAs were identified. For each DSHA a detailed description was given 
together with specific challenges related to future exploration drilling in the areas. The 
descriptions and challenges are found in Appendix B of in this thesis; review of the DSHAs 
and challenges has been made in this study to obtain the list of DSHAs and challenges being 
specific for the Hopen area location. This work concluded that all DSHAs are relevant for 
Hopen area, and that there are slightly different challenges due to site-specific factors. 
 
The main differences between locations Barents East and West are summarized in the table in 
Appendix B in this thesis  
 
Differences in weather conditions and infrastructural factors may require a different approach 
to emergency preparedness and risk reducing measures during planning and execution. 
 
Extreme weather situations are covered in each DSHA. Extreme weather can be a factor that 
reduces the possibility to meet defined performance requirements, and the focused on how to 
mitigate or compensate this (low temperature, visibility, extreme icing, polar lows/rapidly 
increasing wind and reduced visibility) with additional measures. If extreme weather 
situations are not handled properly they can develop into an emergency situation and a 
DSHA. For each operation it should be considered if there is a need to treat extreme weather 
situations as a defined emergency situation, and to specify the actual weather condition that 
requires an emergency response. Loss of power/blackout on the installation is also considered 
as a challenge that can lead to a DSHA (e.g. loss of position if thruster power is lost due to 
blackout), in addition to loss of winterization. Such events are included in the DSHAs. 
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7.0 Conclusions 
 
In this thesis, I have put forward and discussed data based on interviews with representatives 
of companies, organizations and authorities involved in the Norwegian HSE regime. The 
interviews show an important feature an entire industry, small and large businesses, employer 
and employee, department and supervision, all agree and said they were generally pleased 
with the Norwegian HSE regime. 
 
This can confirm that the Norwegian HSE regime, with function based regulations provide 
players in the petroleum industry a significantly larger scope than a detailed and prescriptive 
regulations work well and by its intension. By this, I mean that businesses, workers and 
supervision have greater autonomy to even decide how they will deal with the HSE field 
compared with the action possibilities that a prescriptive legislation could provide 
 
The Norwegian HSE regime has proven to be robust over time, also when facing significant 
technological and structural changes. It is generally a well functioning and should be 
continued. It is therefore important to consider the whole context and dependency in the 
regime if one wants to make changes. Tripartite is an important pillar and this must be 
maintained. 
 
There is a need for clearer prioritization and use of instruments. One should continue its 
supervision strategy risk and purposes based and with regulations that mainly function 
oriented, and linked up with industry standards. Consideration should be given to introducing 
a practice of explicitly comparing costs relative to expected usefulness of introducing new 
regulations and decisions. 
 
Despite the fact that the function based regulations shall provide for flexibility and custom 
solutions, some of the requirements is developed because of different conditions and 
assumptions, than one sees in the Barents Sea. To achieve a good level of safety for the 
emergency preperness, it is critical that the industry and regulatory authorities are able to take 
into over themselves this dynamic and adapts to the changes we now face when regime then 
reallocated to new areas. The requirements for skills and equipment are rooted in legal 
standards on professional responsibility, but it referred not to yardsticks indicating what the 
government actually expect the acceptability requirements. 
141 
 
As earlier discussed what is the conclusion with the remoteness is identified as a key 
challenge for both area A and B se figure 45, but where area A is significantly longer from 
shore and infrastructure than area B. Remoteness creates significant challenges with respect to 
ensuring a robust level of emergency response. This is particularly related to external rescue 
resources such as Search and Rescue helicopters, which will have longer response times. 
Relatively long periods of reduced visibility due to fog may lower the possibility for the 
helicopter to land on the rig. It has been a basic assumption and recommendation that a 
helicopter base will be established onshore, to reduce the helicopter flight distance as much as 
practically possible. Another important compensating measure is that the field-dedicated 
resources, in particular the Stand by Vessel, will need to be given a more extensive role in 
rescue operations and serving as an integral part of the area emergency preparedness. This 
includes precautionary down manning, Medevac and first aid, rescue after helicopter 
accidents in the sea and also rescue from life boats or sea after an emergency evacuation from 
the rig. For both areas operations during the summer season are less challenging than winter 
season operations. Winter season operations will require adequate winterization of a drilling 
rig and field dedicated vessels. In addition winter season operations may experience more 
operational limitations and possibly increased down time due to harsh polar weather (heavy 
snow fall, polar lows, troughs3,) and low temperatures. In the winter season marine icing 
conditions may occur in both areas. This represents additional operational 
Challenges and potentially also negative impact on safety critical systems, like lifeboats and 
launching systems. Marine icing is more critical for ships than for the drilling rig. 
 
The main conclusions difference to work and operating in the Barents SW area as PL720 and 
Barents Sea SE area as A and B se figure 45 is as follows: 
 
The main difference regarding met ocean and ice conditions as summarized below: 
 
• Higher air/water temperatures 
• Higher waves 
• Higher wind speeds 
• More fog 
• Less icing, sea ice and ice bergs 
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The main differences regarding challenges and emergency preparedness may be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• Better access to resources/aids: Somewhat improved access to resources due to 
proximity to permanent installations as Goliat and possible future activities at 
Johan Castberg, Gotha, and Wisting. Bear Island can also be considered as 
temporarily base for evacuees in emergencies. SAR base at Longyearbyen will 
also improve the situation, but will not be included in the dimensioning of the 
emergency response resources. 
• Hypothermia: Somewhat higher air/water temperature (on average 2-3 degrees 
higher) will cause less convective heat loss from water, but considering other risk 
factors; wind, waves, human conditional factors (age, body fat, fitness), Such a 
marginal temperature difference is not likely to increase time to suffer from 
hypothermia substantially. 
 
• Fog challenges related to searching for missing persons: Depends mainly on 
occurrence of fog, and heavy snow showers and polar lows (visibility/wind). Fog 
probability is higher around Bear Island than in areas A/B 
 
• Availability of onshore hospitals: In addition to Hammerfest there are hospital 
capacities at UNN in Tromsø and in Longyearbyen which may support operations 
at PL720 
 
• Almost same mobilization and transportation times for receiving back up of 
relevant equipment from shore due to almost same distance(s) to shore as for area 
B. 
 
• Unavailability of AWSAR due to flight conditions: Fog probability is higher 
around Bear Island than in areas A/B and hence higher unavailability. 
 
• Operational limits of MOB/FRDC: Higher waves (Hs) may lead to lower 
availability of rescue vessels (more often beyond operational limits) 
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• Low air/sea temperatures will expose the FRDC/MOB crew during the operation 
to rescue personnel from sea: Somewhat higher water/air temperature in the area 
PL720 compared to areas A and B may increase time marginally before critical 
cold effects on crew and personnel in sea suffering from hypothermia 
In this thesis it was also assessed if any other onshore facilities and relevant places can be 
used as rescue resources then it comes to escape, evacuation and rescue when operating in 
Barents Sea West as i.e. PL 720 the main conclusions are: 
 
• Hopen is not relevant as emergency response hub due to too long distance from 
other infrastructure and drilling locations. 
• Bear Island has some infrastructure today. Bear Island can be used as temporary 
accommodation after a dry evacuation, (using helicopters) and as base for 
temporary accommodation of people after a precautionary down manning. In 
addition Bear Island can also be used to shelter against wind and waves for life 
boats that are escorted by a stand by vessel. This can facilitate transfer of 
personnel to the stand by vessel. Bear Island is a natural reserve (except from the 
Station area), and hence a natural reserve cannot be used as a main base for utility 
support or pre location of equipment for petroleum activities. This apply for the 
current plans and regulations regarding Bear Island. 
 
• SAR helicopter stationed at Longyearbyen may go to Bear Island, refuel, and then 
go to e.g. PL720 or other locations in the area, and back either to Longyearbyen or 
to Hammerfest. Goliat platform has one dedicated standby vessels and a supply 
vessel with multi functionality including SBV role, at its disposal. In an emergency 
situation Goliat may release one of its vessels for support at PL720. In this 
situation, the vessel in Hammerfest will be mobilized to Goliat to maintain area 
preparedness and other activities on board. Installing equipment for helicopter re-
fueling on Goliat will also increase the operational time for SAR helicopters at the 
location. In addition, the extra availability of fuel combined with the rig’s 
proximity to PL720 location will also make the helicopter flights to PL720 more 
efficient. 
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• The Coast Guard may act as on scene coordinator, provide support with Sea King 
and SAR helicopter, re-fuelling of national SAR/Sea King. This is also relevant for 
area A and B, but the Coast Guard is more likely to be operating around Bear 
Island and Svalbard. 
 
• The Orion aircraft stationed on Andøya may give assistance in Escape, Evacuation 
and Rescue (EER) operations 
 
As has been discussed in this thesis, the challenges at in the Barents Sea are not entirely new 
they have been encountered elsewhere in the past. However, the combination of factors such 
as sea ice, waves, wind, precipitation, icing, polar lows, visibility, light conditions and 
remoteness probably makes Barents Sea West the most challenging development on the NCS 
so far. The remoteness in combination with the environmental factors will create significant 
challenges for logistics, operational availability HSE and emergency response. 
7.0 Recommendations for further studies 
 
The goal is to follow Ptil that is the security in the Barents Sea should be at least as good as in 
the NCS. Without concrete measures, this study shows that safety will not be as good as in the 
other place in the NCS in some area. The framework conditions have changed and the 
foundation behind the functioning regulatory system is about to crumble, as a result of lack of 
standards. To remedy the changed regulatory framework and to ensure proper professional 
preparedness in The Barents Sea it must establish a good dialogue, good cooperation and with 
all actors involved must recognize the problem and take responsibility. The Basec and Barents 
2020 is the first step in this direction. 
 
I will also suggest a further study to describe possible new operational concepts for Barents 
Sea West. The remoteness and lack of infrastructure makes remote sensing and the use of new 
technology such as AUVs even more important to detect and monitor oil spills, sea ice, 
icebergs and so on. I suggest a further study to describe how these tools can be applied to 
counter the operational challenges for an installation at North of Barents Sea West.   
 
It should be carried out an overall assessment of needs for the oil and gas industry where one 
considers the all the question over so that it is possible to conclude whether / when the 
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industry will eventually need satellite capacity in the northern areas (outside the current 
coverage area). Telenor Satellite Broadcasting and Space Norway have shared a project to 
conclude whether there is a basis for the parties to invest in a HEO satellite system for the 
Arctic. Input from and binding agreements with various industries and governments will be 
required for such a system to be realized. It is in this context important to have the best 
possible knowledge of the future needs of oil and gas activities in the Arctic. 
 
In addition, to be considering investigating, will a new preparedness regime required new way 
of EER (emergency, evacuation and rescue). Would it be preferable with  a new additional 
requirements to be better defined need for remote EER capability?, i.e. preparedness must be 
in place relative to factors such as distance, existing infrastructure, time to mobilize and 
storage of equipment. The combination of distance from permanent services and the at times 
challenging weather conditions, will this elevates both operational and safety risk?  
 
Should new field development concepts be accompanied with appropriate rescue methods, 
e.g. evacuation methods for tunneled field development? 
 
The Barents RN04 Phase report 4 was developed in order to provide guidance to operators on 
issues related to EER for the Barents Sea. This report contains important issues that need full 
consideration when performing activities in the cold climate conditions in the Barents Sea.  
Can that document together with the other documents be used as the basis for the a 
development of a new Performance Standards and Project Specific Technical Specifications 
(PSTS) covering new EER Performance Requirements and Equipment Specifications?. In its 
current form and content, maybe this document could contain enough necessary information 
to create specifications for and perform design of EER equipment. ? 
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Appendix A  
Terms and definition in NORSOK Z-013 
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Appendix B 
 
Main differences Barents Sea West compared to South East area 
 
 
#  DSHA name Differences 
0 General DSHA Limited access to resources/aids: 
• Better access to resources/aids due to 
proximity to permanent installations as 
Goliat and possible future activities at Johan 
Castberg, Gotha, and Wisting. Especially if 
shore base is possible at Bear Island. SAR 
base at LYR will also improve situation 
Hypothermia: 
• Somewhat higher air/water temperature 
(on average 2-3 deg higher) will cause less 
convective heat loss from water, but 
considering other risk factors; wind, waves, 
human conditional factors (age, body fat, 
fitness). Such a marginal temperature 
difference is not likely to increase time to 
suffer from hypothermia substantially 
Search for missing persons: 
• Depends mainly on occurrence of fog, and 
heavy snow showers and polar lows 
(visibility/wind). Fog probability is higher 
around Bear Island than in areas A/B 
Availability of onshore hospitals: 
• In addition to Hammerfest there are 
hospital capacities at UNN (Tromsø) and 
Longyearbyen. Kirkenes not relevant for 
operations at PL720 
1 Shallow gas blowout • Unknown reservoirs also at PL720, but to a 
lesser extent since more wells have been 
156 
drilled in the area 
• Probability of experiencing scenarios where 
well needs to be abandoned during ice 
season, is considered lower than for A/B 
due to shorter ice season. However, this 
will not impact the planning of the 
emergency preparedness 
2 Well kick As for DSHA 1 
3 Subsea blowout As for DSHA 1 
4 Topside blowout and uncontrolled 
releases of 
hydrocarbons 
As for DSHA 1 
5 HC release in well test area None 
6 Toxic gas release Unknown reservoirs also at PL720, but to a 
lesser extent since more wells have been 
drilled in the area  
• Almost same mobilization and 
transportation times for receiving back up 
of relevant equipment from shore due to 
almost same distance(s) to shore. However, 
significantly shorter time if future base at 
Bear Island 
7 Fire in accommodation None 
8 Fire/explosion in the machinery 
spaces/fire in utility 
areas 
None 
9 Helicopter accident on installation 
(at helideck area) 
Fire water/foam may freeze when flushed onto 
the 
helideck in low temperatures 
• Somewhat higher minimum temperatures 
at PL720 compared to areas A/B 
10a Helicopter accident into the sea 
within safety zone 
Operational limits of MOB/FRDC: Higher 
waves (Hs) may lead to lower availability of 
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vessels (more often beyond operational 
limits). This will also put restrictions on 
transport helicopter flights when MOB/FRDC 
cannot be launched. 
• Low air/sea temperatures will expose the 
FRDC/MOB crew during the operation to 
rescue personnel from sea: Somewhat 
higher water/air temperature may increase 
time marginally before suffering from 
hypothermia (see above) 
• Rescue from sea within 120 mins: same 
situation as for A/B due to long flight times 
from onshore bases (except from Bear 
Island) 
10b Helicopter accident into the sea “en 
route” 
Helicopter base for PL720 operations will be 
Hammerfest 
11a Ship and other objects on collision 
course 
Higher fishing activity around PL720 than 
for A/B. However, this does not impact the 
planning of the emergency preparedness 
11b Sea ice and ice berg threats Shorter ice season 
• Lower probability of ice/icebergs 
12 Structural failure None 
13 Loss of position Lower probability of ice/icebergs causes 
lower probability of loss of / damage to 
mooring/anchors 
14 Loss of stability 14 Loss of stability • As for DSHA 13 
15 Loss of control in transit N/A 
16 Evacuation and rescue Flight and sailing times in the same order of 
magnitude as to area B (except from Bear 
Island) 
• Positive effect of SAR base at LYR even 
though 278 nm from PL720. 
• Fog probability is higher around Bear Island 
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than in areas A/B and hence possibility for 
helicopter to land on the rig may be 
reduced 
• The reduced availability of the AWSAR 
helicopters (unless base at Bear Island) will 
make the overall evacuation and rescue 
concept more dependent on the resources 
present on the field; SBV, basket and 
means for wet evacuation: More fog, wind 
and waves at PL720 affect SBV operational 
capabilities, though marginally 
• There are weather limitations for using MOB 
boats, FRDC and AWSAR. Weather 
conditions may marginally reduce the 
availability of these resources for rescuing 
personnel from lifeboats 
• For personnel ending up in the sea after an 
evacuation, drowning and hypothermia was 
identified as the main challenges. 
Hypothermia can occur due to late rescue 
of personnel if helicopter and MOB/FRDC is 
unavailable: Hypothermia: See above 
17 Occupational accidents/acute 
illness 
Almost same transport distances to 
hospital, but a possible emergency hospital 
facilities at Bear Island will improve the 
situation 
18 Man overboard situations None 
19 Fire/explosion in mud treatment 
areas 
None 
20 Security threats None 
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Appendix C  
Interview with informants 
 
 Kan du gi en kort presentasjon av deg seg? (Bakgrunn, arbeidsoppgaver i bedriften, tidligere 
erfaringer, etc.) 
 
 Vil det være noen utfordringer du ser på som større enn andre i Barnets 
 Havet? 
 
 Hvilke utfordringer ser dere i utvikling av beredskapssystemer tilpasset for 
 Arktiske operasjoner 
 
 Vil disse beredskapssystemene møte nye utfordringer når petroleumsaktiviteten flyttes stadig 
lengre nord? 
 
 Hvilke områder må dere omstille dere på/endre for å møte de utfordringene som er i 
Barentshavet kontra lengre sør? 
 
 Har dere bruk norsk planverk standarder og bransje anbefalinger for å operere i Barentshavet 
? Hvilke, Vis Ja…..Hvis nei Hvorfor ikke 
 
 Hvem bruker dere som ressurs for å sikre dere EER, områdeberedskap,etc ? 
 
 Hvilke forholdsregler bør en ta i forhold til at en ikke kan kalkulere med å få helikopter ? 
 
 Hvordan er Petroleumsregleverket, hvordan jobber de?, hva er bra?, Hva fungerer ikke så bra 
? 
 
 Hva har det å si for dere at det brukes et funksjonsbasert regelverk i Barentshavet? Beskriv , 
tolking,  
 
 Er det god kompetanse i selskapet for å tolke regverket riktig 
 
 Hvilke utfordringer gir dette regelverket i dag 
 
 Hvordan synes du tilsyns myndigheten etterlever regelverket ? 
 
 Beskriv det Norske HMS regimet hva er bra ? hva er ikke så bra, etc 
 
 Hva er de største utfordringer i dag med hensyn for å operere i Barentshavet? 
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 Hva ønsker du mere av for å operere sikkert i Barentshavet i dag? 
 
 Har du noe annet og tilføye utover dette som vi har pratet om, hvem bør jeg kontakte videre 
synes du? 
 
